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The U.S. Pacific Command 
Humanitarian Demining Program 
Under the direction of the U.S. Pacific Command, SOCPAC guides the deploy-
ment of Special Operations Forces to mine-affected countries throughout Asia 
and the Pacific to teach clearance and develop indigenous capabilities. 
By Joe Lokey, MAIC 
T he focal point for U.S. military assistance in humanitarian demining efforts in Asia and 
the Pacific Rim is a small, two-person 
office in an obscure wing of an old 
building on Camp H.M. Smith in 
Hawaii. It is from this office that two 
members of the Special Operations 
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) plan 
and coordinate humanitarian 
demining training and equipment 
donations to Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. 
SOCPAC is a sub-unified 
command under the direction of the 
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
and is responsible for activities 
covering two-thirds of the Earth's 
surface and 15 time zones. The 
training teams come from Special 
Forces units both within the Pacific benefits their combat skills and 
theater and from units based on the 
West Coast of the United States. EOD 
personnel from other military units in 
the Pacific also augment the reams. 
Once they enter a country for a 
training mission, they are under the 
operational control of SOCPAC, 
which coordinates their activities with 
rhe host nation's U.S. embassy and 
their home units. They are the ideal 
capability tO use in this important 
initiative because of the unique skills 
they develop under Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) training. 
The Role of Special Forces 
Although the humanitarian 
demining mission is a collateral 
training mission for the Special Forces 
teams, it directly and substantially 
• 2 • 
requirements in areas of Foreign 
Internal Defense (FlO) and 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) . These 
unique capabilities and mission casks 
led Special Forces ro be chosen to lead 
the U.S. effort ro provide this kind of 
training and assistance ro other 
nations. Not only do benefits accrue 
to those being trained, but U.S. 
soldiers also receive a substantial 
training benefit that increases their 
effectiveness. 
In this peacetime mission, as in 
its wartime task, the role of Special 
Forces focuses on using mission related 
skills (FIO/UW) tO establish and train 
a host nation organization. This occurs 
at both the headquarters and 
subordinate level, in a range of basic 
to advanced skills such as 
communications, field and trauma 
medicine, small unit leadership, and 
logis t ics support skills . Support 
training is also provided in demining 
mission planning, as well as demining 
and mine awareness teaching 
techniques. This is all done with full 
cognizance of the U.S. law that 
prohibits U.S. forces from entering an 
active mine field. 
In the execution of these 
missions, the benefits to the U.S. 
military of deploying Special Forces 
teams are clearly obvious. These 
deployments benefit the troops in that 
they provide: training opporrunities tO 
practice mission skills; experience and 
familiarity with the cultures in these 
countries; an opportunity tO improve 
already substantial language skills; and 
the ability to enhance the coordination 
and integration of the host nation and 
NGOs' involvement in their activities. 
These unique SOF skills and the 
troops' considerable coalition building 
assets make the use of conventional 
forces in chis role less effective. 
The U.S Goal 
The foundation for the U.S. 
humanitarian demining training effort 
in the Pacific, and all areas around the 
globe, is the focus on eventual self-
sufficiency and the use of the "train-
the-trainer" concept. This ensures that 
the host nation is fully capable of 
creating and sustaining their own 
demining teams and the support 
infrastructure, sooner rather chan later. 
It is through this philosophy in the 
Pacific and elsewhere that the United 
States encourages host nation 
ownership and understanding of their 
own experiences and gained 
knowledge. This is truly a way ro 
ensure that, once fully engaged, a solid 
foundation is provided for developing 
local solutions to local problems. 
By integrating NGO efforts inro 
this concept and encouraging the 
pursuit of donor support funding, a 
long-term solution tO a country's 
landmine and UXO problem can be 
easily developed and initiated. 
SOCPAC 
The SOCPAC role in humani-
tarian demining, like other U.S. 
military involvement, operates to 
enhance the regional U.S. military 
posture in the Pacific, contribute to 
peace and stability in conflict prone 
regions, have a positive impact on 
critical humanitarian situations 
around the Pacific Rim, and foster self-
sufficiency and interoperability. 
The goals of SOCPAC: 
• Relieve suffering from the adverse 
effects of landmines while 
promoting U.S. interests. 
• Alleviate the threat of landmines 
to the innocent. 
• Establish sustainable indigenous 
demining programs. 
• Encourage international coopera-
tion and participation. 
• Support the Pacific Commander-
• 3 • 
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in-Chief's (CINC) regional 
strategy for national and regional 
security. 
• Improve the readiness and quality 
of training for the U.S. military 
involvement. 
The U.S. military is specifically 
funded for this mission through the 
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and 
Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation 
provided yearly by Congress. It 
provides the transportation, sustain-
ment and equipment needs of the 
units conducting the training, and a 
limited initial equipment provision 
that is donated tO the units being 
trained at the conclusion of training. 
These missions are coordinated with 
the U.S. Department of State, which 
provides more equipment and long-
term capabilities to aid nations 
through the Nonproliferation, 
Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 
Activities (NADR) appropriation. 
It is the teamwork and coordi-
nation among the agencies working to 
support a nation, in close cooperation 
with the U.S. embassy in that nation, 
that makes the U.S. humanitarian 
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demining program so effective. 
Throughout the Pacific, SOCPAC is 
recognized as the executive agent for 
humanitarian demining assistance and 
will coordinate all U.S . assistance to 
the following countries that have 
entered into a formal agreement with 
the U.S. government: 
Current Programs 
CAMBODIA 
T he U.S. assistance and training 
program began in June 1994 with an 
assessment visit that set the foundation 
for mine clearance training and mine 
awareness training. This was followed 
by the deployment of a 27 -man team 
in September of that year. There were 
three separate deployments of similar 
size and duration every year for the 
next few years until the summer of 
1997 when operations were suspended 
because of the political situation in 
Cambodia. An assessment team from 
the U.S. Department of Defense 
visited Cambodia in February 2001 to 
review the situation and determine if 
U.S. assistance could be re-engaged. 
As a result, the United States is 
planning to provide additional 
training and support to CMAC in the 
areas of medical training, munitions 
storage and handling, and vehicle 
• U.S. so ldiers 
perform a 
medical skills 
training drill for 




maintenance through 2003. This 
follow-on training has begun with the 
arrival of a medical training team. 
Approximately 50 to 90 people 
continue to be killed or injured by 
landmines each month in Cambodia. 
Current "official estimates" place the 
number of mines at approximately 4 
million-6 million spread throughout 
some 3,600 mined areas identified to 
date. These areas are estimated to cover 
about 2,900 sq. km. The Cambodian 
Mine Action Center (CMAC), an all 
civilian insitution, believes that the full 
extent of the mine problem in 
Cambodia is not accurately known. 
Mine contamination is spread 
throughout the country with heavier 
concentrations in the northwestern 
provinces. UXO contamination 
appears to be moderate to high and 
comprises mostly unsophisticated 
munitions spread throughout the 
country with possibly higher 
concentrations in the central, southern 
and eastern provinces. 
In spite of the heavy focus on 
Cambodia by the international 
community, it is likely that mine 
action operations will need to 
continue at the current level by 
CMAC for at least the next 5-1 0 years. 
Beyond that, it is likely that a reduced 
capability will be needed to deal with 
smaller or lower priority clearance 
• 4. 
tasks and numerous individual mine/ 
UXO reports- perhaps as long 50 
years. 
The military engineers of the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
(RCAF) have been involved in 
"demining" (and bomb disposal) since 
approximately 1994. Their contri-
bution to the reduction in the mine/ 
UXO threat has been quite substantial: 
according to RCAF data, their troops 
have cleared approximately 26 million 
sq. m (26 sq. km) and destroyed some 
88,000 mines, 46,000 booby traps and 
19,000 UXO. Given the magnitude 
of the mine/UXO problem in 
Cambodia and RCAF's contributions 
to date, there is a strong argument to 
continue their involvement in mine 
and UXO clearance. 
Though the use of national 
military forces for demining purposes 
is not unusual, their involvement in 
human itarian and/or external ly 
funded mine action activities is 
presently contentious or an unpopular 
option for some donors. As a 
consequence of these sensitivities, the 
Uni ted Nations developed the 
"United Nations Mine Action And 
The Use Of The Militaries" policy. 
This policy, which provides clear 
guidelines on this issue, was approved 
by the Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group on Mine Action on 25 January 
1999. For other reasons, the U.S. 
assistance through both NADR 
funding and SOCPAC will not be 
through the RCAF, nor will training 
activities engage RCAF members. 
CMAC will remain the so le 
governmental recipient of U.S. 
assistance in the foreseeable future. 
LAOS 
The UXO and mine contami-
nation in Laos led to a request for U.S. 
assistance in early 1995. An assessment 
team conducted a review of the Lao 
situation and the National Security 
Council's Interagency Working Group 
(IWG) approved U.S. assistance for a 
comprehensive Ordnance Removal 
and Community Awareness training 
program in October 1995. The 
partners in this endeavor with the U.S. 
teams were the Ministry of Social 
Welfare and U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP). 
Training of Lao humanitarian 
deminers began in 1996 with a 
clearance and awareness mission 
coordinated by SOCPAC and the 
United States. This helped to build 
and establish the original training 
center at Nam Souang. The Lao teams 
assumed responsibility for their own 
training in October 1999 after 
certification and selection of trainers. 
Over 104,000 items of ordnance have 
been cleared since the creation of 
UXO Lao and over 700 villages visited 
with comprehensive mine risk 
education messages. 
Though U.S. military technical 
assistance ended in 1999, UXO Lao 
continues to train staff at the National 
Training Center at Ban Ylai. Over 
1,000 Lao nationals have graduated 
with a variety of mine action skills. 
UXO Lao is emerging from its 
consolidation phase and is moving 
into the sustai nment phase of its 
growth as it seeks to reduce inter-
national support and become a fully 
indigenous and sustainable operation. 
In April of 2000, SOCPAC 
conducted a technical assistance visit 
to the national Training Center and 
UXO Lao National headquarters. 
Possible U.S. assistance in the future 
will focus on training aids, explosives, 
and some smal l unit leadership 
tram mg. 
Though the mine/UXO problem 
in Laos is still large in comparison to 
other countries in the region, the 
political and security situation in the 
country is stable enough for existing 
programs to make a significant 
difference in the coming years. A small 
increase in Hmong rebel activity in the 
north does not appear to have a 
landmine aspect to it and the teams 
already trained are sufficient to engage 
any further threat. 
THAILAND 
Though Thailand itself has not 
been engaged in a major military 
conflict for quite some time, the threat 
of smaller cross-border insurgencies 
and outside conflicts have resulted in 
• 5 • 
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a significant landmine problem for 
Thailand along its borders with four 
other neighbors. In 1998, a govern-
mental survey indicated that 
approximately 796 sq. km of land can 
not be utilized in these border areas, 
within which nearly 400,000 people 
reside. Of these mined areas, 532 sq. 
km are on the Thai-Cambodian 
border, 124 sq. km are on the Thai-
Lao border, 53 sq. km are on the Thai-
Myanmar border, and 87 sq. km are 
on the Thai-Malaysian border. 
The Lao border problem was 
primarily the result of the Thai Army 
conflict with the Thai Communist 
Party that starred in 1964 with both 
using landmines as a principle weapon 
in a jungle war. The hostilities 
concluded in 1989. The problem 
along the Malaysian border was the 
result of British/Malaysian military 
fighting with the Communist Party of 
Malaysia (CPM) from the early 1950s 
through 1989. The military junta's 
repression of minority groups in 
Myanmar (Burma) have also led to 
increased hostilities and defensive 
actions along that border. The greatest 
single use of APL and threat to 
civi lians exists along the Thai-
Cambodian border. This legacy 
4
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol5/iss1/1
remains from the Khmer Rouge and 
other internal insurgencies. 
From 1994-99, a total of 2,837 
landmines were cleared and destroyed 
by the Burapha Field Force in Sa Keao 
province. Enhancing existing mine 
detection dog (MDD) capacity at Pak 
Chong by acquiring, training and 
deploying 12 MDDs with handlers. 
Four MDDs with handlers are 
operational with Unit #1 and 10 
additional dogs are undergoing 
training at Pak Chong Military Dog 
Center. The Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center (ADPC), an 
international training center located 
on the campus of the Asian Institute 
ofTechnology in Bangkok, is working 
in partnership with TMAC to increase 
mine awareness in Thailand. ADPC 
hosted a National Seminar on Mine 
Action in December 1999 to 
announce the launch of ADPC's 
Landmine Awareness Program 
(chaired by HRH Princess Galiyani) 
to attendees, such as prominent 
members of the Royal Thai 
Government. As pan of the Landmine 
Awareness Program, ADPC coordi-
nates monthly mine awareness 
seminars in Sa Keao province. 
U.S. assistance began in 1999 
with help in establishing a mine action 
center in Ratchaburi and a community 
mine awareness program centered in 
Lop Buri. Several rotations of training 
assistance began in August 1999, while 
the seventh rotation of these teams 
arrived in January 2001. To date, there 
have been 300 deminers trained and a 
cadre of the selected students assuming 
instructor duties to support the live 
mine clearance operations which 
began in July 2000. It is anticipated 
that sustainment rotations will begin 
in 2002 with upgrade training and 
component course training in specific 
skills. 
VIETNAM 
Since the Vietnam War ended in 
197 5, it is estimated by the 
Vietnamese government and foreign 
experts that more than 4,000 
Vietnamese have been injured and at 
least 500 killed in accidents involving 
landmines and UXO. U.S. and U.N. 
estimates put the number of mines in 
Vietnam-a battlefield from rhe 
1940s until the 1970s-ar 3.5 million. 
The mine/UXO threat is varied 
and many of the munitions are dated 
and rusted-making many more 
sensitive and more dangerous. 
Vietnam itself produced as many as 18 
types of AP mines in the past, mostly 
as copies of U.S. or Eastern Bloc 
mines. The only type known to have 
been produced in the 1990s is the 
"apple mine "-a recycled BLU-24 
bomblet. A majority of the heavy 
landmine and UXO threat is in and 
around Quang Tri province in central 
Vietnam along the former 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between 
north and south. Other heavily mined 
areas were along rhe Sino-Vietnam 
border. While China claims to have 
cleared all of its mines from this area, 
Vietnam says that it cleared more than 
100,000 mines from the border 
between 1992-97. 
In July of 2000, an assessment 
team briefed the U.S. Interagency 
Working Group on the Vietnamese 
request for U.S. assistance. As a result, 
the IWG approved the inclusion of 
Vietnam in the U.S. program. The 
initial support package is anticipated 
to support ongoing demining efforts 
by providing equipment worth about 
$1.7 million to help mine clearance 
and mine action program manage-
ment efforts. The Vietnamese have a 
particular need for assistance with 
demining and ordnance clearance in 
shallow littoral areas, as well. The U.S. 
assistance program is still under 
formulation and will commence in the 
summer of2001. 
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Other Regional Concerns 
There are other landmine plagued 
countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim. 
At the top of most any list would be 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, 
Korea, China, India, Pakistan and 
Taiwan. Of course, there are very 
specific guide! ines to be met and 
procedures to be followed by a country 
desiring to receive U.S. humanitarian 
demining. In general, U.S. assistance 
is predicated on (1) the host nation 
submitting a formal request for 
assistance through its U.S. Embassy, 
(2) hostilities in the country having 
ceased and a workable peace 
agreement being in place, and (3) the 
landmine hazards being clearly 
present. 
Not all countries that have 
requested U.S. assistance have been 
approved. Also, the demand for the 
highly skilled Special Forces teams in 
other areas around the globe is causing 
a shortage of qualified trainers rhar 
limits the availability of these teams. 
In many cases, a periodic assessment 
and support team visit, skills upgrade, 
quality assurance review and analysis, 
or other limited assistance may be all 
that can be realistic for any given 
request. The decision to support any 
country with assistance rests with the 
Interagency Working Group (IWG) 
co-chaired by the U.S. Departments 
of State and Defense. 
Other countries in the Pacific also 
have significant mine problems but are 
either ineligible for U.S. assistance or 
have not asked for assistance. In 
Myanmar, 10 our of the 14 stares and 
divisions are mined and had some 
I ,500 landmine victims reported in 
1999 alone. In the Karen state, it is 
believed that one person is either 
injured or killed by a landmine every 
day. Information from within the 
country is unreliable and what is 
known comes from aid organizations 
working along the Myanmar-Thailand 
border. Myanmar also still manu-
factures landmines th at are used 
regularly by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) to 
fight the various armed resistance 
groups barding with the mili ta ry 
regime, including ethnic minority 
groups from the Shan, Karen and 
Karenni states in rhe east of Myanmar, 
and Chin and Arakan stares in the 
west. The two most common are 
patterned after the Chinese Type 58 
blast mine and Type 59 stake mine. 
Another key Pacific country with 
a significant landmine problem is Sri 
Lanka. By the end of 1999, a small 
U.N. demining ream in Jaffna 
supported by the Australian and 
Dutch governments had cleared about 
68,500 sq. m of mined land, destroyed 
577 APLs and unearthed 42 
unexploded devices. Clashes with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) are increasing and ovenaking 
land formerly held and controlled by 
gove rnment forces. Meanwhile, 
refugees' occupat ion of previously 
mined areas is a major humanitarian 
concern in a conflict that has killed 
65,000 people since 1983. The LTTE 
has become adept at using landmines 
in addition to weaponry that is often 
far more advanced and plentiful than 
those used by government forces, as 
evidenced by rhe their purchase of 
SA14 m issiles from Bulgaria and 60 
tons of high explosives from the 
Ukraine. The consecutive losses of II 
government camps in rhe Wanni in 
November 1999 and Elephant Pass in 
April 2000 demonstrated that this 
conflict is likely to persist for some 
ume. 
A major new development in 
June 2000 occurred with the report of 
landmines in rhe Philippines. Guerilla 
groups from the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) and the New 
People's Army have been employing 
landmines against government and 
police forces, as have the bandit groups 
from the smaller Abu Sayyaf who 
kidnapped tourists in 2000. Of major 
concern is rhar many of the radical 
groups in the Philippines and 
Indonesia may be developing 
operational ties since a raid on a major 
MILF base last July resulted in 
Indonesian passports being discovered. 
The national army appears to be fully 
capable of meeting this threat and it 
is not anticipated that the U.S. 
government will become actively 
engaged in assisting the Philippines in 
the near furure. As bilateral military 
exercises are conducted annually with 
the Philippines, this threat is 
recognized and dealt with to ensure 
proper awareness and responses are 
considered for the safety of all forces. 
Ethnic unrest and uncertainty 
must continually be watched as small 
and poorly armed, bur devoted 
insurgency groups seek to instill fear 
and respect through the use of cheap 
and easily manufactured weapons such 
as APLs and other similar improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). 
• 7. 
Police and Islamic activists with 
homemade bombs clashed 111 
Brahmanbaria, Bangladesh, on 
February 6, killing six. A landmine 
arrack in Kashmir, India, by the 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba militants killed two 
soldiers on February 7. After a 
relatively mine-free conflict in East 
Timor, Indonesia, ended, the 
government there now faces a growing 
threat from others looking to follow 
as the growing build up in West Papua 
is being watched closely. 
Finally, the Maoist insurgency has 
been growing in Nepal. In September 
2000, 14 policemen were killed when 
the headquarters in the Dolpa district 
were sieged. There were no reports of 
APLs or IEDs being used in this 
instance, bur the concern remains even 
today. 
As long as landmines and UXO 
hamper post conflict reconstruction, 
pose a significant threat to civilians 
and cause imernal shifts in refugees in 
Asia and the Pacific, there will be a 
need for training assistance and 
support that is ideally suited to the 
skills, experiences and expertise of the 
U.S. military units in the Pacific. 
When it is called upon to provide this 
assistance, SOCPAC will coordinate 
and manage irs employment and 
program content to ensure that the 
highest quality training support and 
assistance is given. The end result will 
be a sustainable program and an able 
host nation capability. • 
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• Mud from heavy 
rains can limit 
transportation and 
wash landmines 
out of mine fields 
and into the paths 
of civilians. 
c/oCMAC 
A National Mine Action Institution: 
The Cambodian Mine Action Center 
With peace and a new government in place in Cambodia, the country has turned 
its attention to the debilitating mine situation. Leading these efforts is the 
Cambodian Mine Action Center, an all-civilian national demining program. 
by leng Mouly, Chairman, 
Governing Council, CMAC 
Background 
Cambodia is a country roughly twice the size of Virginia. lt shares borders with Thailand 
to the northwest, the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic to the north, 
Vietnam to the southeast and the Gulf 
of Thailand to the southwesr. The 
country was plunged into a long 
period of war and political uncertainty 
when in March 1970 former Head of 
State Norodom Sihanouk was over-
thrown. Following a five-year struggle, 
in April1975, the communist Khmer 
Rouge regime captured Phnom Penh, 
the capital city. It ordered the 
evacuation of all cities and towns. 
Over I million displaced people died 
from summary execution or forced 
labor. In 1978, Vietnamese troops 
invaded Cambodia, inciting war. The 
Vietnamese drove the Khmer Rouge 
to the Thai border and installed a new 
regime in January 1979 that touched 
off 13 years of fighting. The "Paris 
Peace Agreement" signed in October 
1991 put an end to the confl ict, 
though the Khmer Rouge remained an 
obstacle to the security, peace and 
stability of the country until its 
downfall in 1998. 
Cambodia has only recently 
emerged from decades of conflict-
conflict that displaced millions of its 
people and destroyed much of the 
country's infrastructure. T he battles 
that ravaged most of the country have 
left Cambodia with a menacing legacy 
of modern warfare: landmines and 
UXO. These explosive devices, 
particularly AP mines, are strewn 
throughout the country. 
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Landmine casualties are a fact of 
life in Cambodia. More than 40,000 
mine victims are struggling to survive, 
many having paid the price of lost 
limbs. Many are blind. About the same 
number of victims have been killed by 
landmines. More than 2,900 square 
kilometers of the country are infested 
by landmines, which continue to kill 
and maim the innocent population. At 
present, the full extent of the mine 
problem is not accurately known. 
However, current estimates approx-
imate the landmine contamination to 
number from 4 million to 6 million 
landmines. During periods of conflict, 
the military used landmines for 
defensive purposes and civilians used 
them to protect their private property. 
The use of landmines was generally 
widespread and no records were kept, 
making the identification of mine 
fields difficult. 
In the ea rly stages of the 
Cambodian mine action program, the 
information about the quantity of 
landmines and the location of mine 
fields was obtained through interviews 
with the local population, as well as 
with former soldiers. The task of 
determining the location and number 
of landmines effecting Cambodia's 
borders and fields was an uncertain 
and daunting one for mine action 
proponents. It was in this climate of 
uncertainty that the Cambodian Mine 
Action Center (CMAC) was created 
under the auspices of the U.N. 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC). In Annex 1 of the Paris 
Peace Agreement, one of the UNTAC 
mandates called for assistance in 
clearing mines, undertaking training 
programs in mine clearance and a 
mine awareness program to help 
educate the Cambodian people. The 
mission of CMAC was to achieve an 
atmosphere in Cambodia where 
people are free of the threat of mines 
and UXO, thus allowing reconstruc-
tion and development activities to take 
place in a safe environment. In this 
respect, CMAC has defined and 
executed four main programs: mine 
awareness, mine field information, 
mine and UXO clearance and training 
in mine clearance. These programs 
were carried out according to well-
defined priorities. The highest priority 
concerned humanitarian purposes-
the resettlement of displaced persons. 
The second concerned economic 
purposes, including the expansion of 
agriculture, rehabilitation, reconstruc-
tion and development projects. 
The disintegration of the Khmer 
Rouge's political and military powers, 
and the subsequent formation of a new 
government after the general election 
in 1998, created a political stabi lity 
that aids Cambodia's continued social 
and economic development. In this 
new era of peace, the Cambodian 
• CMAC official marks a mine field. 
c!oCMAC 
A National Mine Action Institution 
national mine action program is 
becoming part of the national 
development plan. The result is a 
national mine action program that will 
grow as a function of social and 
economic aspects that are being 
assessed in the National Level One 
Survey. This survey rook place last 
year, with the generous support of 
Canada. In 200 1, Cambodia will gain 
a clearer picture of the social and 
economic impact of landmines. On 
the other hand, the planning process 
and the priorities of the mine action 
program are worked out in close 
cooperation with other stakeholders in 
development fields. Mine action in 
Cambodia is no longer an isolated 
operation. The benefits of mine action 
in the realms of casualty reduction and 
land use, as well as in socioeconomic 
impacts on vulnerable factions of the 
general population will be more 
accurately measured in the future. 
CMAC Achievement 
Since its inception, CMAC has 
been a center of joint efforts between 
the Cambodian people and the 
international community to fight 
against landmines. Thanks to many 
generous contributions, the expertise 
of the donor community and the 
regular assistance of the Royal 
Government of Cambodia, CMAC 
has become a model of a successful 
national demining program. At the 
end of 1998, CMAC employed a 
workforce of nearly 3,000 well-
qualified Cambodian deminers and 
had formed an importan t national 
landmine database- a precious 
demining asset for the country. 
Until 1999, the mine action 
program worked to reduce the rate of 
casualties. The latest report presented 
by the Cambodia Mine Incidents 
Database Project indicated a total of 
60 casualties for November 2000, 
compared with the monthly average 
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of 600 casualties in 1992. This 
reduction in casualties is the mine 
action program's top accomplishment 
as Cambodia emerges from the 
turmoil of a long armed conflict. 
Challenges and the Reform 
Process 
The rapid growth of CMAC 
caused some difficulties. In 1999, the 
organization was plagued by constanr 
mismanagement. This led CMAC to 
engage in an important reform process 
in order to regain the confidence of 
both donors and the Cambodian 
government. The strategy for reform 
cons isted of: 1. Change where 
necessary and appropriate in order tO 
increase the overall transparency, 
efficiency, effectiveness and 
productivity in humanitarian mine 
action. 2. Retention of the many 
positive elements ofCMAC that have 
been developed in the past. 3. 
Emphasis of CMAC's core values of 
safety, cost effectiveness, honesty and 
integrity, appropriate technology, and 
expertise. 
T he result of CMAC's reform 
process is a mission that is unwavering 
in its efforts to save lives and support 
development for Cambodia. However, 
• CMAC deminers 
mark a portion of 
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due to serious financial difficulties, 
CMAC is not yet able to totally 
complete the reform process. In the 
meantime, a review mission and an 
socioeconomic evaluation of CMAC 
have been commissioned and assigned 
by UNDP in order to assess the 
structural reform and the socio-
economic component of CMAC. 
UNDP believes that CMAC's service 
delivery and regulatory responsibilities 
must be separated. There is a general 
and commonly held assumption that 
the current CMAC mandate is too 
broad "to be everything to every-
body"-national planning and coordi-
nation body, major provider of mine 
and UXO clearing services, provider 
of survey and mine awareness, national 
technical training center, and research 
and development institute. As a result, 
there is a consensus of opinion that 
CMAC should focus on quality of 
work over quantity of roles. 
CMAC: Mine Action Service 
Provider and CMAA:Mine Action 
Regulator 
In September 2000, the 
Cambodian government established a 
new mine action authority called the 
Cambodian Mine Action Authority 
(CMAA). The new authority will rake 
over from CMAC rhe responsibilities 
of national planning, coordinating, 
and monitoring of mine action in 
Cambodia. 
In addition, the authority will 
undertake the following tasks: 
accreditation and licensing of mine 
action operators (principally those 
involved in mine and UXO clearance); 
advocacy work in relation to the 
elimination of landmine stockpiles, 
usage and reporting as required by 
Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention; 
development of national standards 
(including survey, clearance, EOD and 
mine awareness); maintenance of a 
national mine action database and 
dissemination of mine action 
information; and status as a focal point 
for the implementation of the national 
law. CMAA is not yet fully operational 
as its stakeho lders' roles and 
responsibilities in mine action are 
being considered. 
In the current reform process, 
CMAC is prepared to transform itself 
into a national mine action service 
provider. The center will retain its 
special status as a national institution 
with a clear mission to implement the 
four core programs: mine awareness, 
mine field information, training in 
UXO and mine clearance. 
A steering committee of donor 
representatives was first established to 
function as a review and advisory body 
for the use of trust fund resources. The 
committee convenes every six months 
to review progress reports, work plans, 
and consider new policy and 
operational recommendations. Until 
the end of 1998, the level of donor 
funding was approximately $12 
million (U.S.) per year. Given the 
current state of Cambodia's economy, 
donors are requested to maintain the 
same level of funding for five to 10 
years. It is suggested that long-term 
commitments will help long term 
• Children play perilously close to a mine field. c/o CMAC 
Conditions Conducive to 
Successful Mine Action 
From lessons learned tn 
Cambodia and other mine action 
programs, there are rwo main factors 
chat influence the establishment of a 
mine action program: donors and the 
government. Without the two, mine 
action cannot be carried out success-
fully. For more than seven years , 
donors have played a vital role in the 
development of CMAC. They are 
welcome to oversee the management 
of their contributions within CMAC. 
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planning. CMAC welcomes all 
support (financial, equipment and 
technical) from donor communities, 
NGOs or private agencies either 
through UNDP General Trust Fund, 
UNDP Earmarked Trust Fund, 
Project Management Unit (PMU), in 
kind donations, or by contractual 
arrangements. 
In 1999, CMAC received 
$8,594,491, of which $7,989,086 
came from the UNDP Trust Fund. In 
2QOO, CMAC received only 
$6,298,000. The recently reconfirmed 
and renewed commitment of donors 
to maintaining capacity building and 
financial support to CMAC is widely 
considered by all deminers as a sign of 
optimism and hope. The overall com-
mitment of about $5 million to the 
General Trust Fund for 2001 is a 
positive outreach. Unfortunately, it 
was still necessary and very painful for 
CMAC to reduce irs staff by 1,937 
people as of Nov. 13, 2000. 
The Cambodian government 
exerts great influence on the mine 
action program. CMAC needs 
government support not only in terms 
of financial contributions bur also for 
political, diplomatic and legal support. 
In 2000, CMAC received $700,000 
from irs government. At the national 
symposium on mine action in Phnom 
Penh on Sept. 16, 2000, the prime 
minister announced char the 
government's financial contribution to 
mine action for 2001 would be 
approximately $780,000. CMAC has 
also been aided in its mine action 
efforts by Their Majesties the King and 
Queen, the National Assembly, the 
Senate, the Civil Administration, the 
Royal Armed Forces, the National 
Police and the general public . 
However, since external donor funding 
will likely diminish in years to come, 
the government must be prepared to 
increase its financial contributions to 
C MAC. From CMAC to the 
Cambodian government and donors, 
the conditions most conducive to a 
successful mine action program are 
based on trust, understanding and 
transparency. 
Donor Community and Mine 
Action Funding in Cambodia 
When UNTAC withdrew from 
Cambodia in 1993, the U.N. 
Development Program (UNDP) and 
the U.N. Department for Humani-
tarian Affairs (UNDHA) jointly 
launched a project entitled "Assistance 
to Demining in Cambodia." The 
A National Mine Action Institution 
project was funded by the UNDP 
Trust Fund, which was established for 
this purpose. The initial phase of the 
projecr (Phase I) consisted of two 
major components, both executed by 
the U.N. Office for Project Service 
(UNOPS). The first component 
assured the administration of an inter-
national trust fund and provided the 
framework through which donors 
could contribute military technical 
advisors to assist CMAC in meeting 
its operational objectives. The second 
component was financed from UNDP 
core funds. It provided technical 
assistance to CMAC to allow it to run 
as an efficient and autonomous 
national organization. The initial two-
year project, running from 1994-96, 
was followed by a second two-year 
phase of support (Phase II: 1996-98) 
and by a third two-year phase of 
assistance (Phase III: 1998-2000). 
Leading up to 2000, CMAC 
received $57.06 million from the U.N. 
Trust Fund. The major donors 
included Australia ($ 1 0.49 million), 
the Netherlands ($9.36 million), 
Sweden ($8.02 million) and Japan 
($7.8 million). Other donors 
inc! uded : Belgi urn, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Holy See, Norway, 
New Zealand, South Korea, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
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the United States. In 2001, through 
an UNDP earmarked rrust fund, 
France will finance the demining of 
an archeological site. 
Australia is the biggest 
contributor to the trust fund. In May 
2000, former Australian Ambassador 
Malcolm Leader made public that 
CMAC has gone a long way to meet 
the criteria for reform as set by donors 
and that Australia wants CMAC to 
continue as an organization. He said 
Australia has faith in CMAC and 
believes it has the capacity to perform 
irs mine clearance activities. 
The current Australian 
Ambassador Louise Hand told a 
national symposium on mine action 
in September 2000, on behalf of the 
donor community, that Cambodia is 
a leader in the preparation of a vision 
that aims to move mine action in this 
country beyond an emergency or high 
capacity phase and into a longer term 
and ultimately sustainable develop-
ment phase. 
The Cambodian government has 
also contributed financially to CMAC 
through the trust fund. However, an 
agreement between UNDP and the 
government put this contribution into 
a "sub-trust fund" titled the "Royal 
Government of Cambodia's Contri-
bution to the Governing Council and 
• Cattle graze 
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CMAC." The rules and procedures 
governing this sub-trust fund are quite 
different from those of the UNDP 
Trust Fund. It is important to note 
that Cambodia is the only country in 
the world that has made a financial 
contribution to the U.N. Trust Fund 
under the custody of UNDP to 
support its own mine action. 
Aside from the trust fund, other 
contributors to CMAC included the 
European Union (EU), Germany, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, CARE/UNDP, 
NPA and some private donors. In 
April 2000, a program initiated by the 
U.N. Association-USA was intro-
duced to Cambodia. Since the 
beginning of the program, the United 
States has a lso provided in-kind 
donations to CMAC. 
Other Mine Action Operators in 
Cambodia 
NGOs have also combined efforts 
with CMAC. Halo Trust and Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) are two 
British NGOs who were actively 
involved in mine clearance since the 
start of the mine action program. NPA 
provided support for resettlement, 
rehabilitation and community 
integration. Handicap International 
(HI) provided support to landmine 
victims with disabilities, the social 
rehabilitation in provinces, and 
capacity building of disabled people 
to the Cambodian Red Cross's 
database of mine victims. Other 
NGOs included Jesuit Service 
Cambodia, Marynoll and the 
Cambodian Red Cross. Cambodia is 
grateful to all governments and NGOs 
that have aided its mine action efforts. 
However, in order to attain a state of 
zero victims and work towards the 
eradication of landmines throughout 
the country, Cambodia needs 
additional external support. 
Conclusion 
The horrid legacy of landmines 
and UXO in Cambodia will be 
apparent for years to come as casualties 
continue to mar daily life. Yet, in a 
land hindered by years of political and 
social instability under the Khmer 
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Rouge regime, the safety improve-
ments of the late-1990s and early-21" 
century are symbols of significant 
advancement. The hope for future 
improvements in the realms of mine 
clearance, safety and program manage-
ment will lie in the alliance of govern-
ment agencies and NGOs, alike. 
CMAC and various NGOs have laid 
the foundation for continued success 
and improvement. The key now will 
be the integration of the CMAA into 
demining activities and the continued 
support of donors-small feats when 
one considers how far Cambodia has 
come in the past 1 0 years. • 
Ieng Mouly is chairman of the 
Governing Council of CMAC and 
demining advisor to the Royal 
Government of Cambodia. He served 
as minister of information and 
member of the National Assembly 
from 1993 to 1998. 
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Returning Life to Field and Forest 
Returning Life to Field and Forest: 
Mine Clearance by Villagers in Cambodia 
Despite the dangers, villagers often resort to clearing mine fields, especially when 
the use of valuable agricultural lands is at stake. This practice is a common topic 
for discussion in the demining community, although it is far from being resolved. 
Introduction 
Prak Vann lives with his wife and young son at the edge of Sung One village in Samlot district, Battambang province, a former Khmer Rouge area 
in the northwest of Cambodia. Their wood and bamboo 
house sits on an 80 by 30 m plot ofland provided by autho-
rities. Assorted vegetables and fruit grow in the fertile soil. 
However, before Vann and his wife could begin to grow 
their crops or build their house, he had to clear the land of 
mines. It took him three months to clear away PMD-6 
and M-14 mines using simple farming tools, such as a hoe 
and a knife. He also cleared the mines from the land where 
his mother-in-law now lives across the road. Vann has never 
been trained in mine clearance, although he served as a 
soldier with the Khmer Rouge for over 10 years, during 
which time he was assigned to lay and clear mines. He 
learned on the job. His left leg is amputated below the 
knee from a mine injury obtained during the war. 
Vann's story is not unusual in Cambodia. Almost 30 
years of conflict and insecurity have left Cambodia with a 
legacy of landmines and UXO throughout much of the 
countryside. The heaviest concentration of mined land is 
located in the north and northwest provinces along the 
Thai-Cambodian border where most of the fighting 
occurred. The provinces of Battambang and Banteay 
Meanchey are considered to be the most severely affected. 
Since the 1993 elections in Cambodia, mine clearance 
has been undertaken by U .N. organizations, the 
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), the military 
engineers of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and 
NGOs. However, these organized demining operations in 
Cambodia have not been able to keep pace with the need 
for land (Roberrs & Williams, 1995: 144), and relatively 
large sections of the population continue to live in areas 
affected by mines and UXO. The response of these 
communities has been ro try to deal with the problem as 
best they can. One of the results of this response has been 
the occurrence of mine clearance activities by villagers 
themselves, a phenomenon that has been noted and 
documented to a limited extent since the early 1990s. 
By Ruth Bottomley, Research Coordinator, Spontaneous 
Demining Initiatives Study, Handicap International 
• Village deminer holding a PMN-2 mine that he recently cleared from 
a path while harvesting bamboo. c/o HI-Belgium/Ruth Bottomley 
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Informing the Debate 
The fact that villagers are known to be involved in 
mine clearance activities has led to considerable debate 
among mine action practitioners in Cambodia as to how 
this issue should be addressed. Some argue that since this 
type of informal demining will occur regardless of the 
opinion of professional deminers, it would be better to 
give the village deminers training and equipment in order 
to minimize risk. Others believe that such programs would 
sanction activities that would not only be a risk to the village 
deminers, bur would also be a risk to villagers who attempt 
to use the unsystematically cleared land (Roberts & 
Williams, 1995:145). 
The 1999 Landmine Monitor Report provided 
astounding figures regarding mine clearance activities by 
villagers, drawn from the CMAC database. As of August 
14, 1988, out of the total of 88,710,000 sq. m of land 
cleared by the different operators, local people were 
reported to have cleared approximately 79 percent 
(Landmine Monitor Report, 1999:402). This report was 
supplemented with figures from the Cambodian Mine 
Victim Information System, which was recording high 
casualty figures resulting from tampering with mines and 
UXO. The combined findings suggested that mine 
clearance by villagers, regardless of the initial debate, was 
continuing on a relatively large scale throughout Cambodia. 
Since the early 1990s, Handicap International (HI) 
has been concerned about the practice of mine clearance 
by villagers and has been eager to learn about the issue in 
order ro assess the viable solutions. HI stepped in to 
instigate a six-month research project to investigate the 
occurrence of mine clearance activities by vi llagers, or 
"Spontaneous Demining Initiatives." The research, which 
was conducted from July to December 2000, focused on 
the heavily mine-affected provinces in the northwest of 
Cambodia. The research aimed to assess the scope of mine 
clearance activities by villagers in Cambodia, the social and 
economic motivations that encourage the activity, the tools 
and techniques used and the quality and risk of the work. 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted by 
the research team in the provinces ofBattambang, Banteay 
Meanchey and Krong Pailin. Out of 45 villages, 94 village 
deminers were interviewed. Other key informants included 
village authorities, families of village deminers and general 
villagers. Although such small-scale, in-depth research does 
not allow for extrapolation beyond the sites surveyed, it 
does give an accurate picture of the affected area and allows 
for common trends to be drawn out of the case studies. To 
provide a complement and cross-check to the qualitative 
data collected th rough the in-depth interviews, a 
questionnaire was also devised and sent out to 12 provinces 
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with assistance from the Cambodian Red C ross data 
gatherers. 
No easy or straightforward answers to the issue of mine 
clearance by villagers emerge from the research, and it is 
likely that the subject will continue to be horly debated by 
those involved in the mine action sector. However, by 
allowing for a better understanding of mine clearance 
activities by villagers, the research findings may encourage 
a review of existing assumptions held by mine action 
practitioners and instigate renewed consideration of the 
subject. 
Demining for Survival 
Village mine clearance activities are generally rational 
activities driven by livelihood needs. The extent of village 
demining activities largely depends on the availability of 
mine-free resources, alternative income-generation activities 
and, increasingly, alternative mine clearance capacity. 
Villager livelihoods in rural Cambodia depend on 
agriculture, which is supplemented by secondary activities 
such as fishing or the collection of forest products, including 
bamboo, thatch, vines and vegetables. Mines often affect 
the villagers' access to these very resources. In most 
households in the northwest it is common for at least one 
member to be involved to some degree in an activity in a 
suspected mined area simply because there are few 
alternative ways to make a living. The vulnerability of 
people living in the northwest of Cambodia is increased 
because of the effects oflong-term insecurity in the recent 
past. A large proportion of the population has been 
transitory due to the ongoing conflict, either as refugee 
populations, internally displaced persons or as military 
populations. They have few, if any, existing resources or 
support systems to draw on. The high population density 
in these border areas and the shortage of mine-free land, 
exacerbated by the increasing incidence of land grabbing 
by powerful people, means that many of these former 
transient populations are now seeding in areas that contain 
landmines. 
Alternative income-generation activities may help 
reduce community reliance on mine-affected resources. 
Some villagers living close to the Thai-Cambodian border 
have been drawn to this area for the very reason that 
alternative income-generation activities are possible, and 
many have been able to work as itinerant laborers in 
Thailand. However, such work is notoriously high-risk and 
insecure. Many have spent time in Thai prisons, and at 
other times border crossings are closed, cutting people off 
from this additional source of income and forcing them to 
turn to collection and foraging activities in mined areas. 
Mine clearance activities by villagers in the northwest 
are ultimately a strategic response to these environmental 
and economic conditions by a section of the population 
that has the ability to draw on existing knowledge and skills. 
The majority of village deminers are demobilized soldiers 
who learned the rudiments of mine clearance or mine 
breaching and defense tactics during their military service. 
However, there are also villagers who have no military 
background bur will move mines out of their way. 
Demining is a necessary activity enabling villagers to 
support their families, often through the clearance or 
extension of farming land. It is also common for mines to 
be cleared on paths to common property resources such as 
forests, grazing lands and water sources, as these resources 
are often vital for subsistence livelihoods, particularly 
during lean periods when rice supplies are at their lowest. 
According ro rhe findings of the research, village deminers 
generally clear mines for personal livelihood needs rather 
than as a means for alternative income. Relatively few village 
deminers were employed to clear mines from the land of 
other people, and fewer still were involved in the sale of 
mine or UXO parts for scrap metal or other uses. 
Priorities and Choice 
Villagers often claim that they have to clear mines 
because they cannot wait for the mine clearance 
organizations to clear their land for them. T he resources 
and capacity of organized mine clearance activities in 
Cambodia means that it is, and will remain, impossible 
for mine clearance professionals to respond to all the needs 
of rural villagers living in mined areas. Villagers may have 
to resort to clearing mines because they need to access land 
and resources in order to support their families. Limited 
alternative livelihood options present a decision over which 
they feel they have little choice. As the wife of a village 
deminer in Battambang province explained, "Today my 
family earns a living by doing farming. As far as risk is 
concerned, I think it is very dangerous for a man to work 
as a village deminer. But if my husband does not clear 
mines, my family will have no rice fields and we wi ll have 
no way to make money to support the family." In terms of 
access to resources, families who have a household member 
capable of carrying out demining activities are perhaps at 
an advantage to those families who do not have this ability 
Village demining may still exist even where mine 
clearance is operating because rhe prioritization of the 
organized mine clearance does nor march the priorities or 
expectat ions of the villagers. Clearance organization 
priorities include land for settlement and agriculture, but 
such is the extent of the demand that it cannot be 
realistically met. Often the village land that is cleared by 
mine clearance organizations is neutral community land 
Returning Life to Field and Forest 
such as roads, school fields, watarams (land for the village 
temple) or land around pump wells. Although these areas 
are perceived useful as a whole to villagers, they do nor 
respond to their individual livelihood requirements. Village 
deminers are able to clear agricultural land for their own 
individual needs and often help remove mines for others 
who want to access land for farming. Village deminers also 
clear land to access secondary resources or marginal lands, 
such as forests, bamboo groves or grazing lands, that are 
often viral to village subsistence livelihoods. Such areas are 
notoriously difficult to access by demining reams and are 
considered a lower priority in terms of cost effectiveness. 
Similarly, mine awareness education often fails to 
address the underlying livelihood needs that drive people 
to clear mines by themselves. As Eaton, era! (1997:14) 
argue, if it is the very means of survival that are affected by 
mines "it is not tenable to assume that affected communities 
can be cautioned of the dangers and asked to await the 
arrival of mine clearance teams some subsequent years 
hence." Although mine awareness education can help 
promote safer behavior, it can never prevent villagers from 
entering suspect areas or from conducting high-risk 
demining activities if mines continue to be an impediment 
to their daily living. As a village deminer in Banteay 
Meanchey explained, "I participated in mine awareness 
education conducted by the organization. This has made 
me scared of digging the land and hitting mines 
accidentally. I also don't know where the mines are deep in 
the ground. However, I have no choice but to demine the 
land." 
• A field "demined" and cultivated by a villager before official 
mine clearance, Banteay Meanchey province. 
c/o HI-Belgium/Ruth Bottomley 
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The Safety Question 
Humanitarian mine clearance organizations operating 
in Cambodia admit that they are unable to respond to the 
needs of all the people living in mine-contaminated areas. 
Villagers and local authorities often commemed that they 
felt village deminers help make the village a safer place 
because they removed mines from their own land, public 
paths and tracks and assist other villagers, thus reducing 
the risk of accidents. 
However, in terms of Western standards of 
humanitarian mine clearance, village mine clearance is a 
hazardous, high-risk and inadequate practice. Village mine 
clearance practices differ from professional demining 
practices in several pronounced ways. The most obvious 
difference is in terms of experience and training. Although 
the villagers may have years of military experience and 
knowledge regarding local mine deployment, most village 
deminers lack professional mine clearance training. This is 
reflected in their clearance methods, which, without doubt, 
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place the village deminer in situations of much higher risk 
than their professional counterparts would ever experience. 
Unlike professional deminers, villagers generally clear 
the land where they suspect mines are presem. Their mine 
location knowledge is based on visible mines, military 
experience or simply from observing accidents. In contrast 
to professional humanitarian mine clearance, which 
measures activiry in terms of area cleared with as close to 
100 percent safety as possible, the work of the village 
deminer is guided by a targeted approach with a higher 
mines-to-area ratio. Because access to resources takes 
prioriry over complete safery of land, relatively large areas 
of land will go unchecked by village deminers. 
Professional deminers do not touch the mines if at all 
possible and prefer in-situ destruction. Village deminers 
tend ro remove the mines from the ground using their 
hands. Their mos t common method of mine disposal 
involves burning the mine with firewood, although a large 
number of village deminers interviewed during the research 
said that they first neutralize the mines by dismantling 
them. They said that this helped make the mines easier ro 
handle and reduced the impact of the explosion when the 
mines were burned. 
However, it should also be recognized that, despite 
conducting a high-risk activity, the majority of village 
deminers do attempt ro practice a certain degree of self-
regulation to reduce the likelihood of injury both to 
themselves and to others. Village deminers frequently said 
that they would not clear mines if they were drunk or felt 
ill, and that they only clear devices they recognize and know 
they can dismantle and burn. If they are unable to remove 
or dismantle the mines, either because they are unfamiliar 
devices or the pans are rusry and unstable, they tend ro 
burn them in-situ. Village deminers usually clear alone to 
prevent the risk of injury to other people and to avoid 
distractions, and cleared mines are frequently burned in 
the evening when other villagers have returned home. Such 
practices are still far from the international safery standards 
recognized for mine clearance and the risk undertaken by 
the village deminers remains high. 
Most village deminers are under no delusion that the 
land they clear is 100 percent safe. Both they and other 
villagers realize that using the eye or a hoe to detect mines 
leaves mines in the ground. This realization is perhaps an 
important one in terms of accident reduction. People are 
still wary on land that has been demined by villagers, bur 
the only way ro test the safery of their land is ro use it. 
After clearance, in general, villagers will initially cultivate 
their fields with spades, as it allows for more careful work. 
If no mines are found in consequent years, they will begin 
ro use cattle or even a rracror ro cultivate their land . 
An awareness of mine clearance risks is also reflected 
by some village deminers who have attempted to adopt 
safer behavior in recent years. Several vi llage deminers said 
that once they had cleared mines they would keep them 
for professional deminers to destroy rather than dismantling 
and burning them. Although village deminers realize they 
put themselves at risk, they feel they are more likely to be 
injured by unknowingly stepping on a mine than by 
demining. T he paradox of th is is that in order ro clear 
mines, the village deminer has to enter suspected mined 
areas, rhus increasing their likelihood of stepping on a mine. 
Mine clearance is a coping strategy, but due ro the 
high risk involved, most village deminers would prefer to 
srop clearing mines and have mine clearance organizations 
clear the land for them. A village d eminer in Banteay 
Returning Life to Field and Forest 
wider coping strategies of communit ies. Village mine 
clearance appears to highligh t several inadequacies of 
professional demin ing in response to local-level priorities 
and need . T he question is, how can these needs be met more 
effectively and promptly? More effective collaboration with 
ongoing community development initiatives could alleviate 
some of rhe economic and livelihood pressures forci ng 
villagers into high-risk activities. At the same time, should 
it not be considered that the risks that are inevitably taken 
by these village deminers could be lessened through the 
promotion of safer practice? If the capacity of professional 
m ine clearance is really such that the needs of those living 
in mined areas cannot be mer, it is inevitable that village 
mine clearance will continue. • 
~~village deminers frequently said that they would not clear mines if they 
were drunk or felt iLL, and that they only clear devices they recognize and 
know they can dismantle and burn." 
Meanchey province said , "I think that in the future I will 
get injured or killed and so now I sro p demining and leave 
this work for rhe organization. Ifl continue ro clear mines 
using only a hoe, I cannot escape from injury. Anyway, 
now I have enough land to provide for my family." 
Conclusion 
As stated earlier, there is no template answer to the 
question of villager demining act ivities. M ine action 
practitioners will continue to d ispute the pros and cons of 
self-demining activities by villagers, but so long as villagers 
need to access resources and land and they have the basic 
knowledge and courage to carry out the activiry, village 
demining will continue. The realiry faced by villagers living 
with mines every day perhaps needs to counter the moral 
arguments of mine action in regards to the safety of the 
practice. The real issue is not one of village deminers versus 
professional deminers, but one of the need to free mine-
contaminated land and resources for local communi ty use. 
Perhaps it is rime for the mine action community to 
reassess the situatio n and learn from the village deminers' 
experiences, reasons for demining and needs. T he actions 
of village deminers need to be seen as ind icative of the 
*The information presented in this paper draws on the findings of 
the Handicap International Research Study on Spontaneous 
Demining Initiatives. However, the opinions expressed in the text 
are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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and Casualty Surveillance in Cambodia 
Handicap International's Reuben McCarthy details the combined efforts of HI, 
the Cambodian Red Cross and UNICEF in Cambodia. Putting faces with statistics, 
he gives the how, when and where of mine/UXO incidents in the country. 
by Reuben McCarthy, 
Project Advisor, Handicap International, Belgium 
Introduction 
O ver the last five years Handicap lmernational (HI) and the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), with the technical support of UNICEF, have been involved 
in the collection, storage and dissemination of information 
related to the human casualties of mines and UXO in 
Cambodia. The following paper provides the background 
to the activity, its rationale and history, along with an 
overview of mine/UXO casualties in Cambodia from 1998 
to 1999. 1 
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Mine/UXO Casualty Surveillance in Cambodia 
In countries heavily contaminated with mines and 
UXO, mine casualty data2 is seen as an essential element 
for fund raising and the effective targeting and prioritization 
of often limited resources, particularly in the areas of mine 
awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. Depending 
on the scope of the information collected, mine casualty 
data may also provide a useful baseline for monitoring the 
aims and effectiveness of different components of such 
projects, establish mechanisms for the direct advocacy of 
mine affected communities, while providing valued support 
to national and international efforrs to achieve a global 
ban on the sale, use and stockpiling of landmines. 
Mine casualty data gathering was 
initiated in Cambodia by the Mines 
Advisory Group (MAG) in 1994. In 
early 1995, the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre (CMAC) began a pilot 
project for casualty data gathering. 
Following the pilot project, the activity 
was outsourced by CMAC to CRC 
and HI. The two agencies were 
considered appropriate for the task in 
view of their work with the survivors 
of mine accidents, because of the 
national coverage of the CRC and its 
extensive network of volunteer health 
workers, and due to HI's ongoing role 
in mine action in Cambodia and 
experience in the development of 
indigenous organizations. 
Starting in September 1995, HI 
and the CRC took full responsibility 
for the project on behalf of CMAC, 
in four provinces of Cambodia. The 
partnership involved CRC under-
taking data gathering in provincial 
locations and HI providing training 
and technical support in the establish-
ment of the data gathering system, 
database and the tools for data analysis 
and dissemination. Initially, the Hl/ 
CRC project was conducted in 
coordination w ith MAG's project, 
enabling coverage of a total of 11 of 
the most mine-affected provinces in 
Cambodia. In its formative stages, 
casualty data gathering in Cambodia 
comprised both a community and 
hospi tal level survey of accidents 
taking place during and prior to 1997, 
and ongoing surveillance of current 
incidents. 
From 1995 to 1997, data 
gathering conducted by HI/CRC 
focused on a village level survey to 
provide comprehensive baseline data 
on the number and circumstances 
surrounding mine accidents in 
Cambodia, from 197 9 to 1997. 
During this period more than 35,000 
casualty reports were completed by 
HI!CRC in heavily mine-affected 
provinces.3 At the same time, MAG 
established a mine incident surveil-
lance system, which concentrated on 
monitoring ongoing mine incidents. 
The intention was to provide up-to-
dare data on incidents and casualties 
and to facilitate the prioritization, 
planning and evaluation of mine 
related activities. 
It was perhaps a unique feature 
of casualty data gathering in 
Cambodia that it combined survey 
with surveillance. The combined data 
sets enabled a comprehensive picture 
of the circumstances of mine incidents 
and occurrences offatal and non-fatal 
injuries caused by mines and UXO 
throughout Cam bodia. The 
documented history allowed patterns 
to be traced in the rate and type of 
mine injuries and established means 
for advocating the interests of an 
enormous number of mine accident 
survivors. At the same time, the 
surveillance of ongoing incidents 
enabled the effective prioritization of 
mine action resources and established 
a baseline for measuring the 
effectiveness of different aspects of 
mine action programs, on a month-
by-month basis. Nonetheless, the dual 
system had certain weaknesses, not the 
least being the lack of srandardization 
between the information collected and 
the techniques for prioritizing data 
gathering. By th e end of 1997, 
however, most villages in heavily mine-
affected areas had been visited by HI/ 
CRC and a national data set of 
historical mine incidents was mostly 
finalized. 
Subsequently, in 1998, HI/CRC 
and MAG agreed on a common 
system of data gathering, which 
focused on the surveillance of currem 
or ongoing mine incidents and their 
human casualties. Both data sets were 
later merged into a single database, 
established and managed by HI/CRC, 
and a standardized data gathering 
form was used by both agencies. 
Priority areas for data gathering were, 
and remain largely, determined by the 
degree of mine contamination at a 
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commune, district and provincial 
level, as reported by MAG, CMAC 
and the HALO Trust. Additionally, 
the results of HIICRC's national 
survey of mine victims have enabled 
the division of Cambodia into 
operationally high and low incident 
villages, districts, communes and 
provinces, according to the number of 
casualties recorded by the survey. 
Finally, an analysis of the history of 
the conflict in Cambodia, and areas 
known to have experienced large 
amoums of armed conflict, influenced 
the choice of sites. 
Following the recommendations 
of a Mid- Term Review of MAG and 
HIICRC's projects by UNICEF4 in 
early 1999, MAG began to transfer the 
responsibility of its project ro HI/CRC 
to enable greater standardization and 
use of the CRC volumeer network in 
data gathering. By November 1999, 
the transfer was complete, and HI/ 
CRC was conducting data gathering 
in all of MAG's coverage areas, in 
addition ro nine other provinces and 
municipalities, bringing the total 
coverage, by December 2000, to 20 
provinces and municipalities. 
fn all of its aspects and phases of 
operation and development, mine 
casualty data gathering in Cambodia 
has as its cen tral motivation the 
facilitation of a reduction and, 
ultimately, cessation of mine and 
UXO related casualties, th rough the 
collection and dissemination of timely 
and useful data on mine casualties to 
mine action agencies. Moreover, a key 
motivation of the project has been to 
provide support to survivors of mine 
and UXO accidents by disseminating 
information on the location and 
condition of survivors to victim 
assistance agencies. Thus far, the 
project has established an effective 
organization dedicated ro the advocacy 
of the interests of mine victims and 
mine affected communities. To these 
ends, information provided by rhe 
project has facilitated: 
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• The discovery and location of new 
or unknown mined areas through 
the village level identification of 
mine accident sites. 
• The design of appropriate mine 
awareness curricula through the 
identification ofbehavior leading to 
mine accidents and the types of 
devices causing the incidems. 
• The ability to better help determine 
priorities for different mine action 
program componems in different 
locations (mine awareness, survey, 
clearance, explosive ordnance 
disposal). 
• The monitoring and evaluation of 
mine action acnvmes. 
• Increased awareness of the mine/ 
UXO problem facing the Cambo-
dian people, among the national and 
international communities. 
• Fundraising among mine action and 
victim assistance agencies through-
out Cambodia in the interests of 
mine victims and mine affected 
communities. 
To date, the primary end users of 
the data have been MAG and CMAC 
in the development of their mine 
action programs; the Cambodian 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL) 
and the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL); and 
Geospatial International in support of 
their National Level One Survey of the 
Mine and UXO situation in 
Cambodia. Along with agencies 
involved in mine action, the project 
has provided information support to 
numerous agencies involved in mine 
victim assistance. 
From June to July 2000, 
UNICEF supported an external 
evaluation of the HI/CRC's project. 
The evaluation focused on an analysis 
of the stated objectives of the project 
and the system of data gathering 
employed. Overall, the recommen-
dations were highly positive and will 
serve to guide the development of the 
project over rhe coming years. As of 
January 2001, the project continued 
to receive the technical and financial 
support of UNICEF, and gained 
additional financial support from the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
and the U.S. Department of Stare. 
Mine/UXO Casualties in 
Cambodia: 1998-99 
Cambodia is one of the most 
mine-affected coumries in the world, 
both in terms of human casualties and 
land lost due to landmine and UXO 
contamination. Following nearly three 
decades of war, the military situation 
in Cambodia began to stabilize from 
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1997-1998, leading to an overall 
reduction in the number of human 
casualties caused by mines/UXO. 
Despite this, mines and UXO remain 
one of the foremost obstacles to 
development and are a present threat 
to the lives and livelihoods of the 
people of Cambodia, particularly as 
they enter areas previously inacces-
sible due to ongoing conflict. 
The following section provides an 
overview of the situation of mine 
accidents in Cambodia from 1998 to 
1999. Throughout this period, HI/ 
CRC utilized 25 full-time data 
gathering staff and a coordinated 
network of volunteers, who reported 
incidents and casualties to the full-
rime staff. In partnership with MAG 
and with the technical assistance of 
UNICEF, data gathering was under-
taken in an array of community 
senings, hospitals and physical 
rehabilitation centers. Information 
was gathered on the number, location 
and circumstances of mine incidenrs 
and casualties in Cambodia through 
direct interviews with casualties, their 
family members, witnesses to an 
incident, local authorities, hospiral 
staff or other secondary sources. 
Overview of Casualties: 1979-98 
From 1979 to 1999, a total of 
41,993 mine/UXO casualties were 
recorded in Cambodia, by HI/CRC 
and MAG. 
• Throughout this period, there was a 
strong relationship between political 
violence and the total number of 
mine/UXO casualties. During 
periods of civil war casualties 
increase; during periods of relative 
peace, casualties decrease. 
• Since the emergence of relative peace 
and stability in Cambodia from 
1997 to 1999, mine/UXO related 
casualties steadily diminished, 
following a peak in 1996. 
• From January 1998 to December 
1999, a total of 2,690 people were 
reported to be casualties of mine/ 
UXO incidents in Cambodia. Of 
these, 1,685 casualties were reported 
in 1998, and 1,005 in 1999. 
• In 1996, an average of 253 
Cambod ians suffered mine 
incidents per month. In 1997, the 
rate of casualties decreased to 137 a 
month; in 1998 a slight increase was 
recorded and an average of 140 
casualties per month were reported; 
while in 1999 the average decreased 
significantly to less than 84 
casualties per month. 
• Kreng Liep holds a photo of her son 
who was killed when he drove his ox 
cart over an AT mine. 
c/o UNA-USA Debra Boyle 
• The decrease in mine/UXO related 
casualties may be attributed to a 
multitude of factors, but the 
cessation of conflict in 1998, a 
stabilized political situation, a more 
settled population with an increased 
knowledge about the location of 
mined areas and the mine situation 
in general, and increased clearance 
activities all play an important part 
in a reduction of accidents, though 
no single faccor can or should be 
attributed to the reduction. 
Casualties in 1998-99 by Age and 
Gender 
• Of all casualties Ill 1998-99, 91 
percent were males, while 9 percent 
were females. 
• Among children, as among adults, 
males made up the majority of 
casualties. Nonetheless, girls suffered 
at a higher rate (as compared to 
boys) than did women (as compared 
co men). Nineteen percent of the 
child casualties were girls. Among 
adults, only 6 percem of recorded 
casualties were women. 
• In general, adults were killed or 
injured four times as often as 
children. Children (under 18 years 
old)5 made up 20 percenr of all 
casualties. 
• Adult males, 18 to 40, suffered the 
most from mines and UXO. 
• However, the casualty rate among 
children as a proportion of total 
casualties actually increased. 
Occupation 
• In both 1998 and 1999, more 
civilians suffered from mines and 
UXO than did members of the 
military. The last year in which 
military casualties outnumbered 
civilian was 1996, and civilian 
casualties as a proportion of total 
casualties (civilian and military) are 
increasing dramatically. 
• In 1999, the gap between civilian 
and military casualties widened 
dramatically. 
• Though civilians suffered co a greater 
degree (in absolute numbers) than 
members of rhe military, in relative 
terms (as a fraction of the toral 
exposed population), members of 
the military remained at a far greater 
risk of becoming a casualty of mines 
or UXO than civilians, though their 
accidents were not always associated 
with military activities. 













Table 1. Total mine/UXO casualties: 7 998-7 999. 
Injuries 
• From 1998-99, rhe majority of mine 
and UXO related injuries were 
wounds (minor and major), while 
the second most frequent injury type 
was the amputation of one or more 
limbs. (see Table 2.) 
• Both mines and UXO are more likely 
to cause amputation and/or wounds 
to lower limbs than to any other parr 
of the body. 
• From 1998- 99, 20 percent of all 
casualties were reported as dying 
from their injuries, while 80 percent 
suffered non-fatal injuries. Death 
was more common among elderly 
adults (less than 40 years), than for 
infants, children and younger adults. 
• From 1979-99, 34 percent of 
incidents resulted in death. Though 
total incidents varied due to political 
and military factors, the fraction of 
incidents that resulted in death 
Table 2 
Injury Type Cases6 
Wounds 1,597 
Amputation 944 
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Table3 
steadily declined over the e n tire 
period. 
• From 1998-99, casualties suffering 
amputation or death by mine/UXO 
were geographically concentrated in 
the north, northwest and southeast 
provinces of Cambodia, with little 
variation between the two types of 
casualty. 
Medical care 
• The majority of mine/UXO 
casualties had their injuries treated 
either in a provincial or district level 
hospital (see Table 3.). 
• A significant minority of casualties 
received no medical assistance at all , 
indicating very minor injuries or 
death at the site of the incident o r 
enroute to a medical facility. 
• The majority of casualties received 
first aid/care within thirty minutes 
of suffering their accident. 
• Casualties whose access to medical 
facil ities was between 30 minutes 
and two hours were more likely to 
suffer amputation than those had 
access in less than 30 minutes. 
• Of the 835 cases of amputation, 
requiring some kind of orthopedic 
d evice, a total of 449 prosthetic 
devices were received by casualties. 
Medical Assistance Casualties %ofTotal 
Provincial Hospital 828 32% 
District Hospital 593 22% 
None 383 14% 
Unknown 384 14% 
Army Hospital 190 7% 
Self-treated 104 4% 
Other 89 3% 
Private Clinic 59 2% 
Commune 51 2% 
Health Centre 
Traditional octor 5 0.001 o/o 
Wat/monks 4 0.001 o/o 
Total 2,690 100% 
Ta ble 3. Medical assistance received: 1998-1999. 
The number is not, however, 
n ecessarily a reflection of the 
effectiveness or lack thereof of 
orthopedic services in Cambodia, 
because many casualties may not 
have been ready to receive a device 
at the time of their interview. 
Cause of Injuries 
Device 
• In 1998 and 1999, 70 percent of all 
incidents involved mines and 29 
percent involved UXO. (see Table 4) 
• Since 1994, incidents involving 
UX:O have increased as a proportion 
of total incidents, while those 
involving mines have decreased. 
• Children were more likely to be 
injured as a result ofUXO than adults. 
• In 1998 and 1999, both mines and 
UXO in cidents varied with the 
season: wet season and dry season. 
More casualties were repo rted 
during th e dry seaso n as rural 
Cambodians travel more and as they 
seek alternative sources of income to 
rice farming. Fewer casualties were 
reported during the rice planting 
and harvesting seaso ns , when 
populations are less mobile. 
• In periods of conflict, mine incidents 
rise and UXO incidents decrease. In 
periods of relative peace, mine 
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• Cheap Chea points to a landmine that 
he found in his field. 

















Table 4. Casualty causing device: 7998-7999. 
inciden ts decrease, while UXO 
incidents tend to increase. 
Activities Associated With Incidents 
• In 1998 and 1999, the three most 
important activities that led to mine 
incidents were: 1) tampering, 2) 
military activities, and 3) traveling 
(see Table 5.). 
• However, if all activities associated 
with one's livel ihood are taken 
together, livelihood is the most 
common associated activity leading 
to mine inciden ts, followed by 
military and tampering. 
• Tamp ering incidents almost 
exclusively involved UXO, while 
incidents involving mines were more 
often associated with livelihood 
activities. 
TableS. 
Table 5 Incident 
associated 
activities: 
Activity Casualties %ofTotal 1998-1999. 
Cambodia border than were 
reported in 1997. This is partly 
explained by a greater capacity of the 
project to collect data in these areas 
in 1998 and 1999, following a 
cessation of conflict. Tampering 762 
Military activities 514 
Traveling 498 
Farming 364 
Collecting wood 264 







• Children were more likely to be 
injured whi le tampering than were 
adults. 1 Adults were more likely to 
be injured while undertaking 
military or livelihood activities than 
were children. 
• Both tampering and livelihood 
activities followed the same pattern 
in 1998 and in 1999: they fell during 
the rice growing and harvest season 
and peaked during the dry season. 
• Military activities led to far fewer 
total casualties in 1999 than in 
1998. At the same time, incidents 
involving the military followed the 
same seasonal patterns as those 
Table6 
Rank Province 
1 Bat Dambang 
2 Banteay Mean Chey 
3 Otdar Mean Chey 
4 Preah Vi hear 
5 Siem Riep 
6 Pousat 
7 Kampong Thorn 
8 Kampong Cham 
9 Krong Pailin 













involving civilians, largely because of 
the "dry season offensives" 
conducted by the military. 
Locations When Injured 
• As in previous years, the majority of 
mine and UXO casualt ies were 
concentrated in the northwest of 
Cambodia. This is particularly true 
for military casualties, while civilian 
casualties covered a grea ter geo-
graphic area. 
• From 1998-99, a greater concentra-
tion of mine and UXO casualties 
were recorded on the Thai-
• Mine incidents (excluding UXO) are 
more concentrated in the northwest 
than UXO incidents (exclud ing 
mines). UXO incidents are more 
geographically spread out and a 
greater number of casualties 
involved in UXO incidents were 
recorded on the Vietnam-Cambodia 
border than mines. 
• In 1998-99, Bat Dambang province 
continued to rank as the province 
recording the highest number of 
mine and UXO casualties (see Table 
6.). 
• In 1998-99, Samlout District, in Bat 
Dambang province, recorded the 
highest number of casualties. 
However, if the number of casualties 
is taken as a percentage of the total 
population, Veal Veaeng District, 
Pousat province, is the most affected 
district. 
• For the same period, Traeng 
Commune in Bat Dambang 
province recorded the highest 
number of casualties. However, if 
the number of casualties is taken as 
a percentage of the rota! commune 
population, Sala Krau Commune, 
Total Cum Total %ofTotal Cum% 
Casualties 
790 790 29.4% 29% 
405 11195 15.1% 44% 
331 1,526 12.3% 56% 
281 1,807 10.4% 66% 
169 1,976 6.3% 72% 
149 2,125 5.5% 78% 
126 2,251 4.7% 83% 
107 2,358 4% 87% 
97 2,455 3.6% 91 o/o Table 6. Ten most affected 
49 2,504 1.8% 93% provinces for mine/UXO 
casualties: 1998- 1999. 
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Krong Pailin province, is the most 
affected commune. 
• From1998 to 1999, Ampil Village, 
in Bavel District, Bat Dambang 
province, recorded th e highest 
number of c.'lsualties with incidents 
raking place in villages. 
Terrain Type(1998-99) 
• The overwhelming majority of mine 
and UXO incidents (72 percent) 
occurred in three types of terrain: 
forests, villages and fields (see Table 
7). 
• Incidents raking place in fields are 
seasonally based and occur more 
frequently in the wet season, while 
incidents occurring in forests occur 
more frequently in the dry season. 
Incidents occurring in villages, on 
paths and roads, or near rivers do not 
demonstrate any major seasonal 
vanattons. 
Casualties %of Total 
999 38% 
573 21 o/o 
363 13% 







Overgrow n area 6 Oo/o 
Total 
Table ?.Incident 
location by terrain 
type: 1998-1999. 
2,690 100% 
• Th e majority of incidents (35 
percent) rook place within five 
kilometers of village centers. 
• For the same period, 39 percent of 
all casualties were reported to have 
visited the site of their accident often, 
prior to the incident taking place. 
• Mr. Phia lost his leg to a land mine. c/o UNA-USA Chim Sereivuth 
Mine Incident Prevention 
Mine Awareness Training 
• Eighry-rwo percent of casualties were 
reported as not having received mine 
awareness training prior to their 
incident. 
• The results indicate either a severe 
lack in mine awareness training, or 
the impression that people who 
receive mine awareness training are 
less likely to be involved in an 
accident than those who do not. 
• Both women and children received 
proportionately more mine 
awareness training than adult men, 
even though adult men are a higher 
risk group, suggesting a need to 
refocus training on them. 
• Assuming that a lack of mine 
awareness among casualties indicates 
the weakness of the activity, the 
location of casualties not having 
received mine awareness training vis-
a-vis the rate of casualties indicates 
a need to reconsider the concentra-
tion of mine awareness activities in 
certain provinces of Cambodia. 
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Mined Area Marking and Mine 
Clearance at the Site of the Incident 
• On ly 2 percent of incident sites were 
reported as being marked with 
official mine field markings at the 
time of the incident. 
• Only four percent of incident sites 
had any previous mine clearance. 
• The results suggest that the majority 
of incidents are raking place in areas 
not known to be mined, not 
surveyed, or not prioritized as being 
high priority for clearan ce or 
marking activities. 
• The results do not tell us what mine 
action or survey activities may have 
been conducted following any 
reported mine incident. 
• The Mine Incident Database Project 
is performing a vital and unique 
function within the mine action 
context in Cambodia and provides 
valuable information that assists 
different agencies and governmental 
bodies in multiple areas of activity. 
• 
(Chris Horwood and Andrea 
Crossland, External Evaluation of 
UN!CEF-Supported Activities to 
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1 Excerpts obtained from rhe report Mine & 
UXO Casrlfl!ties in Cambodia: 1998-1999 ; 
C am bodia Mine/UXO Vic tim Information 
System (ne. Mine Incident Database Project), 
September 2000. 
2 Un less o therwise specified, where rhe term 
"mine victim/casualty" is used alone it is taken 
to include UXO casualties. 
3 By Septemb er 2000 rhe number of casualty 
rep orts reached in excess of 45,000. 
those of the U.S. Department of Stare, rhe 
M inistry for Foreign Affa irs of Finland o r 
UNICEF. 
s The definit ion of a child being less rhan 18 
years of age follows from the definition outl ined 
in rhe Convention on the Rights of Children. 
6 Th e numb er o f in jury cases does no t 
correspond ro rhe number of casualties because 
many casualt ies suffered multiple injuries. 
Injuries that led ro death are also included . 
7 Unknown: unidentified devices often reported 
by rhird parries. Sometimes fuses. 
Email: hi.mines@bigpond.com.kh 
4 Ar rhe rime U N ICEF was providing financial 
and technical assistance for borh MAG and HI/ 
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-
0021 ) . The opinions, find ings and 
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of rhe author and do not necessarily refl ect 
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and methodology during 1998 and 1999 that 
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tampering. 
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Korea United: 
North & South Set Aside Differences to Demine 
Following a historic summit between Leaders from North and South Korea, ef-
forts are underway to clear a path through the DMZ. In the South, efforts are 
also being made to clear the paths civilians use in areas outside the DMZ. 
By Keith Feigenbaum,MA/C 
I
n a land marred by over a half-
century's wonh of fierce political 
divisions and lingering suspicions, 
agreemem and coexistence have come 
to be as rare as the landmines are 
plentiful. Such is the troubled state of 
Korea-from the isolationist Commu-
nist North, through the neutral (and 
heavily mined) demilitarized zone 
(DMZ), to the revitalized republic in 
the south. Despite the troubled history 
of this divided peninsula, steps have 
been taken recently to pur aside 
ideological differences and focus on 
the estimated 1.12 million mines in 
the 4 km-wide DMZ, as well as the 
tens of thousands of mines in "rear 
areas" situated outside the DMZ. 
In June 2000, leaders from North 
and South Korea met in a historic 
summit in Pyongyang. The meeting 
between South Korean President Kim 
Dae-jung and North Korea's Kim 
Jong-illed to efforts to reconstruct the 
Kyongui (Seoul to Shinuija) railroad 
and to create a four-lane highway that 
would link the two countries. Based 
on the leaders' desire to create this link, 
• Equipped with a mine detonation device, a South Korean K-1 tank drives across a mine field during 
training to remove landmines. c/oAP 
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the two sides' militaries set out in 
September 2000 to address the unique 
mine situation. 
Efforts Underway 
Un like many mine-affected 
countries, the vast majority of mines 
found in the Koreas have had minimal 
affects on civilian populations. The 
Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(KCBL) estimates that at least 1,000 
civilians have fallen prey to mines 
washed from the DMZ in flooding. 
Conversely, Koreans have the DMZ 
to thank for its role as a buffer against 
the 95 percem of mines suspected to 
be in Korea. Of South Korea's 
estimated 1.2 million mines, only 
about 68,000 have been located 
outside the DMZ in rear areas. 
Rachel Srohl, a senior analyst for 
the Center for Defense Information, 
writes, "The landmine problems 
facing North and South Korea differ 
from those encounte red in other 
countries afflicted with large numbers 
of mines. For the most part, mines in 
Korea are concentrated in well-
designated 'fields' along the DMZ and 
surrounding areas and do not affect 
farming, industry or other segments 
of'normallife ... ' The enduring danger 
from landmines in Korea, once the 
known fields are removed, ought to 
be much less than in countries such as 
Cambodia and Vietnam." 
Of course, while the landmine 
situation may differ from that of other 
affected countries, threats such as 
unmapped mine fields, floods that 
-
carry mines out of mapped areas (and 
often outside the DMZ) and the 
unknown nature of the mine problem 
in North Korea add an a ir of 
uncertainty to the overall situation. 
Demining in Rear Areas 
While the DMZ is widely known 
to be a dangerous, mine-affected area, 
rhe effects of mines on other regions 
of the Koreas are less publicized. 
Meanwhile, the effects on areas outside 
the DMZ in North Korea are shielded 
from the outside world. But, in South 
Korea, landmines have been identified 
in areas frequented by civilians. The 
mines found in these areas, more so 
than those located in the DMZ, pose 
a definite threat to civilians as many 
have been displaced through flooding 
or are unmapped. 
A November 2000 edition of The 
Ko rea Herald reported that the 
environ mental group Green Korea 
United (GKU) identified large 
numbers oflandmines "planted in and 
around Seoul and other large cities, as 
well as national and provincial parks." 
GKU has noted 21 mine-affected areas 
in the following South Korean 
provinces and cities (number of mine-
affected areas in parentheses): Kyonggi 
and South Kyongsang (4), South 
Chungchong (3), Pusan and South 
Cholla (2), and Seoul, Taegu, Ulsan, 
Kangwon, North Kyonsang, and 
Norrh Cholla (1 each). 
GKU Secretary General Lim 
Sam-jin told the Herald, "In most of 
the mined places, mine warning signs 
are easily found near villages, meaning 
the safety of civilians is threatened." 
In response to these threats, the 
South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(]CS ) announced in February 2001 it 
would remove all mines in rear areas 
by 2006-th e same y ar South Korea 
and the United Stares plan to sign the 
Mine Ban Treaty, contingent on the 
development of acceptable mine 
alternatives. The JCS expects to begin 
chis effort by clearing about 6,000 
APLs (the only type of mine reported 
to be found in rear areas) from these 
locations: two former air defense bases 
on Mr. Chungni in Pusan and in 
Kumo-ri in Hadong County, South 
Kyongsang Province, Haeundae in 
Pusan, Mr. Kumdan in Songnam, 
Kyonggi and Kwangju. 
The J CS expects the upcoming 
demining efforts to puc a significant 
dent in the already reduced number 
of mines oucside the DMZ. 
In a Herald article from Dec. 23, 
2000, a South Korean Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) official said, "The army 
completed the removal of some 1,100 
AP mines planted on top of Mount 
Kumho [sic] this year, where Nike 
missile radar systems were located. We 
have cleared a total of 6 ,800 mines in 
seven spots [since 1996] to reduce the 
number of landmines planted in the 
rear areas to around 68,000." 
To aid the military in demining 
Korea's rear areas, GKU, KCBL and 
the Japan Campaign to Ban Land-
mines (JCBL) have also reportedly 
agreed to begin efforts to map mine 
fields. According to KC BL Coordina-
tor Cho Jai-kook, the efforts will 
include surveys of three mine-affected 
areas that pose a threat to the lives of 
civilians and soldiers: two of rhe 21 
locations identified by GKU as mine-
affected, U.S. Air Force bases 
surrounded by AP mines and "civilian 
passage restricted areas" located from 
3 km to 30 km south of the DMZ. 
Railroad-Highway Construction 
Route 
On September 18, a force of 
about 2,800 South Korean soldiers set 
our to rake on the difficult task of 
ridding the train and highway 
construction route of its estimated 
100,000 mines. Of the 2,800 officers, 
700 were dispatched from field 
engineer battalions to begin mine 
clearance work with a deadline of 
• 27 • 
December 2000 in place (since 
postponed to September 2001), an 
official from the South Korean 
Defense Ministry told the Herald. 
Meanwhile, the North Korean 
military was also reported to have 
begun clearance efforts on September 
4, removing trees and other obstacles. 
Adding complexity to the mine 
s ituation is th e fact th at of the 
estimated 100,000 mines in the 
construction route, only 3,000 are in 
confirmed areas. This, along with the 
short timeframe allotted for clearance 
efforts, caused demining to be 
suspended in mid-December. South 
Korean defense officials expect work 
to resume following the spring thaw 
in March 2001. Lt. Gen. Sun Young-
jai of the South Korean Army told the 
Herald on Sept. 19 , 2000: "Our 
schedule for the mine clearance is 
flexible as we are putting top priority 
on the safety of soldiers. We have 
prepared various safety equipment and 
methods for our soldiers." 
Demining the DMZ 
A variety of demining methods-
noted by a variety of sources-have 
been identified as potential clearance 
methods to be used in creating a path 
through the DMZ. The South Korean 
Defense Ministry told the Herald in 
August 2000 of its plans to initiate a 
six-stage clearance program (see box 
on next page for elements of this 
program). 
The equipment used by deminers 
was expected to consist of a mix of 
foreign and Korean tools and vehicles. 
"We have designed remote-controlled 
'armored buckers' with thick steel 
plates and bulletproof windows 
attached to heavy equipment such as 
excavators, bulldozers, cranes and 
water sprinklers to be used for mine 
removal," Lt. Gen. Sun said. "With 
these safety measures, soldiers will be 
able to do most of their work without 
setting foot on the ground, thereby 
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• So uth Korean 
soldie rs move to 
the next position 
after removing a 
mine field fence 






Anticipated Mine Clearance Procedures: 
• Use of water sprinklers to uncover mines. 
• Insertion of 15-meter-long plastic pipes filled with dynam ite and 
detonators into suspected areas (for mines up to 10 em 
underground). 
• Use of excavators and bulldozers to remove plants and dig up earth 
(for mines 20 to 30 em underground). 
• Final inspections by soldiers to ensure the removal of all mines. 
grea tly enh anc ing th e safety of 
deminers." 
Another method reported to be 
under consideration by the South's 
Defense Ministry was a "scorched 
earth policy." This method would 
involve spraying fuel alo ng the South 
Ko rean portion of the DMZ berween 
the Imjin River and C hangdan in 
Munsan and then burning rhe fuel. 
More Help on the Way? 
Although mine clearance and 
mine identification efforts in both rear 
areas and the D MZ have thus far been 
limited to the mili tary and civic 
groups, in January rhe South's Sungdo 
Constructio n Co . crea ted the 
demining firm Specialist Demin ing 
Engineering (SDE) to aid rhe Koreas 
• 28. 
and other mine-affected nauons 111 
clearance efforts. The firm's vice 
president, Koo Ja-ho, recently said the 
SDE has formed a "technical assistance 
agreement" with the UK's Specialist 
Gurkha Services (SGS)-one of the 
wo rl d 's to p-10 m ine and UXO 
clearance companies. Koo expressed to 
the Herald a desire to aid the Korean 
govern ments' demini ng efforts, saying 
that private firms are at an advantage 
over mi li tar ies when it comes to 
insuring operations, gain ing funding, 
and secu ring the most advanced 
equ•pment. 
To date, no formal agreement 
between the private firm and the 
Korean governments has yet w be 
announced. H owever, JCS Bartle 
Coordination Division official Lee 
Kang-soo, head of mine affairs in the 
d ivision, recently told the Herald the 
continued on page 30 
Southeast Asia 
Air Combat Data 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Tom Smith details the United State's 
efforts to create an informational and relational database for mine/UXO identi-
fication in Southeast Asia and its importance in targeting landmines. 
by Tom Smith, 
Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, Office of Humanitarian 
Demining 
0 ne of the greatest challenges in the global effort to remove the deadly debris of war and 
conflic t is the collection of records 
kept by the combatants from either 
side in the conflict. In that regard, the 
United States has realized the 
importance of, and is making 
available, data from a variety of sources 
to assist with the survey and clearance 
work in Southeast Asia. 
Since 1994, the humanitarian 
dem ining offices in the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
and U.S. Paci fi c Command, in 
conj unctio n with the Federal 
Resou rces Corpo ration and MRJ 
Tech nology Solu t ions, have been 
developing an informational/relational 
database derived from the separate 
declassi fied rapes of allied air combat 
and combat support operational 
activities conducted during the war in 
Indochina. The output of chis analysis 
will provide nations in the region with 
accurate target and ordnance data so 
that host countries can set priorities 
for UXO clearance operations and 
assess the p robab il ity of UXO 
contamination in areas identified for 
economic development. 
These combat missions were 
conducted in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The 
original data system was developed by 
TBM in the early 1960s and captured 
daily air combat information on the 
Vietnam conflict in the National 
Combat Command Information 
Processing System (NIPS). The data 
(class ified Top Secret) was maintained 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 1976 
declassified and delivered to the 
National Archives for safekeeping. 
Four major databases are being 
reviewed for information that will 
assist host nations in determining the 
scope and scale of air bombardment, 
helping to prioritize bomb and mine 
clearance operations: 
Files Accessed & Data Period 
Combat Activities File (CACTA) 
October 1965 - December 1970 
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB) 
January 1970- June 1975 
Strategic Air Command's Combat 
Activities report (SACCOACT) 
June 1965 -August 1973 
Herbicide Data Files- (HERBS) 
July 1965 - February 1971 
• 29 . 
Other databases to be reviewed 
include the Combat Naval Gunfire 
Files, Mining Activity Files, and other 
files relating to friendly and opposing 
force base camp and artillery data. 
Data in the air combat files 
includes specific mission numbers, 
type and number of aircraft, location 
of target, latitude/longitude coordi-
nates, ordnance type, number of 
ordnance dropped, and additional 
information on downed aircraft. 
The goal of this combined effort 
is to provide host nation mine action 
offices with geospatial information 
(maps, digital, and other data) to 
support humanitarian demining 
surveys, setting priorities for demining 
operations, training, and assessment of 
the mine and UXO threat to economic 
development activities. The recovered 
data are being incorporated into 
geospatial databases for analysis by the 
host nation mine action centers using 
Geographical Informacion Systems 
(GIS). 
Information for Laos has been 
retrieved, inco rporated into a 
relational database, and installed at the 
headquarters of the Lao National 
Unexploded Ordnance Program 
(UXO LAO ) in the capital city of 
Vientiane. The air combat informa-
tion is displayed with vector or raster 
geospatial data and used to plan UXO 
clearance operations and to assess the 
probable impact ofUXO on economic 
development projects. 
Herbicide mission data has also 
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Anticipated Mine Clearance Procedures: 
• Use of water sprinklers to uncover mines. 
• Insertion of 15-meter-long plastic pipes filled with dynamite and 
detonators into suspened areas (for mines up to 1 0 em 
underground). 
• Use of excavators and bulldozers to remove plants and dig up earth 
(for mines 20 to 30 em underground). 
• Final inspections by soldiers to ensure the removal of all mines. 
greatly enhancing the safety of 
deminers." 
Another method reported to be 
under consideration by the South's 
Defense Ministry was a "scorched 
earth policy. " This method would 
involve spraying fuel along the South 
Korean portion of the DMZ between 
the Imjin River and Changdan in 
Munsan and then burning the fuel. 
More Help on the Way? 
Although mine clearance and 
mine identification efforts in both rear 
areas and the DMZ have rhus far been 
limited to the military and civic 
groups, in January the South's Sungdo 
Construction Co. created the 
demining firm Specialist Demining 
Engineering (SDE) to aid the Koreas 
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and other mine-affected nations in 
clearance efforts. The firm's vice 
president, Koo Ja-ho, recently said the 
SDE has formed a "technical assistance 
agreement" with the UK's Specialist 
Gurkha Services (SGS)- one of the 
world's top-1 0 mine and UXO 
clearance companies. Koo expressed to 
the Herald a desire to aid the Korean 
governments' demining efforts, saying 
that private firms are at an advantage 
over militaries when it comes to 
insuring operations, gaining funding, 
and securing the most advanced 
equipment. 
To date, no formal agreement 
between the private firm and the 
Korean governments has yet to be 
announced. However, JCS Battle 
Coordination Division official Lee 
Kang-soo, head of mine affairs in the 
division, recently told the Herald the 
continued on page 30 
Southeast Asia 
Air Combat Data 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Tom Smith details the United State's 
efforts to create an informational and relational database for mine/UXO identi-
fication in Southeast Asia and its importance in targeting landmines. 
by Tom Smith, 
Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, Office of Humanitarian 
Demining 
0 ne of the greatest challenges in the global effort to remove the deadly debris of war and 
conflict is the collection of records 
kept by the combatants from either 
side in the conflict. In that regard, the 
Un ited States has realized t he 
im portance of, and is making 
available, data from a variety of sources 
to assist with the survey and clearance 
work in Southeast Asia. 
Since 1994, the humanitarian 
demining offices in the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
an d U.S. Pacific Command, in 
co njunction with the Federal 
Resources Corporation and MRJ 
Technology Solutions, have been 
developing an informational/ relational 
database derived from the separate 
declassified tapes of allied air combat 
and combat support operational 
activities conducted during the war in 
Indochina. The output of this analysis 
will provide nations in the region with 
accurate target and ordnance data so 
that host countries can set priorities 
for UXO clearance operations and 
assess the probability of UXO 
contamination in areas identified for 
economic development. 
These combat missions were 
conducted in Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The 
original data system was developed by 
IBM in the early 1960s and captured 
daily air combat information on the 
Vietnam co nflict in the National 
Combat Co mmand Information 
Processing System (NIPS). The data 
(classified Top Secret) was maintained 
by rhe Joint Chiefs of Staff and in 1976 
declassified and delivered to the 
National Archives for safekeeping. 
Four major databases are being 
reviewed for information that will 
assist host nations in determining the 
DefEnSe SEcurity Coop«ratlon Agenc y 
scope and scale of air bombardment, 
helping to prioritize bomb and mine 
clearance operations: 
Files Accessed & Data Period 
Combat Activities File (CACTA) 
October 1965 - December 1970 
Southeast Asia Database (SEADAB) 
January 1970 -June 1975 
Strategic Air Command's Combat 
Activities report (SACCOACT) 
June 1965 -August 1973 
Herbicide Data Files- (HERBS) 
July 1965 - February 1971 
• 29. 
Other databases to be reviewed 
include the Combat Naval Gunfire 
Files, Mining Activity Files, and other 
files relating to friendly and opposing 
force base camp and artillery data. 
Data in the air combat files 
includes specific mission numbers, 
type and number of aircraft, location 
of target, latitude/longitude coordi-
nates , ordnance type, number of 
ordnance dropped , and additional 
information on downed aircraft. 
The goal of this combined effort 
is to provide host nation mine action 
offices with geospatial information 
(maps, digital, and other data) to 
suppo rt humanitarian demining 
surveys, setting priorities for demining 
operations, training, and assessment of 
the mine and UXO threat to economic 
development activities. The recovered 
data are being incorporated into 
geospatial databases for analysis by the 
host nation mine action centers using 
Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS). 
Information for Laos has been 
retrieved , incorporated into a 
relational database, and installed at the 
headquarters of the Lao National 
Unexploded Ordnance Program 
(UXO LAO) in the capital city of 
Vientiane. The air combat informa-
tion is displayed with vector or raster 
geospatial data and used to plan UXO 
clearance operations and to assess the 
probable impact ofUXO on economic 
development projects. 
Herbicide mission data has also 
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been incorporated into the GIS at 
UXO LAO. Herbicide mission data 
was obtained from the U.S. Armed 
Services Center for Research of Unit 
Records (CRUR) that is also the 
source for substantiation of veteran's 
claims of herbicide contact. Data 
includes the original HERBS tapes 
plus man-portable, truck, and 
helicopter missions that were con-
ducted during the conflict. 
The partnership between the 
DSCA and irs contractors is also in the 
process of developing a user-friendlier 
informational/ relational database and 
look-up tables to better assist the end 
user in planning for and prioritizing 
bomb clearance missions in specific 
areas of the country. A prototype 
internet-accessible version of the 
geospatial data is also in the develop-
mental phase and will make it easier 
for host nations to access the data 
without a major investment in infor-
mation technology equipment. 
Maintaining the work on chis 
Korea United 
continued from page 28 
South Koreans are considering 
cooperating with SDE in clearing the 
estimated 20,000 mines on Mr. 
Chungni. 
The End in Sight? 
project is essential for continuing 
assistance ro Laos and possible 
expansion to the Cambodian Mine 
Action Center (CMAC) and the newly 
established Vietnamese Centre for 
Treating Technology Bombs and 
Mines. The project will continue to 
support our government's engagement 
strategy in the region. 
In October 2000, a senior 
Vietnamese military delegation visited 
the United States to observe demining 
training activities and discuss ways in 
which the two countries could begin 
engagement by sharing information 
on demining issues. The delegation 
was extremely impressed with the 
bombing data retrieval project and, as 
a result, former President C linton 
offered to share the information with 
the Vietnamese government during his 
historic visit ro Vietnam in November 
2000. Efforts a re underway to 
coordinate the d evelopment and 
support of this initiative with the 
Government ofViernam. 
The use of this kind of data, and 
the integration with facilitating 
technologies, is unprecedented and is 
a clear demonstration of the value that 
technology can play in enhancing 
demining efforts, reducing costs, and 
building cooperative efforts between 
nations . The skills being learn ed 
through this process and the 
knowledge gained will most certainly 
be of value in other countries and 
other situations. This and other like 
initiatives will help ensure that the 
world will become mine safe sooner 
rather than later. • 
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Mr. Tom Smith 
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Tel: (703) 601-3657 
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E-mail: tom.smirh@osd. pentagon. mil 
partially reversing in about one year 
what rook over 50 years of animosity 
to create. • 
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Yon hap News Agency 
When the Korean soil thaws in 
early spring and the demining effort 
is continued, the Koreas will be en 
route to clearing a path not just 
through the DMZ, bur through years 
of silence and conflict. Though we 
may never know of advances in 
clearance operations and mine 
awareness on the northern side of the 
DMZ, the North's pledged 
cooperation with the South is a huge 
step towards reconnecting the once 
united peninsula. Even the People's 
Republic of China has pledged 
technical and personnel support to 
both Koreas' efforts, according the 
August 23, 2000 Yonhap News. It 
could be said that the mine situation 
in Korea pales in comparison to such 
places as Bosnia-Herzegovina or 
Afghanistan. Perhaps this is true from 
a numerical standpoint. Bur when one 
considers a country divided in two by 
a guarded, man-made boundary and 
by stark ideological differences, there 
are few, if any, situations ro rival that 
of the Koreas. If, in fact, the drive to 
clear a path for railroad and highway 
construction is successful in 
September 2001 , the joint efforts of 
enemies will be responsible for 





Pakistan: The Landmine Problem in 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
After a decade of fighting, the effects of conflict beyond Pakistan's bor~er wi~h 
Afghanistan are seen everyday in border regions. With little governmen~ a1d a~all­
able, agendes like HSD are taking the initiative in the country's battle agamst mmes. 
by Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz, Executive Director, 
Human Survival & Development (HSD) 
T he ravages of the decade-long art_Ued conflict i.n Afghanistan between che Sov1ecs and ann-co mmunist forces were not co nfin ed to 
Afghanistan. Rather, irs ill effects spilled over to neighbor-
ing countries. One effected country of note was Pakistan, 
which was used as a base for war activities. Pakistan served 
as a home to arms depots and camps for training guerillas, 
and as a passageway for logistic supplies and other activi ties 
for the coordination of the war effort. In addition, throngs 
of refugees crossed the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 
search of safe harbor, rendering the border weaker and 
weaker throughout the war. . 
One of the most detrimental effects of the Afghani 
war on Pakistan was the thousands oflandmines left behind 
in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Soviet 
troops dropped mines and bombs in FATA border rowns 
in order to intimidate the local population and prevent 
any support of anti-com munist fo rces. Alchough the 
Afghan war broke out in December 1979, it wasn't until 
the early-1980s that the land mine problem surfaced in the 
FATA. Of the seven tribal Agencies of the FATA, Bajaur 
and Kurram were the most effected, counting an alarming 
number of casualties. 
Bajaur and Kurram have witnessed some of the worst 
casualries, which affected not just soldiers bur women and 
children, as well. An encire disabled population now 
exists-a change chat has effected the socioeconomic fabric 
of the area. While the FATA was socially underdeveloped 
previous to rhe war, it has regressed further as a result of 
mines. The region's inadequate health services must deal 
wi th a public heal th situation of tragic proportions. 
Agricultural land has been rendered un-productive. Once 
productive men responsible for earning livelihoods have 
not only been rendered unproductive, but have become 
liabilities. Children have been forced to perform hard labor 
and beg on rhe streets. 
Assessment 
In order to assess the depth of Pakistan's landmine 
problem, 1997 Nobel co-laureate Rae McG~ath, an 
authori ty on landmines, visited Human Survival and 
Development (HSD) in the summer of2000 at the behest 
of the Swis s Federation for Mine Clearance and Swiss 
• Shaima, 9, waits to have her prostheses adjusted at the 
ICRC workshop. c7o ICRetAdrian Brooks 
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Foundation for Landmine Victim Aid (H SD donors). 
McGrath visited the affected areas, met with locals and 
interviewed victims. He compiled a derailed assessment 
report that proffered suggestions and recommendations, 
substantiated our assertions and initial research, and called 
for support for a mine action project in response to che 
humanitarian disaster in FATA. 
Following McGrath's assessment, HSD initiated a 
mine action program in Bajaur Agency through funding 
from the Swiss Federation for Mine C learance and the Swiss 
Foundation for Landmine Victim Aid. This program is 
dedicated to the safety and integrated rehabilitation of mine 
victims of FAT A, functioning apart from the humanitarian 
mine clearance effort . Specifically, the program consists of 
Basic Mine Awareness (BMA) and Risk Avoidance (RA) 
education and physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation 
of the mine victims. Locals are also interviewed throughout 
the program to determine household data. At present, HSD 
is engaged in BMA and RA and collection of household 
data. It has recorded data for 599 mine victims and 
educated about 25,000 locals. 
Rehabilitation 
HSD's philosophy on rehabilitation goes beyond the 
practice of mere physical rehabilitation, the provision of 
means of mobility, and prosthesis/orthotics. It also involves 
the integration of socioeconomic rehabilitation. For this 
purpose, H SD has planned in irs project to provide the 
victims with skill development training and micro credits 
to establish and operate viable and profitable micro 
enterprises. In this way, the mine victims will be able to 
earn steady incomes to support themselves and cheir 
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families and become reintegrated into che household , 
communi ty, and society. 
To aid in rehabilitation efforts, H SD h as installed a 
mine victim da tabase. T he database is part of a larger 
management informacio n sys tem (MIS ) char includes, 
besides the database fo r mine victims, a geograph ical 
information sys tem (GIS). In addition to that, it has a 
package fo r H SD fi nance. A package for ad ministration 
will also be developed, while a database for BMA and RA 
education is being perfected. HSD has also proffered a progress 
report on the conduction of operational activities commenced 
on August 2, 2000. 
FATA Breakdown 
FATA is a collection of seven agencies, which, unfor-
tunately, have been neglected by successive governments 
in Pakistan for the last 50 years. The pol icy of status quo 
has prevailed in chese a reas, disallowing any concrete social 
progress. FATA is geographically linked to the NWFP and 
constitu tes these seven tribal agencies (six of which share a 
freely passed border with Afghanistan): South Waziristan, 
North Wazi ristan, Kurram, O rakzai, Khyber, Mohmand 
and Bajaur. Located within the seven districts are six tribal 
areas o r Frontier Regions, which constitute an area of 
27,220 sq . km, or 2.6 percent of the total area of Pakistan: 
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank, and Dera Ismai l 
Khan. T he region consists of 3.1 m illion generally 
conservative, rel igious people. 
Bajaur Agency 
Bajaur valley (a rea of 600 sq. miles) is a hilly area 
located northwes t o f Malakand . T he approxim ate 
population of 364,000 comprises two main tribes-the 
Tarkhanis and Utmankhels. 
BMAandRA 
BMA aims to red uce casualties by promoting safe 
behavio r and facili tating appropriate responses to rhe 
problem. In general, programs provide information on the 
identi ficat ion of mines and UXO and the dangers they 
pose, and seek to reach safe behavior to civilians living in 
or moving into mine-affected areas. This includes guidance 
on how to recognize a potentially mine or UXO-con-
taminated area, as well as what to do if someone accidentally 
finds himself in che m iddle of a mine field. Instruction in 
basic fi rst aid for mine victims is often a part of che program. 
Teaching BMA and RA, especially to the most 
vulnerable gro ups, is important in Bajaur due to its 
land mine situation. About two mine-related incidents 
-
occur weekly in the area, generally as a result of a lack of 
mine awareness training. Children and women are among 
the most vulnerable groups that have become mine victims. 
BMA and RA, which were instituted in Bajaur on August 
2, 2000, are also an important pillar ofHSD mine action 
strategy. In the absence of these educational programs, the 
magnitude of the mine threat is multipl ied. 
In an area with an unusually high death ratio, the HSD 
field ream prioritizes the teaching of first aid as part of its 
mine awareness program. Measures taught include stopping 
profuse bleed ing and learning to guard against infections, 
shocks or other typical afflictions. HSD performs this 
training in an arrempt to remedy the lack of first aid training 
in the community and a lack of effective transport. In 
general, casualties must be initially transported to the local 
hospital for fi rst aid and then to the provincial metropolis 
hospital fo r treatment. By the rime victims reach the 
hospital, colossal amounts of blood are lost. HSD's training 
would allow victims' initial treatment to be done on site. 
To combat this problem on another level, HSD has 
also secured two ambulances through irs donors. These 
will be stationed in close proximity to the community of 
Bajaur to pass casualties to an equipped medical center. 
One of them is ready to be sent from Geneva. 
Since August 2000, HSD has educated about 30,000 
comm unity members in schools, Madrassas (religious 
schools), mosques, hujras (places for men to gather), and 
bazaars. The community has now largely accepted the mine 
awareness program and is cooperating with HSD teams. 
Children, in particular, are displaying keen interest in the 
class because of the easy and culturally appropriate medium 
of communicarion-Pushro-the local language. Due to 
the cultural practice of excluding women during mine 
awareness sessions in the schools, mosques and public 
places, the H SD team urges the audience co transmi t the 
lessons to the females of the com munity, as well. After 
several meetings between the HSD executive director and 
other staff members wich community elders and religious 
groups, the ream has been allowed to gain access to the 
female child ren in the schools and mosques for cond ucting 
awareness classes. 
Throughout the course ofHSD field activities, we have 
observed that t he community has a few strange and 
dangerous ways of responding to landmines and casualties. 
Our team d iscovered char members of the community use 
whey (yogurt beaten to liquid form) over a victim's wounds. 
This is not an isolated occurrence, but a widely practiced 
exercise-a fact borne by the household survey HSD 
conducted. Admittedly, this is harmful practice. HSD is 
attempting to raise awareness in the community against 
the potential harm held by chis practice. A second 
dangerous practice widely seen in Bajaur is the shoo ring of 
mines with a gun or stoning mines as a mine clearing 
strategy, as determined by HSD surveys. Finally, a few of 
the communi ty members have bought poor quality mine 
detectors from the black marker and used them in 
inappropriate manners. With no formal training from a 
mine action expert, the result has been a number of 
accidents. The community is also not familiar with any 
safe victim evacuation methods. Multiple casualties often 
result from the presence of multiple mines in the vicinity 
of the victim. 
Mine Awareness Materials 
HSD developed irs mine awareness material after 
considering the needs and suffering of the local community. 
It includes wooden mine models (appropriately painted) 
of the common types of mines found and used in the 
region. In addition, there are two kinds of posters-one 
depicting common types of mines found and used in the 
region and the other showing landscapes with mine 
problems. Both these tools are used for instruction in rhe 
field. T he clear and simple message on the printed materials 
appears to be assimilated by rhe community. 
HSD is using places like mosques, schools and hujras 
for conducting irs BMA and RA classes. Such locations 
ensure maximum attendance of all age groups of the 
community. Children and reachers are rhe target group in 
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schools. In mosques, mullahs (rel igious groups) and other 
male members of the community assemble for prayers five 
times a day. In hujras, the elders of the community and 
youth commonly get together fo r entertainment. The aim 
is to maximize the reach of the classes and ensure rhar rhe 
composition is wide ranging. 
HSD BMA and RA education team uses class teaching 
methodology for instructions. As per the tenet of BMA 
and RA education , HSD's ream has made it a poin t not to 
touch the dummy mines in presence of children who have 
a proclivity to imitate and tamper with novel things. Mines 
are laid before children are allowed to arrive in the class 
and a wand is used to point to mines. 
Child-to-Child and Child-to-Woman Technique 
HSD has empl oyed child-to-child and child-to-
woman techniques in order to spread irs BMA and RA 
messages. C hildren have strong learning faculties, as 
compared to adults. T hey are active and energetic, hence 
efficient and effective transmitters. Curiosity is a part of 
their built-in behavior pattern. We have discovered that 
the feedback from the children in Bajaur is mostly 
encouraging. Push to serves as a very smooth, efficient and 
effective vehicle of communication. Children are also 
helpful in carrying our message ro women. 
Children make up about 45 percent of the total sub-
jeers H SD has covered so far. Their vulnerability is appar-
ent in that they constitute 27 percent of rhe recorded casu-
alties (see Household Survey table). HSD is using child-to-
woman and male-to-female techniques to transmit and ex-
tend irs message to women. As the community is very touchy 
on the issue of women, it is difficult to reach out to them. 
• 34 . 
Case Studies 
Mohammad Zaman is one of six children of 
Rehman of Bar Gabaray, Tehsil Mamund, Bajaur 
Agency. On May 12, 1987, Mohammad brought 
home a p iece of UXO. Due to a lack of mine 
awareness education, he did nor foresee rhe danger 
inherent in the UXO. He struck the UXO with 
stones until it went off. It was at a rime when his 
parents and siblings were busy with their routine 
household chores. As a result of the explosion, he, 
his mother and his sister died instantly, while his 
fa ther and another sister susrained serious injuries. 
O n Dec. 15,2000, a large, Russian-made UXO 
exploded while children were p laying with it at the 
res idence of H ak im Khan of Gabaray. The 
explosion claimed the lives of six innocent children. 
T he bodies of the children were badly mutilated. 
Another ch ild was badly injured. 
However, HSD has managed to access some female 
schools where female teachers received our message. These 
reachers can also serve as effective transmitters. Moreover, 
feedback we have received from rhe community indicates that 
a child-to-women/male-to-female technique is proving robe 
fai rly effective. Meanwhile, H SD is attempting to devise an 
efficient and effective way ro transmit BMA and RA messages 
to women. 
Household survey 
The extent of rhe land mine problem in FATA warrants 
significant concern- a fact that was ignored for years by 
the government at the worst possible time. Ir officially 
recognized rhe problem for rhe fi rs t rime in reports 
subm itted to the CCW in December 1999. 
H SD recognized the imperative need to address the 
problems FATA. It formed a general theoretical perspective 
of the problem , and laid it fort h nat ionally and 
internationally. Fortunately, it has succeeded not only in 
securing recognition for rhe problem, bur also in securing 
funds for a project to rehabilitate the landmine victims of 
FATA. 
H SD aims to achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of 
mine victims to help them return to normalcy. This will 
be possible through their physical, social and economic 
rehabili tation. Physical rehabilitation will involve the 
provision of p rostheses and means of mobility, whereas 
socioeconomic rehabilitation 
sha ll requi re providi ng the 
victims with support to earn 
steady, decent income. 
T he HSD project provides 
skills development training and 
micro finances for this purpose. 
The victims are supported to run 
viable, profitable micro enter-
prises that produce steady 
incomes. T hey will be helped to 
perform normal social functions 
so that they will be accepted by 
society. We required a large base 
of knowledge and data for rhe 
planning of these activities. 
Obviously, an interview with 
household survey was made to 
collect all rhe data needed for 
planning these activities. 
Database 
Ir is imperative that rhe 
planning and execution of the 
database portion of rhe mine 
action project include information on the physical and 
socioeconomic rehabilitation of mine victims. Data has to 
be gathered and wielded not only to ascertain the extent 
and nature of physical disabilities, but also to determine 
the socioeconomic status of the community. Only then 
can rhe provision of prostheses, skill development training, 
and micro credits be planned and executed. It is obvious 
that H SD needs a database for the processing and analysis 
of such a big volume of data. It would rake a great effort 
on the part of HSD staff to wield such a large volume of 
data manually, ler alone process and analyze information, 
without the database HSD has assembled on incidents from 
August to October 2000. 
Casualties (Tehsil) 
Tehsil Casualties 
Death Inju ry Amputations 
Khar 1 5 18 
Mamund 220 63 186 
Salarzai 5 2 15 
Utmankhel 0 0 1 
Nawagai 33 15 30 
Barang 1 0 0 
Total 260 85 250 
The table shows the distribution of casualties by death, 
amputations, and injury. It is evident char Mamund Tehsil 
of Bajaur Agency has been one of rhe most affected by 
landmines. It has one of the most alarming death rolls: 
220. There were also 186 amputations and 63 injuries. 
Nawagai Tehsil has also counted 33 deaths and 30 
amputations. The death ratio would not have been so high 
had rhere been efficient transports to carry the victims to 
an equipped landmine casual ty medical center following 
incidents. In Bajaur, it usually rakes one and a half to four 
hours before a victim receives first aid . By rhe rime victims 
reach an equipped medical center, they have lost large 
amounts of blood and their injuries often become infected. 
• Statistics show that 
males aged 12-1 8 




Casualties Death Injury 
24 4.17 20.83 
469 46.91 13.43 
22 22.73 9.09 
0.00 0.00 
78 42.31 19.23 
100.00 0.00 
595 43.70 14.29 
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Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to understand 
the high death and amputation rates in Bajaur. 
As seen in the previous table, the percentage offemale 
landmine victims in Bajaur, as compared to other landmine-
affected countries or regions, is on the higher side. This 
could be a result of the local gender division in labor (that 
excludes women) and the resulting significant role of 
women in the local agrarian economy. Women generally 
help in harvesting, collecting firewood, cutting fodder for 
the cattle, and carrying water to the home. They are also 
responsible for tending cattle. All of these activities increase 
their vulnerability to mine incidents. Subsequent data on 
this matter should help HSD in coming up with concrete 
findings and conclusions to replace the current provisional 
and hypothetical findings. 
From the table, it is apparent that Bajaur became 
infested with landmines after the breakout of the Afghan 
war in late-1979. T hrough forthcoming data, HSD will 
attempt to interpret the wide fluctuation of incidents in 
the 1990s. The cause of this fluctuation from the 1980s 
to the 1990s is currently unclear. HSD will refrain from 
drawing any conclusions from this data until more 
conclusive research is completed. 
However, our hypothesis is that those who had 
migrated to safer places in the 1980s returned to their 
homes in the 1990s, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan 
and the areas near the border came under the control of 
the Mujahideen, who were struggling to gain control of 
Pakistan. 
The overall death and amputation numbers are also 
on the high side compared to other mine affected countries. 
According to Handicap International's 1997 report on 
Cambodia, the rates of death, amputations and injury were 
20, 22 and 58 percent, respectively. Our of the total 1,369 
casualties, deaths, amputations and injuries numbered 271, 
307 and 791, respectively. In Bajaur, the death and 
amputation percentages for I 997 were 44.9 percent and 
37.76 percent (our of98 incidents), respectively. The ratios 
for death and amputation in Bajaur are double that of 
Cambodia. Injuries accounted for 58 percent of casualties 
in Cambodia, compared to 17.35 percent of casualties in 
Bajaur. 
Activity during Casualty 
It stands our from the data that the presence of land-
mines in Bajaur is impeding agricultural activity, as the 
largest number (158) out of 584 accidents has occurred 
during farming and the number of casualties (58) while 
crossing agricultural fields is the third largest figure. This 
is not surprising, as agriculture is rhe mainstay of Bajaur's 
economy. Most people are engaged in farming and thus 
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No.of Incidents Percent 
389 65.40 
206 
34.60 595 100.00 
run the risk of being injured by a mine. The second largest 
figure is that of casualties during walking (1 07). People 
fall victim to mines while going to mosque, fetching water 
and during other routine walks for indispensable things. 
Children have been hit by mines while playing (29). Others 
have been crippled (25) while collecting firewood, an 
activity very common in an agricultural, tribal economy. 
While the number of incidents resulting from mine 
tampering is not large (I 0), chis is a common occurrence 
in the community. In some instances, though, parents may 
have refrained from divulging the fact that an accident 
occurred during tampering due to a fear of losing 
compensation from HSD. 
Victims by Age (Bajaur Agency) 
S# Age Group # of Incidents Percentage 
1 0 - 10 Years 92 15.46 
2 11 -18Years 81 13.61 
3 19-30 Years 168 28.24 
4 31-40Years 112 18.82 
5 41-50 Years 81 13.61 
6 51 - 60 Year 43 7.23 
7 Above 60 Years 18 3.03 
Total 595 100.00 
It is highly evident that landmines interfere with daily 
life in Bajaur. Mines and UXO have injured no one during 
non-essential activities. The socioeconomic status of the 
region has been altered immeasurably. Even some children 
have been prevented from attending school for fear that 
they will encounter mines while en route. This, in an a 
place where the literacy level is already threatened. 
Methodology 
Designing and Development of Interview Schedule 
With the help of irs field staff, HSD developed a 
suitable interview schedule after thoroughly studying the 
landmine problem in Bajaur. Ir had help from the already 
tested tools of Handicap International, the guidelines of 
Physicians for Hum an Rights and other similar 
organizations working for the collection of data on 
landmine victims. 
Training and Orientation of Reid Staff 
The HSD field staff was duly trained and oriented 
before deployment in the field . Dr. Anwar Hussein, 
assistant professor at NWFP Agriculture University's 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in Peshawar, 
Pakistan, held sessions with field staff and trained them in 
interview techniques. Dr. Hussein is also a member of the 
HSD Board of Directors. Rae McGrath has continued to 
aid HSD as a consultant, using his rich and versatile 
experience to help the staff. 
Initiating Volunteerism in the Community 
HSD has initiated the trend of volunteerism in the 
community and received a positive response from the 
community. Various members of the communi ty, ranging 
from farmers to students, have shown keen interest in 
volunteering with HSD. They have offered their services 
on a humanitarian and service basis for the noble enterprise. 
Currently, HSD is working to train volunteers from 
the community, common people, schoolteachers, religious 
Victims by Year (Bajaur Agency) 
Year Casualties Total 
teachers and leaders, and the youth to carry our 
humanitarian jobs on a volunteer basis. This is particularly 
essential when it comes to training people to treat fellow 
citizens through first aid. 
As a final note, it would benefit HSD's mine awareness 
program to find women volunteers among the community 
who could act as liaisons between other females in Bajaur. 
As was earlier expressed, the female segment of the 
population is effected on a daily basis by mines, bur is 
prevented by their social standing from participating in 
mine awareness training. This situation must be addressed 
if the mine situation in Pakistan's FATA is to improve. • 
Contact Information 
Faiz Muhammad Fayyaz 
Executive Director 
Human Survival & Development (HSD) 







Death Injuries Amputations Casualties Death Injury Amputation 
1980 0 0 1 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 
1980 5 2 4 11 45.45 18.18 36.36 
1982 4 0 3 7 57.14 0.00 42.86 
1983 0 0 0.00 0.00 100.00 
1984 3 0 2 5 60.00 0.00 40.00 
1985 3 11 15 20.00 6.67 73.33 
1986 16 1 18 88.89 5.56 5.56 
1987 9 2 2 13 69.23 15.38 15.38 
1988 18 2 9 29 62.07 6.90 31.03 
1989 5 0 4 9 55.56 0.00 44.44 
1990 29 11 34 74 39.19 14.86 45.95 
1991 6 2 3 11 54.55 18.18 27.27 
1992 14 18 33 42.42 3.03 54.55 
1993 7 2 9 18 38.89 11.11 50.00 
1994 19 8 11 38 50.00 21.05 28.95 
1995 19 7 27 53 35.85 13.21 50.94 
1996 13 8 22 43 30.23 18.60 51.16 
1997 44 17 37 98 44.90 17.35 37.76 
1998 28 7 23 58 48.28 12.07 39.66 
1999 12 3 14 29 41.38 10.34 48.28 *All charts and 
2000 6 11 13 30 20.00 36.67 43.33 graphs supplied by 
the author. 
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Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields 
On the subject of Landmines, media attention is rarely focused on Myanmar. 
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Andrew Seith examine the country's manufacture 
and indiscriminate use of mines and lEOs. 
• AP land mines manufac-
tured by Myanmar's 
Defense Products Industries. 
On the extreme left is an 
MM 1 (PRC Type 59 copy) 
and in the center is an MM 2 
(PRC Type 58 copy). The MM 
2 is flanked by the LTM 76 
stake/fragmentation mine. 
c/o Jane's Intelligence 
by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Andrew 
Seith 
T here are an estimated 120 million-plus uncleared anti-personnel (AP) landmines around the world, scattered through more 
than 60 countries. In all the literature produced on 
this subject to date and in discussions of the problem 
in international forums, mention is rarely made of 
Myanmar (formerly Burma). This is despite the fact 
that anti-personnellandmines have been, and are still 
being, manufactured and laid in large numbers in 
that country. Indeed, the number of landmine 
casualties now surpasses Myanmar's mine-affected 
neighbor, Cambodia, which has been the subject of 
much greater world attention. 
Landmine Use in Myanmar 
T he use oflandmines and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) has been a feature of armed conflict 
in Myanmar since it regained its independence from 
the UK in 1948. Before the 1960s, fighting between 
the Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) and the 
country's many ideological , ethnic and religions 
insurgent groups was bitter. There has also been a 
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long-running war between the Myanmar armed forces 
and a number of narcotics-funded private armies. All 
sides, however, found it difficult to obtain regular or 
plentiful supplies of modern munitions. This 
prevented the extensive use of commercially produced 
landmines and forced the protagonists ro rely more 
on IEDs. These still resulted in a large number of 
casual ties, but they tended to be less effective and had 
more limited operational lives. 
After the 1960s, landmines became easier ro 
obtain, and their rate of usage increased. The 
Tatmadaw was able to obtain supplies of AP and 
(probably) anti-vehicle (AV) mines from its own arms 
facrories, established with German assistance during 
the 1960s and 1970s. After the military coup, led by 
General Ne Win in 1962, Myanmar still received 
modest shipments of munitions from friendly 
countries like the USA. These almost certainly 
included supplies of landmines. 
Around the same time, China increased its supply 
of arms (including landmines) to the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB) guerrillas on Myanmar's 
northeastern border. Other insurgent groups were able 
to purchase landmines on the black market in 
Thailand, and reportedly from members of the Thai 
armed forces and police. The insurgents financed these 
deals by selling precious stones, jade and narcotics, 
or by taxing cross-border trade. 
Myanmar's two paramount intelligence agencies, 
the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) and the 
Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI), 
claim that landmines are no longer being used by the 
Myanmar Army as there is no need for them. 
The Myanmar government's website seeks to 
portray the civil war as a thing of the past, stressing 
that many of the armed insurgencies have collapsed 
or that rhey have entered into a cease-fire agreement 
with the central government. While the CPB did col-
lapse in 1989, and notorious drug lord Khun Sa and 
his Mong Tai Army (MTA) surrendered in 1996, other 
armed groups have yet to secure more than a verbally 
agreed and tenuous cease-fi re. Like the Mon National 
Army, they keep their arsenals and maintain their 
right to continue armed struggle if negotiations do 
not work out. 
Other groups like the Karen National Union and 
irs armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA), which have never entered into a cease-fire 
agreement with Rangoon, are porrrayed by the 
government as weak and marginal with little capacity 
for military operations. 
Despite these official denials, rhe manufacture 
and use of AP landmines in Myanmar has grown 
significantly in recent years. The Tarmadaw appears 
to be placing increasing reliance on landmines to 
defeat insurgents. Perhaps capitalising on the greater 
availability of modern AP mines from a new factory 
built in central Myanmar with Chinese assistance 
about two years ago. 
Mines are being used extensively against the 
KN LA in its areas of operation in both Kayah State 
and the Taninrhayi Division, against the Shari State 
Army (SSA) within Shan State, and against the 
Karenni Army in Kayan State. 
T he Nasa ka, a special division of the Tatmadaw 
engaged in operations along Myanmar's border with 
Bangladesh, maintains an extensive mine field 
virtually the entire length of the land frontier. This 
mine field has claimed numerous civilian and military 
casualties. Further north, along Myanmar's border 
with the northeastern states of India, the Tatmadaw 
has also laid mines as part of its counter-insurgency 
operations against the C hin National Army 
The insurgent groups are also using landmines 
and IEDs more than before. In particular, the KNLA 
is relying heavily on them in its operations against 
the Tatmadaw, prompted in part by the fall of the 
Karens' fixed bases at Manerplaw and Kawmura in 
1995 and the KNLA's subsequent reversion to mobile 
guerrilla tactics. Landmines also make up for their 
inferiority in numbers and arms especially since the 
split in the KNLA (which produced the pro-Rangoon 
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army in 1994) and the 
introduction by the junta of a massive military 
expansion and modernization program. 
Methods and Results 
Landmines and IEDs have been used by all 
military forces in Myanmar, for both offensive and 
defensive purposes. As a general rule, the scarcity of 
resources has not permitted the mining oflarge tracts 
ofland but mines have been laid outside the perimeter 
Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields 
of both permanent and temporary camps to warn of 
approaching enemies and to defend against attack. 
They have bee n widely us ed along lines of 
communication, such as ra ilways, roads and 
pathways, to hinder the movement of troops and 
supplies. 
Landmines have been used to deny territory to 
the other side and to prevent the use of routes across 
the international border. Mines have also been laid 
to encourage local villagers either to leave particular 
areas, or to stay away from villages that have already 
been cleared or destroyed. The latter policy seems to 
be part of a deliberate and widespread campaign by 
the Myanmar Army to resettle local populations in 
an effort to deny insurgent groups food, funds, 
recruits and intelligence. 
As a result of all these developments Myanmar 
has suffered a large number of casualties from 
landmines over the years. Reliable stattstlcs are 
difficult to obtain but, according • Map c/o Jane's Intelligence 
to the U.S. State Department, in 
the early 1990s casualties from 
landmines were thought to 
account for about 15percent of all India 
military losses in Myanmar. 
Combatants have not been 
the only ones killed or maimed. 
So have many local villagers, 
particularly in the border areas 
where the fighting has lasted 
longer and usually been the most 
vicious. In 1993 it was estimated 
that each year in Myanmar over 
1,500 people were fitted with 
artificial limbs as a result of 
landmine explosions. Many more 
never received any attention. This 
number has declined since the 
negotiation of cease-fires among 
most insurgent groups, but 
casualties from land mines remain 
high. According to an official 
based in Rangoon, most land-
mine victims now come from 
Karen State. 
G reatly exacerbatin g this 
problem has been the poor 
management of the mine fields 
laid. Both the Myanmar Army 
and various insurgent groups have 
failed to keep accurate or 
comprehensive records of where 
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• Field surgery is carried out 
on a mine victim in Kayah 
State by the Backpack 
Health Worker Team, an 
ethnic-based emergency 
medical non-governmental 
organization based on the 
border of Myanmar and 
Thailand. 
c/o Jane's Intelligence 
mines have been placed. Local villagers are often nor 
informed of their whereabouts for security reasons. 
During the fall of the KNLA's base at Manerplaw, 
for example, the militant All Burma Students 
Democratic Front revealed that all casualties resulted 
from their own defensive mine field, nor enemy fire. 
Even government soldiers often do not know where 
their mines have been laid. 
Proper maps are rarely produced and often, when 
a military unit leaves an area, precise details about 
the local mine fields are not passed on. Even when 
this does occur, the smaller plastic mines now used 
by the Myanmar Army can be washed away during 
heavy rainfall to new, unknown locations. 
One saving grace in the past was that the land-
mines used were made of metal and were liable to 
rust, rendering them inoperable after one or two rainy 
seasons. The batteries required for detonation by 
some insurgent mines rarely lasted more than six 
months. Also, the wooden stakes used ro set up some 
kinds of AP fragmentation mines had a relatively 
short life in areas where the climate was hot and wet. 
According to one government source, some mines 
used by the Myanmar Army during the 1960s and 
1970s became unserviceable because the explosive 
charge tended to be eaten by ants. 
The more modern mines now being used by the 
Rangoon regime, however, have much longer lives. 
They are made from more durable materials, do not 
rely on batteries and remain serviceable much longer 
after being laid. Also, it appears that, where possible, 
stake AP mines are being placed on metal spikes so 
they remain effective for longer periods. Plastic 
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lightweight mines are also being used by insurgent 
groups- mainly Chinese Type 72 AP blast mines and 
U.S.-made M-14 mines (or copies of the M-14 from 
Vietnam and Singapore). 
Mines Used in Myanmar 
A wide range of landmines appear to have been 
used in Myanmar over the years. Details are hard to 
obtain, but it would appear that before 1988 the 
Myanmar Army had access to common Eastern bloc 
AP mines such as the POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M 
stake-mounted AP fragmentation mines. It is highly 
likely that Myanmar also imported (or was given as 
part of military aid packages) a range of other AP 
and AV land mines. These would have probably come 
from countries like the United Kingdom, United 
States, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, all of which 
provided arms to Myanmar at one time or another. 
For example, it is believed that the Myanmar Army 
was familiar with U .S.-man ufactured M-18 Claymore 
mines, M-16 bounding fragmentation mines, M-14 
AP blast mines and M-7 AV mines. It is also believed 
that Yugoslavia provided AV mines to Myanmar in 
the 1950s and possibly the 1960s. 
During this period the insurgents bought U.S., 
Soviet and Chinese mines on the black market or, as 
in the case of the CPB, were directly supplied by 
China. The latter shipments appear to have included 
large quantities ofType 58 AP blast mines. This is a 
direct copy of the Russian PMN mine. The Chinese 
probably also supplied the CPB with their own 
versions of the POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M stake mines, 
known as the Type 58 and Type 59 respectively. There 
has been at least one report of a Chinese Type 59 
"shoebox" AP mine (a copy of the Russian PMD-6 
mine) also being used. 
Since the Myanmar armed forces rook back direct 
control of the country in 1988, the Rangoon regime 
(known initially as the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council , and after 1997 as the State Peace 
and Development Council ) has faced an a rms 
embargo at the hands of its traditional suppliers. As a 
consequence, it has been forced to rely on a much 
wider range of sources for its arms and mili tary 
equipment. 
Most mines have come from China, but 
Singapore, Pakistan, Israel, Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
and Portugal are also known to have sold arms or 
ammunition to Myanmar's military regime over the 
past 12 wars. China and Singapore are the most likely 
NON-STATE ACTORS IN MYANMAR 
polit ical organization Armed wing Ceasefire? AP mine user? Producer? Stockpile? Mines in territory? 
Arakan State 
Arakan Liberation Army No ? ? ? Yes Arakan Liberation Party 
Arakan Army No Likely Likely Likely Yes Arakan Army of Arakan Land (eke NUPA) 
Rohingya Army No Yes ? Yes Yes Rohingya Solidarity Organization 
Arakan Peoples Army No ? ? ? Yes Democratic Party Arakan (former NUFA) 
Pohingya National Army No Command detonated No Yes Yes Arakan Pohingys National Orgamzat1on 
Chin State 
Chin National Army No Command detonated Claim no Yes Yes Chin National Front 
Sagain g Division 
Kuki National Army No ? ? ? Likely Kuki National Front 
National Socialist Council ? ? Likely Likely Likely National Socialist Council of Nagaland 
(Khaplang) of Nagaland 
? ? Likely 
zomi National Front Zomi National Army No ? 
Kachin State 
Kachin Independency Army Yes Not currently Former Likely Yes Kachin Independence Organization 
Kachin Democratic Army Yes ? ? ? ? (former KIA 4th Brigade) 
New Democratic Army Yes ? ? ? ? (former CPB 1 01 ) 
Shan Stat e 
No Command detonated Claim no Yes Yes Restoration Council of Shan State Shan State Army 
(alliance SURA, former MTA) 
United Wa State Army Yes Likely Former ? Yes United Wa Organisation 
Shan State Nationalities Yes ? ? ? Yes Shan State Nationalities People's 
Liberation Organization Peoples Liberation 
Organization 
? ? Yes Palaung People's Liberation Organisation Palaung State Liberation Army Yes ? 
Wa National Army No ? ? ? Yes Wa National Organisation 
Yes ? ? ? Yes (former CPB 815) National Democratic 
Alliance Army 
Karenni State 
Yes Likely Likely Likely Yes (former CPB ally) Karenni National People's 
Liberation Forces 
Karenni Army Broken Yes Yes Likely Yes Karenni National Progressive Party 
Yes Likely Likely Likely Yes Karenni National Democratic Front Karenni National 
Democratic Army 
Karen State 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Karen National Union Karen National 
Liberation Army 
Likely Yes Yes Democratic Karen Buddhist Organisation Democratic Karen No Yes 
Buddhist Army 
All Burma Students Democratic Front All Burma Students No Likely Likely Yes 
Democratic Front 
? ? Yes All Burma Muslim Union No ? All Burma Muslim Union 
Command detonated Claim no Yes Yes People's Defense Forces People's Defense Forces No 
? ? ? Yes People 's Liberation Front People's Liberation Front No 
Mon State 








Command detonated ? Yes Yes Myeik-Dawei United Front Myolk-Dawel United Front No 
Yes Yes Yes Karen National Union Karen National No Yes 
Liberation Army 
All Burma Students All Burma Students No Command detonated Yes Yes 
Democratic Front Democratic Front 
Yes Yes [KNU break-away] God's Army No Yes ? 
Notes for non-state actors chart: . 
Ceasef~re: Has verbally negotiated ceasefire agreement with SLOPC or SPDC (no written agreements extst). 
AP mme use,. Is currently practicing mine warfare, either defensively or offens•vely. . . . ti r onnel landmines 
PrOducer: Ma~ufactures improvised explosive devices which have the characteristic of an anti-personnel landmme, or alter other mumtlons to serve as an -pe s . 
StOCkpile: Maintains a store of mines, or components, for use in wartare, . . 
Mines m territory: Mines now in·the-ground in their province or division of activity, Could be laid by themselves, alltes or adversanes, 
· 1 1 th 1 t included Revolutionary political organizations, which do not maintain an 
There Is a variety of small, self-proclaimed armed groups ~hat. are dysfu~ctlonal or not cd~rrethnt y act ~~cs :.a~~e ,~; sell-perp~tuation rather than any real political activity. Several armed 
armed wing, are not Included. Some of these armed organozat1ons are pnmarily Involve m e narco 
groups are quite small and work only in alliance with other groups. Chan c/o Jane's Intelligence 
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of these countries to have included landmines in their 
arms shipments to Myanmar. 
There is evidence that since 1989, when the BCP 
collapsed and bilateral relations with China rapidly 
improved, Beijing has supplied Myanmar with AP 
landmines. In addition to those types noted above. 
One source in Rangoon has suggested that these 
shipments have included the Type 69 Chinese AP 
bounding fragmentation mine, similar to the US-
made M-16, popularly known as the "Bouncing 
Betty." Both U.S. and Chinese mines of this type 
have been used in recent operations by the Tatmadaw 
in the Taninthayi Division. The Chinese Type 72 AP 
blast mine has also been used against insurgents in 
recent years, as well as an (as yet unidentified) Italian-
designed AP blast mine. Mines manufactured by 
Singapore and Israel are also reported to have been 
used in Myanmar, but this has not yet been con-
firmed. 
The military regime in Rangoon, however, has 
never been comfortable relying on foreign countries 
for its military supplies. Since the mid-1950s it has 
built up a network of its own defence industries, 
capable of producing a range of arms and ammuni-
tion, including landmines. There is evidence that this 
capability has recently been increased. 
Mine Manufacture 
For some years before 1988 Myanmar had been 
able to produce its own landmines at a German-built 
factory in the regime's heavily guarded defence 
industrial complex on the western side of the 
Taninthavi (Irrawaddy) River, near Pyay. Most appear 
to have been copies of proven Eastern bloc stake and 
pressure AP mines, known locally as lu-rhar (AP) 
mines, bur some AV mines were probably also 
produced. 
About two years ago, however, a secret agreement 
was reportedly signed with China for the construction 
of a completely new factory near Meikhrila in central 
Myanmar, solely to produce landmines. Although 
sources disagree on the progress made on the factory 
since then, it seems that serial production of some 
mine types has begun. 
From the limi ted information available, this 
factory is believed to produce at least five types of 
mines, designated MM-1 through to MM-5. The 
MM-1 is essentially the Chinese Type 59 AP stake-
mounted mine, with slight modifications to the 
detonator and weather cap. The MM-2 design closely 
follows char of China's Type 58 AP blast mine. Two 
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variants of the MM-2 have been confirmed. The 
characteristics of the MM-3, MM-4 and MM-5 
landmines are still unknown , although it is possible 
that one is an AV mine. 
Myanmar produces a shi-twe directional mine, 
possibly a copy of the M-18 Claymore, which may 
have been given a 'MM' designation. Following rhe 
practice adopted by Myanmar's defence Industries in 
the past, these designations probably mean Myanmar 
Mine 1, Myanmar Mine 2 and so on. 
Most informed Myanmar watchers believe that 
China is still providing technical assistance and spare 
parts for the Meikhtila factory, as well as some of the 
key components used in the manufacture of these 
mines. Singapore (which manufactures its own range 
of plastic-bodied AP and AV mines, including some 
under licence) may have assisted in the establishment 
and operation of this plant. Singapore is secretly 
assisting Myanmar in other areas of arms manufacture, 
such as the production of a new family of infantry 
weapons. Claims that it is helping to produce land-
mines in Myanmar cannot be proved. 
Most insurgent groups maintained workshops in 
which to repair and manufacture weapons, including 
landmines. After the collapse of the BCP in 1989, 
Khun Sa probably had rhe greatest capacity of all 
Myanmar's insurgent groups and narcotics-based 
armies to manufacture and lay landmines. When he 
surrendered in 1996 the Myanmar Army took 
possession of, and reportedly destroyed, over 2,000 
landmines that had been stored at his Ho Mong base 
camp. Most appear to have been AP mines, bur Khu n 
Sa also had a stock of large AV mines chat he claimed 
was ro protect his camp from "external aggression." 
It is not known what specific kinds of mines were 
being manufactured or held in the MTA's inventory, 
but they are most likely to have been copies of the 
simpler, locally producedAP mines, like the POMZ-
2M. 
Other insurgent groups have not had the funds, 
expertise or facilities to make landmines of this kind, 
or on this scale. Most have tended to rely on booby-
traps and other lEOs. Explosives from quarries in 
Myanmar or neighboring states have been obtained 
and placed in any available container-usually plastic 
pipes or bamboo links. Sometimes glass bottles have 
been used as glass readily lends itself to fragmentation. 
Metal waste and nails have been added as shrapnel to 
make the mine even more destructive. 
Electric detonators were obtained from the same 
quarries. Trip plates were made of wood and wire, and 
were linked to a common dry cell battery. These im-
provised mines are quite effective but usually have a 
limited life, often no more than six months, as the 
baneries tend to run our after that rime. 
Insurgent groups like the Karen reportedly feel 
that their limited funds are better used to buy guns 
and ammunition, rather than components for 
landmines. Because of the current shortage of 
resources, they try to dig up and rake their landmines 
with them when they move. 
Such is the demand for landmines in Myanmar 
that all stocks produced have been used in-country 
There have been no reports of the Rangoon regime 
or insurgent group exporting landmines to another 
country or group. 
Laying, Detection and Clearing 
The Myanmar armed forces rely mainly on 
traditional methods to lay mines- by hand. The 
army's Engineering Corps reportedly has some towed 
mine-laying vehicles when large areas are to be mined, 
but the difficult terrain in the insurgent areas of 
operation would restrict their effectiveness. 
Over the years, Myanmar Army engineers have 
used a variety of means to detect and clear mines. 
Manual methods, mainly using probes, have been 
most common. Since the early 1970s, however, a 
greater reliance has been placed on the use of 
mechanical mine detectors. In the past, these have 
included French DHPM-lA mine detection sets, 
White's Electronics 6000 Di-PRO SL detectors from 
the UK and UK-made NMD-9 equipment. There 
have also been reports that Myanmar manufactures 
irs own mine detector, known as the Tha-ma 93. This 
detector, which consists of a circular search head, 
carrying handle, battery-powered control box and a 
set of attached headphones, seems to be a copy, or 
maybe a modification, of an imported device. 
The Myanmar Army has Bangalore torpedoes, 
which can be used to clear pathways through mine 
fields, and has also used mine detecting and deto-
nating vehicles. These range from a jeep pushing a 
weighted trailer to set off the mines in irs path, and a 
tank-mounted mine roller designed to do rhe same 
thing, to a specially designed mine clearance plough. 
The latter seems simply to be a small tank with a 
bulldozer blade on the front of the vehicle. It is not 
known how many of these vehicles are in the 
Myanmar Army's order of battle, how or from where 
they were acquired. It is possible that some of these 
vehicles have been built by the Myanmar Army itself, 
Myanmar's Forgotten Mine Fields 
with designs based on well-known models for sale on 
the international marker. The nature of the terrain 
around Myanmar's borders, however, would restrict 
the use of such machines. 
The Tatmadaw has seriously considered the use 
of sniffer dogs to detect mines, bur how often this 
method has been used, and with what degree of 
success is unknown. 
There have also been numerous confirmed 
reports of rhe Myanmar Army using local villagers 
and forced laborers as human minesweepers. These 
people (including women and children) have been 
forced to walk ahead of military units, detonating 
any landmines or booby traps that lie in their path. 
Indiscriminate Use 
At present there is no sign that the Rangoon 
regime intends to reduce irs manufacture or use of 
landmines in Myanmar. Indeed, the opposite is true, 
with the increased use of AP mines against insurgents 
by the armed forces being fuelled by a new munitions 
factory and imports from friendly countries like 
C hina. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that the military government has consistently refused 
to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, stating to the U.N. 
that "a sweeping ban on landmines is urinecessary 
and unjustified." 
The problem is the indiscriminate use of mines, 
as well as the transfer of them. The opposition 
National League for Democracy, in contrast, has 
publicly stated that it would be prepared to support 
Myanmar's accession to the Ottawa Convention. At 
present, however, its activities (and those of its leader, 
Aung San Suu Kyi) have been severely curtailed by 
the regime and it has no scope to implement such a 
policy. 
The continuing manufacture and indiscriminate 
use of AP mines by the Myanmar armed forces seems 
set to continue. The insurgents, for their part, will 
also use mines and explosive booby traps in their 
struggle against the central government, made from 
whatever resources they can obtain. The inevitable 
result will be further casualties, as combatants and 
civilians alike are killed and maimed by these weapons 
in a part of the world that has not known peace for 
over 60 years. • 
Reprinted courtesy of jane's Intelligence Review, Oc-
tober 2000. 
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from right) is 
greeted by JMU 
professor Helmut 
Kraenzle (far 
right). c/o MAIC 
Vietnamese Ministry 
Tours U.S. Following Historic Agreement 
Delegation of Vietnamese de mining experts visits James Madison University's Mine 
Action Information Center as part of State Department-sponsored U.S. tour. Visit 
follows the United States's provision of $3 million in landmine aid to Vietnam. 
by Keith Feigenbaum, MAle 
Afive - man delegation of Vietnamese humanitarian de-mining experts recently 
toured the United States to gain an 
appreciation of the American view of 
humanitarian d emining concepts and 
operations. 
The U.S. Department of State-
sponsored visit with the Vietnam 
Ministry of D efense included 
meetings with top officials in the State 
Department and the U.S. Department 
of Defense. The trip was highlighted 
by visits to training sites, corporations 
involved in mine action, and the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA)-sponsored MAIC. 
The arrival of the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Defense followed close on 
the heels of the signing of a historic 
agreement that will provide Vietnam 
with over $3 million (U.S.) in land-
mine assistance in the coming years. 
After visiting the U.S. Army's 
Humanitarian Demining Research & 
Development Center in Fort Belvoir, 
Va., and leading U.S. demining 
organizations in the Washington D.C. 
region, the delegation made its way to 
JMU for briefings organized by the 
MAIC. The Vietnamese delegation 
was led on a campus-wide tour of 
JMU and was briefed by U.S . and 
MAIC officials on demining 
information managemenr. The MAIC 
also provided the results of its mine 
awareness campaign in Vietnam's 
Quang Tri province (site of the former 
DMZ). 
Although the Vietnamese defense 
officials were concerned primarily with 
mine clearance activities, they showed 
special interest in the MAIC's efforts 
to help the local populace in Quang 
Tri province spot and avoid mined 
areas. The delegation, led by Truong 
Quang Khanh, deputy commander of 
Vietnam's Ministry of National 
Defense, was addressed by JMU 
professors Anne Stewart and Terry 
Wessel, who ran the mine awareness 
program from October 1998 - March 
2000. 
Tom Smith, DSCA program 
manager for humanitarian assistance 
and demining programs, outlined the 
program management role his office 
will play in shaping the emerging U.S.-
Vietnam landmine project. 
About the visit to the MAIC, a 
State Department humanitarian 
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demining officer remarked, "The visit 
to JMU was great. It shows that [the 
United States] can do more than just 
provide equipment and gear to the 
Vietnamese mine action effort." 
The visit came just months after 
the United States and Vietnam signed 
a historic bilateral agreement that will 
allow the Vietnamese to receive 
modern demining equipment and 
other mine-related assistance through 
the U.S. Humanitarian Demining 
Program. The Vietnamese will receive 
$1.75 million worth of demining gear 
under the June 2000 agreement to aid 
in the removal of the estimated 3.5 
million mines, as well as vast amounts 
of UXO that contaminates its 
countryside and snarles its infra-
structure. 
The State Department also plans 
to provide $1.4 million to conduct a 
Level One impact survey which will 
help the Vietnamese to prioritize those 
areas which pose the greatest 
immediate threat to civilians, arable 
land and infrastructure. The DoD will 
target $200,000 for technical mapping 
of those selected sites, and $80,000 for 
mine awareness education and land-
mine database support. 
Following its tour of the MAIC, 
the delegation visited mine action-
related facilities at the Global Training 
Academy in Somerset, Texas, the 
Humanitarian Demining Training 
Center at Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo., and 
the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) 
and Asia-Pacific Network in Hawaii. 
• 
.... 
GERBERA: Mine Action 
Activities in Vietnam and Laos 
In an attempt to help Vietnamese villagers resettle their UXO-contaminated home-
land, Germany's GERBERA took the clearance initiative in 1998. As of July 2000, 
it had successfully relocated 40 families and expanded operations to Laos. 
By Lisa M . Vanada,MAIC 
Overview of GERBERA 
The GERBERA demining organization was founded in 1994 to provide three main services: EOD activities in Germany, where the organization is 
based; international EOD and demining assistance; and 
local and international special engineer services, which 
include the surveillance and cleanup of any kind of 
env ironmental waste. Although GERBERA often 
cooperates with humani tarian associations and local 
governments, it is equipped to deal with every facet of a 
mine clearance project. 
Resettlement and Relocation in Vietnam 
Over 25 years ago, villagers in the Quang Tri province 
ofVietnam were evacuated during the Vietnam War. These 
villagers abandoned their farms and homes for a military 
base situated in a nearby river valley. However, this situation 
was far from optimal because the river floods twice a year, 
limiting the agricultural success of the evacuees. In spite of 
the poor farming conditions, the villagers remained on the 
base; UXO contamination prevemed them from returning 
to their homelands. A German NGO based in Berlin 
recognized the need for a resettlement program and began 
the process of preparing the land for the villagers' return. 
In May of 1998, GERBERA began mapping the two 
villages in the districts of Cam Lo and Ai Tu. After 
methodically clearing 171 hectares of over 5,000 UXO, 
the villagers were finally allowed to return to their lands. 
ln an attempt to escape the UXO contamination of 
their land, villagers in Vietnam's Hue province migrated 
south to the Cau Hai lagoon. Approximately 5,000 peasants 
currently live on boats and attempt to make their living 
fishing in the overcrowded lagoon. The area is 
overpopulated and the constant fishing has expended the 
natural resources. The fish they catch are pathetically small; 
the biggest are only 5 em long and most of the local wildlife 
was displaced. Vogt explains the situation as "not only a 
social problem, but an environmental one." In 1999, 
GERBERA began surveying land designated for the 
relocation of the lagoon residents. It began removing UXO 
in July 2000 and has presently cleared enough land for 40 
families. 
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• Family boat in 
Cau'Hai Lagoon. 
c/oGERBERA 
Potsdam Kommunkation, the 
German NGO heading the relocation 
project, hopes that a stable village 
existence will allow families to send 
their children to school for the first 
time. In the past, many of the families 
t raveled seasonally to follow the fish 
Equipment and Clearance 
In addition to the resettlement 
and relocation projects in Vietnam, 
GERBERA is involved with UXO 
clearance in Laos. Since September 
1996, it has destroyed over 34,000 
IIGERBERA has a training advantage: Germany requires all 
civilian workers in EOD companies to complete an EOD 
training school in Dressen. All employees must receive 
their licenses from this school, and Vogt describes this 
license as a 1higher degree' for EOD workers." 
and the shrimp migration. Relocated 
families are given land where they can 
build homes and cultivate small farms. 
By working the land and earning a 
stable living they will be able to build 
a community with neighbors and 
village support. 
UXO in the Luang Prabang province. 
GERBERA has not used heavy mine 
clearing machinery in its Southeast 
Asian projects for two primary reasons: 
terrain and money. Heavy machinery 
is rarely used in Vietnam or Laos 
because of the muddy terrain and 
heavy forests, Vogt clarified this 
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decision as one based on convenience 
and environmental concern. "You can't 
use heavy machines if you destroy 
everything you want to preserve in the 
area," he said. Paddy fields , for 
example, are enclosed with small dams 
to retain the water. Because the average 
field is only 40 by 50 meters, large 
mine detection or clearance machinery 
taken through the area would destroy 
the dam and most of the field itsel( 
The expense of the equipment 
also negates practicality. GERBERA 
tested a computerized detection 
program in Laos; the same program 
has been used successfully in Germany. 
Although this technology is feasible in 
a stable economic environment with 
high wages, the relatively low wages 
in the developing countries in South-
east Asia make expensive technology 
an unlikely option from a financial 
management perspective. Mine 
clearance organizations usually find it 
more efficient to hire a larger number 
of clearance workers than to use 
expensive computerized systems. Local 
workers are readily available, relatively 
inexpensive to hire, and welcome the 
opportunity to suppl ement their 
income and participate in clearance 
activities that increase the safety of 
their £'lmilies and villages. 
Although few mines are found in 
Vietnam, several types of UXO, 
primarily different types of bomblets 
and rifle grenades, contaminate the 
countryside. The M -16 rifles used in 
the war held a small device used to 
launch 40-mm grenades. These rifle 
grenades litter the region and present 
a constant threat. Because the grenades 
were intended to explode shortly after 
they were launched, the fuses are very 
sensitive. Vegetation often partially or 
fully conceals these grenades, which 
have caused more fatal injuries after 
the war than any other types ofUXO. 
Due to the terrain, expense and 
type of UXO contamination, 
GERBERA uses handheld metal 
detectors to locate UXO positions and 
depths. This simple technology is 
reliable and well-suited to the projecr. 
After using rhe metal detectors to scan 
a plotted area, a detailed map is drawn 
up fo r use in clearance and disposal. 
According to Vogt, clearing the mines 
is the most difficult step in their work. 
Project supervisors personally inspect 
UXO or clear a specific area , 
GERBERA's activities in Southeast 
Asia require large tracts of land to be 
entirely clear ofUXO and prepared for 
human inhabitants. To ensure that rhe 
designated land is completely mine-
free, GERBERA usually relies on two 
forms of quality assurance: internal 
quality control and external quality 
GERBERA designed a system 
requiring each project to create and use 
a test field. The test field begins as a 
completely cleared piece of land; any 
objects or minerals that will cause the 
mine detectors to signal are removed. 
Next they carefully map and create 
defined signal sites where metal pieces 
are inserted at different pre-
GERBERA often asks village religious leaders for the best dates and times for major 
project events, such as the opening of a project or the introduction of a new 
building. This approach shows consideration for the village's cultural traditions. 
eac h UXO to analyze the type, 
location , and other factors tha t 
determine if it is possible to move the 
UXO. If it can be moved, the workers 
carefully transport the UXO to a 
designated demolition site. Most of 
the mines GERBERA has encoumered 
are very old and sensitive. If mines are 
too unstable to transport, they are 
destroyed in situ. 
Quality Assurance 
GERBERA places a great deal of 
emphasis on the importance of quality 
assurance . Unlike some demining 
organizations, who respond to a com-
munity request to remove a particular 
• Clearance worker in Quang Tri. 
c/oGERBERA 
control. Because Vietnam and Laos do 
not place external quality controls, 
GERBERA's internal system has been 
revised to provide several levels of 
clearance checks. 
A typical mine clearance ream 
consists of several workers who are 
given daily assignments of UXO-
contaminated zones. Their goal is to 
clear the entire area of any mines, 
UXO or metal objects that could cause 
a metal detector to sound its alarm. 
At the end of each day, team 
commanders canvas between 20-50 
percent of the area their team has 
cleared that day. He checks the area 
without any consistent system, so the 
clearance workers are never certain 
which portions of their area or the 
adjoining areas will be inspected. The 
commander should be able to navigate 
throughout the cleared areas without 
hearing a single beep from the mine 
detector. Any detected items are 
removed immediately and the 
commander restarts the inspection. 
Because this quality assurance 
system relies heavily upon the 
functionality of the metal detectors, 
these handheld devices are frequently 
checked. Commanders test their 
equipment every morning and after 
every break to make sure that it is 
working properly. In addition to daily 
inspections of metal detectors, 
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determined depths. All metal detectors 
must complete these test fields on a 
weekly basis, and every detector is 
graded for the detection accuracy of 
every signal site. 
This consistent rest for detection 
and depth allows the handlers to 
notice slight changes, as the grades are 
compared for any alterations. Frequent 
evaluation of tests and results allows 
workers to determine even sl ight 
technical aberrations. Vogt explains 
the importance of this early detection. 
"It's very easy to realize if a technical 
instrument breaks down completely," 
he says, "but very often ir's not a 
sudden breakdown but [it] goes slowly. 
I r's a process. By using this test field, 
we can realize very early if such a 
weakness occurs." 
Training 
As a German-based organization, 
GERBERA has a training advantage: 
Germany requires all civilian workers 
in EOD companies to complete an 
EOD training school in Dressen. All 
employees must receive their licenses 
from their school, and Vogt describes 
this license as a "higher degree" for 
EOD workers. Even officers of the 
Germany military, regardless of rank 
and professional experience, are not 
permitted to participate in EOD work 
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without obtaining this license. 
GERBERA uses the material from this 
German EOD school to train local 
workers they hire for specific projects. 
The training the workers receive 
depends on the tasks they will be 
assigned and the requirements of the 
local government. 
In Laos, all workers complete 
basic UXO and landmine training in 
UXO-Lao's National Training School 
based in Vientiane. 
The United States founded this 
school. Special Forces reams from the 
Pacific Forces train the local deminers. 
GERBERA also provides training for 
specific project assignments and tasks; 
this specialized training often includes 
regional Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and an intro-
duction to the culture. The task has 
been simplified over the years through 
standardization. When the demining 
activities began, every organization 
had irs own SOPs that GERBERA 
contractors needed to learn. 
Eventually SOPs were standardized, 
and they are currently unified for Laos. 
In Vietnam, the training system 
must accommodate the Vietnamese 
government's regulations. Only the 
higher-ranking officers are permitted 
to receive the advanced training, but 
basic training is provided daily for the 
lower-ranking Vietnamese officers and 
soldiers. Basic training includes 
instructions for removing the normal 
technology, the difference in the 
technology between mine clearance 
and UXO clearance, safety procedures, 
technical procedures, requirements for 
quality control inspections, and 
standard GERBERA rules and 
regulations. The high-ranking officers 
receive special training on fuses, 
ammunition and demolition work, 
equipment handling and mainten-
ance, and technical derails for repair 
work. 
Cultural Respect 
Interactions between the villagers 
and the professional deminers are 
frequent and can be helpful, as the 
villagers often provide crucial 
information on UXO locations and 
terrain. In return, the experts establish 
mine awareness education programs 
and attempt to accommodate local 
customs. GERBERA professionals are 
taught to respect the cultural and 
religious traditions upheld by the 
countries in which they work. Vogr 
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related an event that illustrates the 
importance of respecrfulexchanges, 
particularly when cultural or religious 
infractions are unknowingly made. 
At the end of a workday in a 
remote village in Laos, a GERBERA 
team prepared to destroy the collected 
munitions. The team leader visited all 
the houses in the village to advise the 
residents that they should leave. At one 
of the houses, he called out to ask if 
anyone was home. Hearing a muted 
voice from inside the house, he 
stepped over the flowers at the door 
to en rer the home and asked the 
woman inside to leave before they 
detonated the munitions. He returned 
to the project site unaware that the 
flowers at the entrance of the home 
signified that an occupant had died. 
Custom prohibits anyone except the 
wife of the dead husband from 
entering the house. 
After the detonation, the team 
prepared to leave the village but was 
stopped by the shaman. He told them 
the unwelcome visitor had disturbed 
the ghosts. To appease the ghosts they 
must perform a very expens ive 
ceremony, and the whole team must 
remain in the village for three days. 
After a lengthy dispute the German 
commander paid the equivalent of two 
dollars, the villagers were satisfied, and 
the team was allowed to leave. 
Vogt stressed that the most 
important aspect of this transaction 
was respect. He explained, "If you 
negotiate with the peasants you have 
to respect their feelings and their 
traditions. It was impossible simply to 
leave." Several GERBERA policies 
reflect the value it places on respectful 
exchanges. 
Expanding Mine Awareness 
A complete GERBERA project 
task force includes a community 
awareness team. For the project in 
Laos, the team members attended 
UXO Lao classes on mine awareness 
and safety education. Although some 
of rhe members are already teachers, 
rhey are all taught basic teaching skills 
and methods for increasing mine 
awareness. Team members are taught 
ro accompany their reaching sessions 
with diagrams, pictures, illustrations 
and puppet shows targeted at children. 
In Laos, the GERBERA Commu-
n ity Awareness Team found it 
necessary to teach adults and children 
alike not to make an open fire in the 
woods without first checking the soil. 
After the occurrence of several 
different incidents involving villagers 
who died cultivating new farmland, 
the team incorporated lessons teaching 
the villagers not to cultivate new land 
before the area is cleared. 
Mine education in Vietnam is 
conducted with the cooperation of rhe 
schools. The GERBERA Community 
Awareness Team contacts reachers to 
schedule mine education sessions. 
Team members frequently revise 
sessions to incorporate information 
pertinent to local situations or 
perspectives. Shortly after GERBERA 
arrived in Vietnam, the Community 
Awareness Team developed an 
educational program to address the 
dangers of scrap metal collecting. 
M any Vietnamese men gathered 
grenades and UXO to sell as scrap 
metal, but often their crude digging 
tools and inexperience led to injuries 
and death. The teaching sessions were 
most successful when they focused on 
educating the women and children. 
The women could often persuade their 
husbands and sons to stop recovering 
scrap metal. 
Continued Diligence 
Vogt emphasized that the adher-
ence ro structured project assessments, 
quality control regulations, equipment 
assessments and promotion of mine 
education and awareness is not lim-
ited to the projects in Laos and Viet-
nam. GERBERA personnel are re-
quired to complete advanced training 
in services ranging from mine detec-
tion, mapping, and mine neutraliza-
• The munitions pictured are typical ofthose littered throughoutVitenam's 
Quang Tri province. c/o GERBERA 
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tion and clearance, to mine awareness 
education and local training. Because 
they offer a wide range of skills and 
knowledge, GERBERA personnel are 
often called upon to provide specific 
assistance for international demining 
programs, in addition to entire project 
assignments. As long as humanitarian 
organizations and local and interna-
tional governments and associations 
continue to acknowledge and address 
mine contamination problems, 
GERBERA plans to continue their 
mine action and their efforts to cleanse 
the environment. • 
Much of rhe contenr for rhis anicle has been 
garhered fro m an imerview with Lurz Vogt, the 
General Manager for GERBERA. Vogr is 
responsible for GERBERA's demining and 
UXO clearance activities and has panicipared 
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The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program: 
Engagement in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand 
The Humanitarian Demining Program is working with U.S. government agendes 
and NGOs to provide mine awareness training, mine clearance, clearance training, 
medical services and the latest in demining technology to mine-affected nations. 
by Kela Morehead, U.S. State Department Fellow 
T he U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program administered by the United Nations, the Organization of (USHDP) seeks to relieve human suffering while American States, or the U.S. Agency of International promoting U.S. interests. The program's objectives Development (USAID). 
are to establish and suppon sustainable indigenous A mine-affected country in need of aid can request 
demining programs, reduce civilian casualties, create con- United States assistance via the U .S. embassy in that 
ditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons to country. The embassy reviews the request and forwards it 
their homes, reinforce the stability of affected countries, to the IWA on Humanitarian Demining in Washington 
and encourage international cooperation and participation. D.C. The IWA is responsible for approving, developing 
USHDP is a comprehensive effort supporting mine and coordinating U.S. humanitarian demining policy and 
acrion initiatives including: mine aware- -----~ programs. Its members include policy and 
ness, the clearance of priority land, train- technical experts from several government 
ing host country deminers, review- agenc1es. 
ing and accelerating promising The IWG is chaired by the U.S. 
technologies, and medical and Department of State and vice-
rehabilitative assistance to survi- chaired by the Department of 
vors of landmine accidenrs. 1 Defense. Other members include 
On Sept. 13, 1993, the Na- the National Security Council, 
tiona! Security Council estab- USAID and the Central Inrelli-
lished an Interagency Working gence Agency (CIA). To date, the 
Group(IWG)onlandminesand United States has assisted 37 
demining. The implementation different country programs around 
of this directive resulted in the es- the world, including demining efforts 
tablishment of core concepts for the in Kosovo and Somaliland. The United 
USHDP. The IWG on Humanitarian States has contributed nearly a half a 
Demining is charged with identifying billion dollars to the eradication oflandmines. 
which countries receive U.S. demining assistance 
and managing U.S. resources committed to the program. 
The United States seeks to tailor each program to the 
needs of each nation and often works in cooperation with 
inrernational agencies and host governments of mine-
affected states all over the world. The United States supports 
mine clearance operations and mine awareness programs 
by providing training, expertise and equipment support 
through programs of the U.S. Department of Defense. 
Support also comes from funding, training and operations 
provided by commercial organizations or NGOs. In 
countries where a direct U.S. military training mission is 
not necessary, the United States contributes to programs 
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U.S. Activities in Asia 
There are 16 mine-affected nations in Asia.2 The 
United States currently has four programs within South 
Asia: Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and, most recently, 
Vietnam. Most of these South Asian demining programs 
have been established within the past five years, but are 
al ready saving lives and improving what could be 
considered dangerous living condi tions. Southeast Asia 
has an extensive UXO and landmine problem that the 
United States is committed to eradicating. 
The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program 
VIETNAM 
The United States has supported the NGOs presence 
in Vietnam for many years, building the framework for 
improved U.S.-Vietnam relations. A formal demining 
program for Vietnam was approved in June 2000, allowing 
greater U.S. assistance and further demining initiatives. 
USAID alone has provided Vietnam with over $5 million 
(U.S.) used for various initiatives in order to assist with 
the development ofVietnamese programs and insuring the 
economic stability and indigenous support for the programs 
created. 
U.S. Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and 
Related Programs (NADR) funds were allocated in 1998 
and 1999 to Vietnam for the establishment of a mine 
awareness and training center. The MAIC at JMU was 
chartered by the State Department Humanitarian 
Demining Program Office in 1999 to develop a mine 
awareness program in Vietnam. The goals of the program 
were to develop mine awareness education knowledge, 
teach requisite management skills, and implement a 
rudimentary min e awareness campaign with the 
government and the people of Quang Tri province, 
Vietnam. 
The mine awareness program operations were 
developed in accordance with Vietnam's National Plan for 
Sustainable Development from 1991 to 2000. The overall 
goal of the project was to influence the behaviors , 
perceptions and attitudes of families living in Quang Tri, 
thus allowing them to escape or minimize the effects of 
latent unexploded munitions by providing appropriate 
knowledge and techniques to the children and families of 
the region. This methodology was selected because it used 
an iterative building block approach that utilized maximum 
support of, and ongoing collaboration and cooperation 
with, the People's Committe officials, the Women's Union 
and the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children 
representatives, and the people of the province. To the 
extent that its goals were achieved, the project was successful 
because each component activity was conducted within 
the context of a working partnership with the host nation 
populace. 
In 2000, over $1.7 million was contributed to Viet-
nam for the start up of a humanitarian demining center, 
in addition to demining and mine awareness equipment. 
The United States is also supporting a Level One Survey 
in Vietnam to record the severity of landmine and UXO 
infestation, and to better formulate a plan of action. In 
2001, the United States plans to allocate more than 
$2 million to support mine action in Vietnam. 
The U.S. government is ready to continue to support 
the large NGO population present in Vietnam, but is now 
assisting with the start up of the newly approved U.S.-
Vietnamese Humanitarian Demining Program. With more 
opportunities to help fimd landmine/UXO clearance, provide 
mine awareness and victims' assistance, while building 
cooperative relationships, Vietnam will soon be along the path 
to saving lives and healing the wounds caused by past conflict. 
LAOS 
Intense combat from 1964 to 1973 in Laos led to the 
extreme UXO situation present there today. The primary 
threat to civilians in Laos is UXO, not AP mines, though 
both are present. Two million tons of ordnance were 
dropped on Laos, of which 30 percent is unexploded. Over 
half of the country is plagued with UXO today. The most 
contaminated areas are northern provinces like Houaphan 
and Xieng Khouang and the eastern border, which had 
been heavily bombed. These weapons continue to kill 
people more than 25 years after the original conflict. 
The United States has been assisting Laos since 1995. 
Over $14 million has been provided for humanitarian 
demining projects, mine awareness programs and victims' 
assistance, via the Department of Defense, State 
Department and USAID. The United States is the largest 
contributor to the UXO/ landmine relief in Laos, providing 
over 25 percent of its total contributions. The United States 
has had an active role in UXO Lao programs since 1996, 
and has also been its single largest donor. Funds contributed 
by the United States maintain mine/UXO awareness in 
eight provinces, mine/UXO clearance in seven others, and 
created rapid response teams in the remaining five. In 1996 
and 1997, U.S. money helped established UXO Lao and 
fund training for UXO clearance, community mine 
awareness and medical care for UXO Lao personnel. The 
Nam Suang UXO Training Center was also supported by 
the United States and staffed by Lao instructors. This center 
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class in session. 
c/o USHDP 
offers courses in community aware ness, clearance 
techniques, medical training and leadership development. 
By the end of 1999, U.S. military contingents had trained 
more than 815 indigenous personnel and created a self-
sustaining training capaciry. The U.S. trained deminers 
have destroyed more than 100,000 pieces ofUXO and 43 
landmines. 
.Through international donations and support, 300 
medt~a.l st~ff personnel have received training in emergency 
rehabdaauon and laboratory services. One provincial and 
five district hospitals have received medical equipmenr and 
supplies. The United States and others within the inrer-
narional humanitarian demining communiry will continue 
to support the well-rounded and effective UXO Lao 
program. 
CAMBODIA 
Cambodia's land mine and UXO problem was caused 
by two decades of war. Four million to 6 million landmines 
on 3,000 km 2 of land compose the threat that 23 
Cambodian provinces suffer. There is a minimum of 50 
casualties a monrh attributed to landmines. In addition to 
the devastating physical and medical problems landmine 
and UXO accidents cause, socioeconomic ramifications are 
also increasing. War C hild has reported that without this 
landmine problem "agri cultural production could increase 
.. . 135 percenr in Cambodia."8 
In 1.997, the United Nations train ed 537 Royal 
Cambo~t~n Armed Forces (RCAF) engineers resulting in 
the demmmg of800,000 sq. m of viable land along a major 
htghway. Cambodia has received equipment from the U.N . 
Development Program Trust Fund and over $23 million 
in NADR funds from the United States. The United States 
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has pr?vided trainin~ for I ,200 personnel in basic demining 
techntques, leadershtp, medtcal skills and mine awareness 
Mine clearance operations led to the reconstruction of~ 
r?ad and bridge, opening access to a chief city for the first 
ttme tn 20 years. 
The Cambodian Red C ross Mine Incident Database 
has been a huge project initiated by the NGOs. The 
information entered into this database will further help 
the humanitarian demining cause of Cambodians. Further 
initiatives by the Rural Planning Committees and the 
RCAF, with the contributions from the United States led 
to the establishment of the Cambodian Mine Action Center 
(CMAC). CMAC, with the help of the United States and 
other international donors, has reduced the casualty rate 
from landmmes by 90 percent. Still, one in 45 Cambodians 
ts an ~mputee, presenting a new problem facing this 
landmme-scourged society. 
USAID has invested over $6 .8 million in the 
Cambodia Prosthetics and Rehabilitation Program since 
1 9~2. USA! D. money also goes to support the Disability 
Acuon .Counctl ~~d ~AF, to assist landmine victims by 
expandmg rehabt!ttatton and job training programs, and 
by strengthening the institutions that Cambodian society 
needs to sustain such programs. These programs have 
produced an d fined 635 multi-axle fee t and 1,300 
thermoplastic prostheses and treated 8,000 patients. 
THAILAND 
. Th~iland 's landmine problem is the result of past 
mr~rnalmsurg~ncies, as well as armed conflicts with neigh-
bonng countnes. There are an estimated 100,000 land-
mines located along Thailand's borders with Cambodia, 
Burma, Laos and Malaysia. T hose mines are on approxi-
mately 900 sq. km of land and affect 18 provinces. 
The United Stares first provided Thailand with a 
provisional $1?. million in 1999. T he provisional money 
funded a demtnmg school for mine awareness classes in 
The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program 
Lop Buri, a facility for basic demining in Ratchaburi, while 
also providing essential demining equipment. Sin ce 1999 
the United States has provided nearly $5 million to 
Thailand's humanitarian demining efforts. U.S. Special 
Forces contingents have trained more than 100 Thai 
deminers to international standards. Thailand's Mine 
Action Center (TMAC) was officially dedicated in January 
2000 and demining activities actually began later that year 
in July. TMAC will become a key instrument to further 
humanitarian demining assistance and mine clearance 
initiatives in Thailand. Within the past year the U.S. and 
T hai governments have d ecid ed to initiate a Mine 
Detecting Dog Program. RONCO Consulting Company 
has been contracted to provide support for the Dog 
Program in Thailand beginning in 2001. Mine detecting 
dog programs have been successful in many other countries, 
increasing mine clearance productiviry while also insuring 
greater safery for both deminers and demining dogs. 
Future for Demining 
T he future for d emining efforts looks bright fo r 
Southeast Asia. International cooperation, NGO support 
and U.S. assistance supports productive work within Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. More equipment, funds 
and mine action is planned for 200 I within each of these 
countries, saving more lives and eradicating the dangerous 
evidence of conflic ts from the past. T he United States plans 
to assist NGO projects in Cambodia, help provide more 
equipment and protective gear for demining efforts there, 
and continue to support (via UNDP) the work done by 
CMA C. Laos is continuing irs demining efforts and the 
United States will make equipmenr provisions and support 
the Lao Trust Fund. Thailand's dog program wi ll have the 
backing of the United Stares, while Sa Kaew and HMAU 
put new demining equipment to positive use. Vietnam has 
continual NGO demining assistance, bur since irs approval 
for a formal demining program support and future 
demining efforts will accelerate. 
The Uni ted States has never been more committed to 
rhe land mine and UXO scourge in Southeastern Asia. The 
United Stares will continue to support the indigenous mine 
action efforts of countries already receiving U.S assistance, 
and will review new requests for assistance from neighbor-
ing UXO and landmine infested nations. Remarkable 
successes have been achieved in mature programs like 
Cambodia and Laos, and the new programs in Thailand 
and Vietnam. Hopefully, one day in the future, stabiliry 
and cooperation can reign over the whole Southeast Asia 
landmine crisis. • 
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The Children's Plight in Cambodia 
UNICEF's mine action initiative in Cambodia puts victim assistance, risk education 
and community awareness at the forefront. Efforts have helped produce a national 
mine incident database, which aids in planning and evaluating fundraising. 
by Chris Horwood, Team Leader of the External 
Evaluation, and Michel Le Pechoux, Children Affected 
by Armed Conflict Project Officer, UNICEF Cambodia 
A Sobering Context 
M ine action agencies in Cambodia continue to face a major challenge. In the past decade they have only been able to partially address the vast 
mines and UXO problem. This article seeks to show that 
despite this sobering context there are positive and 
important lessons to be learned from the Cambodian 
experience that need to be shared with the global mine 
action community as models for progress. Specifically, this 
article represents some lessons learned from UNICEF's 
mine action involvement in Cambodia, as highlighted in a 
recent external evaluation conducted for UNICEF. 
UNICEF Gets Involved 
UNICEF Cambodia first started assisting mine victims 
as part of its support to disabled persons in 1992. Direct 
support of mine action activities began in 1994 and has 
increased over the years toward the present more 
comprehensive multi-action support. UNICEF is now 
involved in a range of programs in the field of mine action, 
victim assistance and provision of basic social services, as 
well as community development in mine-affected 
communities. 
UNICEF Cambodia is unusual in that it has been 
closely involved with mine action initiatives beyond irs 
usual role of mine awareness in other countries {l). To 
assess its progress to date and as a guide for future direction, 
UNICEF commissioned an exrernal evaluation in mid-
2000 to assess activities supported for the prevention of 
mine/UXO accidents. A selective summary of the external 
evaluation (2), containing important lessons for other 
country programs are presented below. However, to put 
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these findings in context, the more sobering overview of 
mine action in Cambodia should be presented. 
Official Mine Action 
Cambodia is considered to have one of the longest 
running and most comprehensive mine action programs 
in the world. Over 3,750 people are direcrly involved in 
the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), along with 
the two demining NGOs, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
and HALO Trust. Commercial demining groups have had 
very limited involvement in the last decade. T he overall 
operational profile includes mine clearance, mine field 
marking, survey, mine awareness, EOD rapid-response, 
mine detection dogs and mine incident data gathering. 
Bur in the eight or nine years of operation only a 
fraction of the mined areas and an extremely small 
proportion of the millions of mines and UXO have been 
successfully addressed (3). There are still very large numbers 
of large, identified mine fields awaiting marking and 
clearance, and probably many more small ones that have 
yet to be identified. A national Level One survey was only 
started in Cambodia in 2000, eight years after the 
international response had begun. 
Estimates of the total number of mines in Cambodia 
have been reduced from 10 million to 4 million-6 million 
(and many millions of UXO) (4). Some claim rhe true 
figure of abandoned mines may be much lower(5). 
Numbers, however, are not the key issue: the vital issue is 
where they are and whom they affect through injury, death, 
land denial and socioeconomic debilitation. Despite the 
significant decrease in the past two years, the number of 
new mines/UXO accidents remains one of the highest in 
the world. Since 1979, an estimated 40,000 persons have 
lost limbs as a result of mine/UXO accidenrs and will 
require physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation for the 
rest of their lives. Mines and UXO still constitute a threat 
for thousands of families and an obstacle to the 
development of these communities. In 1998, civilians 
represented 50 percenr of all casualties 
and soldiers 50 percent. In 2000, as a 
result of the end of hostilities and the 
return of the population to former 
conflict a reas , the proportion of 
civi lian causalities has risen to 93 
percent with 30 percent of these being 
children under 18 years of age. 
The efforts and efficient use of the 
resources of mine acrion greatly 
depend on effective prioritization and 
targeting. Also, the end-use of cleared 
land and who exactly benefits from 
mine action is of central importance. 
In Cambodia, a community-level 
request approach is being formalized 
and empowered through the new 
provincial land use planning 
mechanisms. 
The number of mine incidents is 
now dropping significantly. From 
1996-98 the average monthly casualty 
rate was 202 incidents. However, from 
1999-2000 there was a d ramaric 
decrease to an average monthly rate 
of 77 incidents. In October 2000, 
there were just 36 casualties reported. 
T his is a very hopeful trend. 
In terestingly, the statistics do nor 
indicate that the declining figures are 
beneficial impact on levels of injury 
and death as well as on the socio-
economic development of commu-
nities living in mined areas. 
Unofficial Mine Action 
In numerous communities of 
subsistence farms, people have no 
choice bur to live, travel and work in 
high-risk areas. In many cases people 
have taken it upon themselves to 
of land cleared by unofficial demining 
is far greater than that accomplished 
by professional mine action agencies (7). 
To some degree the prevalence of 
village demining and the number of 
people living in mined areas so many 
years after conflict has ceased to be an 
indictment of the use oflandmines as 
well as the shortcomings of the inter-
national response to the landmines 
CriSIS. 
11Villagers who demine are unprotected, unofficial and wo~k 
with inappropriate equipment and no safety backup. It wlll 
never be known how much land has been cleared by locals, 
how many villagers have been killed while attemp~ing 
demining by themselves or by using land only part1ally 
cleared by other villagers." 
Findings and 
Lessons Learned 
The following are 
projects supported by 
UNICEF for the 
prevention of mine 
incidents, which are 
highlighted in the 
recent external evalua-
tion: 
directly linked to mine action in most 
areas (6). Other factors seem to be 
more important: the end of armed 
conflict and population movements, 
and possibly the widespread 
prevalence of "village demining. " 
Although the trend is very encour-
aging it also suggests that planners 
need to understand the context in 
more detail to establish when, how and 
what type of mine action has a direct 
address the problem independently. 
Villagers who de mine are unprotected, 
unofficial and work with inappro-
priate equipment and no safety 
backup. It will never be known how 
much land has been cleared by locals, 
how many villagers have been killed 
wh ile attempting demining by 
themselves or by using land only 
partially cleared by other villagers. The 
number of mines destroyed and area 
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1. The Cambodian Mine Incident 
Database with the Cambodian Red 
Cross (CRC) and Handicap 
International (HI). 
2. Community Mine Marking (with 
CMAC). 
3. Mine Risk Education (with MAG 
and World Education). 
4. The Integrated Mine Database 
(with CMAC)(8). 
• American Red 
Cross rehabilita-
tion center. 
c!o ICRC I Darren 
Whiteside 
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• Population having 
settled in a 
suspected area. 
c/o Chris Horwood 
Mine Incident Database (MID) 
UNICEF is supporting this 
important initiative, which it first 
began in 1994 in partnership with 
MAG. The Mine Incident Database 
(now implemented by the CRC /Hl) 
charts, in derail, the changes in 
monthly accident rates throughout the 
country. Addi tiona! information 
collected through the victims' ques-
tionnaires provides imponant keys to 
understanding the dynamics of how 
and why certain groups and commu-
nities in Cambodia continue to sustain 
mine accidents. Addressing mine 
problems in a post-conflict/rehabilita-
tion or development comext is never 
straightforward and this database 
provides an excellent tool for analysis, 
evaluation and, more importantly, 
strategic planning through prioritiza-
tion. 
When mine action starred in 
1992 there was, as in all mine-affected 
countries, a great information 
deficiency concerning mine incidents 
and derails of accidents. Initially, 
UNICEF supponed MAG to gather 
mine incident data in the five most 
affected provinces in Cambodia, 
which was used to develop mine 
awareness messages, monitor the 
severity of the mine problem and 
advocate a global ban on their 
production, sale and use. Only later 
was it recognized as a strong planning 
tool for mine clearance. 
Looking for a sustainable national 
partner, UNICEF pushed for CRC to 
be the main implementing agency 
instead of international NGOs. 
Unlike the international NGOs, CRC 
had a strong national presence with 
volunteer networks throughout the 
country, which could be harnessed to 
assist with data collection. 
The current project structure uses 
24 CRC staff data gatherers and the 
CRC communication network to 
cover the country. The data gatherers 
are deployed in the most affected 
provinces. In less affected provinces 
networks of communication have 
been created in order to remain cost-
effective. Data gatherers all have 
motorbikes for transport and remain 
in constant contact with a range of 
local authorities and community 
centers (schools and health posts/ 
hospitals) in order to ensure that every 
incident is reported. They individually 
visit every reported mine or UXO 
victim and complete a mine victim 
report form, which is sent ro Phnom 
Penh for processing every month. 
The village level incidents are 
collected nationally, compiled and 
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processed in a database able to generate 
reports for dissemination or respond 
to specific queries. The rota! incident 
figures are processed with a breakdown 
of information that assists analysts to 
understand sociological details of mine 
victims, location of accidents , the 
activity, age and sex of victim, whether 
the victim knew they were in mined 
areas or not, whether it was a mine or 
UXO, ere. The detailed breakdown 
proves to be important information 
for mine awareness and clearance 
teams. 
Monthly reports are distributed 
in both Khmer and English to 
government ministries and provincial 
departments, mine action agencies, 
disability organizations, embassies, 
donors and advocacy groups inside 
Cambodia, as well as internationally 
(9). Over 600 copies per month are 
printed and distributed. A bi-annual 
report for the 1998-1999 period was 
recently released. By July 2000, the 
whole country was covered in the most 
comprehensive and only national mine 
incident database in the world. 
External Evaluation Central 
Findings 
• The MID is performing a viral and 
unique function within the mine 
action context in Cambodia and 
provides valuable information that 
actively assists different agencies and 
government bodies in multiple areas 
of their activities: program planning, 
evaluation, monitoring and fund-
raising. 
• Considering the MID's contriburion 
to the mine action community in 
Cambodia, the evaluation judged 
the MID to be cost-effective and 
inexpensive and giving great added 
value to the national mine action 
effort. 
• The focus has to be on the quality of 
the product (i.e. the monthly report) 
and irs effective use. As CRC 
depends more and more on 
community networks and volunteer 
networks it needs to work hard to 
establish, maintain and moniror the 
system. Stra tegies need to be 
developed on monitOring, testing 
and evaluating these emerging 
networks. This deals with the issue 
of developing quality control. 
• If the currently occurring incident 
reduction continues, there may be 
reduced need for an MID in coming 
years. Such a situation should be 
welcomed by all stakeholders in the 
mine action secror. The role of an 
M ID should be finite. 
Lessons Learned Of Use to the 
Global Landmine Community 
1. An information vacuum in an 
affected country can lead to a 
simplistic understanding of the 
mines/UXO problem and a severe 
lack of planning and monitoring 
tools. Mine action agencies need 
authoritative and detailed informa-
tion for strategic planning. It is a 
false economy to bypass this baseline 
information system. 
2. Once a database is established, it 
needs ro be promoted and end users 
shown how it can serve them in their 
work. The database project should 
be seen as a service provider to 
enhance the added value it offers the 
mine action end users. Central mine 
action authorities should expect 
mine action agencies to be actively 
using such a tool for resource 
targeting and accountability. 
3 . It is important that certain 
information be broken down 
beyond the province, district and 
commune level, right down tO the 
village level as well as provide a 
service to end users for customized 
and targeted data breakdown. For 
certain agen cies only the most 
derailed and specific breakdown will 
assist their targeting. 
Community Mine Marking (CMM) 
In 1996, confronted wi th the 
limitations of mine awareness and the 
shortcomings of traditional mine 
clearance, UNICEF became involved 
in the start up of the Community 
Mine Marking (CMM) project within 
CMAC. CMM consists of small 
mobile teams engaged in survey and 
high priority limited clearance 
accompanied by long term marking to 
indicate safe and/or suspected areas. 
Despite irs small size, CMM 
provides valuable service. With 12 
small teams (of five men with two 
detectors) it has performed over 300 
tasks in three years. The tasks CMM 
selects for marking or limited clearance 
are targeted and prioritized to 
maximize benefit from each task. One 
UNICEF technical advisor was 
attached to the CMM from July 1997 
to October 2000. The project is now 
managed by national CMAC staff 
These de facto "mini -mobile" 
units of CMM fill a gap in CMAC's 
operational profile as CMAC has no 
other mobile ream capacity. 
Comprising only 60 workers out of a 
total CMAC staff of over 2,750, they 
represent a very small unit. Large 
demining reams are very inflexible to 
smaller community needs and can 
only conduct a few tasks each year. 
Largely for logistical and administra-
tive reasons, CMAC deploys platoons 
in large numbers to work on large 
mined areas. In addition, its top 
priority is to clear land for resettle-
ment, whereas the primary goal of 
CMM is to decrease the risk in already 
mined communities. 
Hundreds of communities need 
clearing and marking of safe passages, 
access and facilities in village areas that 
are mined. Most of rhe 300 tasks 
completed have provided safe access 
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and/or construction of wells, schools, 
health centers, pagodas, roads and 
bridges. In all cases they have been 
prioritized directly by the 
communities themselves or by 
development agencies working in the 
areas. CMM is hence contributing ro 
reduce the mine threat to mine-
affected communities and enabling 
the development of basic social 
services, which these communities 
often lack. 
When CMM mark the areas to 
be cleared they use permanent 
concrete markers, which are designed 
to indicate both the area that is 
guaranteed safe and the suspected area. 
In this respect, irs marking system 
differs from the standard marking 
process that seeks to identify the 
boundaries of a suspected mined area, 
which is often imprecise. CMM is 
assisted by the CMAC mine awareness 
teams (posters, TV spots, meetings, 
etc.) to inform the villagers of the role 
of the long-term markers and the 
villagers' need to maintain them. 
Central Findings From the 
External Evaluation 
• In the absence of mobile teams 
within CMAC, CMM fulfills a 
critical function of response to 
requests in high-risk mined areas. 
• CMM is flexible, highly responsive 
and efficient when deployed for 
appropriate tasks. It is also housed 
and based close to its area of 
operation to minimize daily trans-
portation etc. 
• The impact of CMM's work benefits 
a disproportionately high number of 
people when considering rhe 
relatively small areas where CMM 
has cleared/marked. The impact in 
terms of facilitation of NGO/IO 
intervenrion, community access to 
essential needs and access for larger 
CMAC demining platoons Is 
evaluated as highly positive. 
• CMM can be very effective In 
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facilitating rehabilitation a nd 
development work by NGOs and 
other U.N. agencies in terms of well 
drilling, school and health clinic 
building, etc. 
Lessons Learned for the Global 
Mine Action Community 
1. T he profile of any national mine 
action capacity should include small 
mobile rea m s that are able to 
respond with speed and provide 
limited clearance and m a rking 
serv1ces. 
2 . T he efficiency of such teams is 
highes t when working on very 
limited clearance and marking tasks. 
3 . The CMM concept should be 
avai lable in as many mine-affected 
areas as possible both in Cambodia 
and other affected countries. The 
recommendations of the external 
evalua tion a re tha t CMM be 
expanded in terms of number of 
reams and in to o t her high-risk 
provinces as soon as possible. It may 
be noted that as a concept it would 
prove to be very attractive to various 
donors who may wish to fund 
individual teams etc. 
4. CMM is effective but must be 
suppl eme nted by la rge r-scale 
clearance and mine awareness. It is 
a damage limitation concept to offer 
villagers at-risk safer options, bur it 
is by no means a full solution to a 
community's mine problem. 
5 . Limited clearance in a mined 
environment requires long term 
marking both for indi cating to 
people the safe and suspected areas 
and for recording the area cleared in 
preparation for large scale clearance. 
Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
Since 1994, UNICEF has worked 
in partnership with MAG to develop 
mine awareness education with a 
specific child focus using various 
differe nt app roaches, such as 
community presentations, nigh t 
shows, day shows, special presenta-
tions to children and women, school 
presenrarions and training sessions for 
reachers. These activities were carried 
our by MAG staff- raising quesrions 
abou t the susta inabil i ty of th e 
interventions. 
Based on rhe assumption that 
mine risk education in schools would 
be needed for many years as long as 
children were growing up in mined 
environments, UNICEF sought to 
all primary schools of Cambodia. A 
more inrensive program for schools 
located in the 30 most affected 
districts will reach more than 1 ,000 
schools in 130 clusters (10). 
The activ i t ies of t h e MRE 
program go beyond mine awareness 
and rh e simple transfer of knowledge. 
The training of teachers emphasizes 
rhe use of participatory approaches, 
which are essen tial for skills, qualities 
and competencies that aim to affect 
behavioral and attitudinal changes. 
• Community Mine Marking teams cola borate with local communities to set up long 
term markers indicating both safe and suspected areas. c/o Chris Horwood 
support and promote mine awareness 
that was more sustainable, and where 
the Ministry of Education (MoE) had 
greater ownership of the approach and 
activities. The currenr MRE program 
was established and funded in early 
1999. The new approach required rhe 
development of a close partnership 
with the MoE. Sinc e 2000 UNICEF 
has been working with World 
Education (an education-centered 
NGO) to implement this program. 
T hrough its funding of World 
Education, UNICEF is contributing 
ro what is becoming a sustainable and 
formalized mine awareness program in 
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UNICEF expects rhat the whole 
primary education system will benefit 
from the improved reaching methods. 
Central Findings from the 
External Evaluation: 
• The evaluation found that children 
rece ive the MRE well and the 
teachings are effective in terms of 
being able to identi fY safe and unsafe 
behavior in mined environments. 
• Children not attending school in the 
areas targeted by MRE had limited 
information on mine risk behavior 
and were from the most vulnerable 
economic groups with greater daily 
risks to mine accidents. As a result, 
World Education is purring a greater 
emphasis on the development of 
techniques to reach out to school 
ch ildren. 
• U NICEF's current strategy of 
developing a school-based education 
program in mine awareness IS 
contributing to what is becoming a 
sustainable program for all primary 
school students in which rhe MoE 
n ewly enjoys a high sense of 
"ow nership." 
• T he MRE program is at an early stage 
bur has benefited from lesso ns 
lea rned from the previous 
approaches of mine awareness. 
Lessons Learned for the Global 
Mine Action Community 
1. T he key lesson learned for UNICEF 
is that irs close involvement with the 
M o E in the MRE should have 
happened some years earlier and that 
it is problematic develop ing a 
national and child-based program 
without the MoE having a strong 
involvement and in the initiative. 
2. The MRE program is no longer 
being implemented by a mine action 
agen cy, but instead by an 
educational NGO. The evaluation 
found this to be an appropriate 
switch for UNICEF to make in 
terms of working towards a 
sustainable educational impact and 
should be noted by other donors 
who have previously only considered 
mine action NGOs for such a role. 
C learly mine awareness education 
do es nor require mine-related 
technical expertise, bur ins t ead 
education-related expertise. 
3 . Any program focusing on a school-
based education approach needs to 
develop a complementary, parallel 
approach to ensure that our-of-
school children also receive mine 
awareness education. 
4. The link between mine awareness 
and actual impact on children and 
their ri sk-taking behavior is still 
unknown. It is not poss ible to 
establish a direct correlation between 
mine awareness (as with mine 
clearance) and incident reduction 
anywhere in Cambodia. This, 
however, should not reduce efforts 
to maximize awareness and mine risk 
education. 
Endnote 
Cambodia and Afghanistan were 
the first countries to alert rhe world 
to rhe critical need for humanitarian 
mine action. The learning curve for 
these and many other national mine 
action programs has been steep and 
sudden. Mine action is still a new 
sector in humanitarian intervention 
and rhe challenges it faces are still 
immense. Although it has nor been 
possible so far to show any direct 
correlation between any type of mine 
action and accident reduction due to 
rhe multiplicity of factors involved, 
various approaches to mine action 
should continue to be developed. Iris 
very important to establish mechan-
isms to allow the most promising 
elemems such as the ones in this article 
ro be considered for potential imple-
mentation in other affected countries. 
• 
The opinions reflected in this article 
are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those ofUNJCEF 
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UNICEF is the designated focal point 
responsible for mine awareness education 
within the United Nations structure. 
2 "External Evaluation of UNICEF-
Supported Activi ties to Prevent M ine 
Incidents" report (by Chris Horwood and 
Andrea Crossland) can be obtained from 
Michel Le Pechoux, Ch ildren Affected by 
Armed Conflict Project Officer, UNICEF 
Cambodia. 
3 Approximately 2 percent of "registered 
mined land." 
4 "Hidd en Killers: Global Demining Crisis." 
U.S. DepartmentofState Publication 1998. 
5 120 Million Landmines Deployed Worldwide: 
ract or Fiction. Ilaria Bonigliero 20 00. 
6 The evaluation analyzed data in detail cross-
referencing accident location with specific 
mine field clearance loc ation as well as mine 
awareness education. Almost no direct 
correlations could be made between mine 
action and accident reduction. 
7 Handicap International is cu rrently 
com pleting a study of "village" or 
"spontaneous" demining in Cambodia. The 
report should be available in early 200 I. 
8 This section will not be included in this 
article due to limitations of space. 
9 Reports can be obtai ned from the C RC 
office at crc@camnet.com.kh and through 
the H an di cap International mines 
coordinator at himines@bigpond.com.kh. 
l 0 A group of schools around a main schoo l 
equipped with a resource center. 
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Thailand: The Land of Smiles 
(Until you take your first step) 
The remnants of conflicts along the Thai-Cambodian, Lao, Malaysian and Myanmar 
borders affect the Livelihood of about 400,000 residents. The Thailand Mine 
Action Center Looks to reverse 40 years-worth of Landmine contamination. 
By Dave McCracken, 
TMAC Mine Action Technical Advisor 
Four Borders in Conflict 
T he four borders of Thailand have been prey to perpetual conflict, leaving a legacy of shanered limbs and lives. Landmines have been plamed in 
Thailand over the past 40 years by both conventional and 
guerilla armies. Some combatants are long forgotten, but 
the morbid legacy of landmines remains where the mines 
were left years ago to defend borders, depopulate areas and 
deny the use of infrastructure, including roads and bridges, 
resulting in unusable land. 
Initial surveys made by the Royal Thai Army and Navy 
in 1998 indicated that approximately 796 square kilometers 
of! and is unusable, rhus affecting the livelihood of 400,000 
residents. Mine-infested land includes villages, agricultural 
lands and parts of national forests. Of these mined areas, 
there are 532 sq. km on the Thai-Cambodian border, 124 
sq. km on the Thai-Lao border, 53 sq. km on the Thai-
Myanmar border, and 87 sq. km on the Thai-Malaysian 
border. 
The exact number of mines in Thailand is unknown. 
Moreover, information on areas suspected to be 
contaminated is dated and lacks accuracy, although the 
duration of several conflicts indicates that contamination 
could be severe in some areas. In order to quantify 
Thailand's mine problem, the National Mine Action 
Committee commissioned a Level One General Impact 
Survey in the late-1990s through the support of Norway, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the United 
• Preah Vihear, a 




Nations. Preliminary survey reports by expert witnesses 
indicate that as many as 35 provinces are mine affected. 
Cambodian Border 
From 1979 to 1998, the Thai-Cambodian border was 
an arena for intense conflict. The combatants used 
landmines as a weapon of choice for denying access and 
preventing the movement of people in and out of 
Cambodia. The Cambodian Peoples' Armed Forces and 
the supporting Vietnamese Army developed special units 
to lay mines under the K-5 Operations Plan. The K-5 code 
name became synonymous with the entire border area with 
Thailand, focusing on the use of landmines to interdict 
Cambodian resistance groups entering Cambodia from 
Thailand. 
Initially, Cambodian troops mined all of their country's 
border passes or ingress routes, as well as general border 
areas, as a protective measure. In the process, these troops 
often strayed unknowingly into Thai territory to plant 
mines along the perceived border. In response, Cambodian 
resistance groups would plant mines as a protective measure 
around Thai sanctuaries. The net result was numerous 
groups laying landmines for different purposes, rhus 
compounding contamination over a prolonged conflict 
period. The O 'Smach border area served as a prime example 
of the effect of mined border area on civilians. Fighting in 
this area in May 1998 resulted in a high level of mine 
contamination and significant casualties among refugees 
attempting to flee across the border. Thai medical facilities 
along the border continue to provide assistance co 
Cambodian landmine victims seeking emergency medical 
attemion. 
Laos Border 
A long insurgency conflict was waged along the Laos 
border between the Thai Communist Parry (TCP) and the 
Royal Thai Army. Landmines and booby-traps were used 
as principle weapons by both sides. The conflict started in 
1964 when the T C P began operations in northern 
Thailand, Khun Nam Chan Village, Borklua District, and 
Nan province. The insurgencies expanded into Nakorn 
Phanom province and, in 1965, open warfare between 
governmem forces and the guerrilla movement began. The 
conflict expanded to include border provinces of Chiang 
Rai, Payao, Nan, Uttaradit, and Phirsanulok. 
The act of warfare in Laos included laying landmines 
in border passages to restrict movement and as protection 
around guerilla and government military bases. Tactically 
important features such as dominant hills were also a focal 
poim of the fighting. Military conflict continued with 
considerable intensity from 1968 to 1989. 
Thai-Laos border units are currently cooperating to 
demarcate the border. This operation has resulted in 425 
km of previously disputed border areas being marked as 
delineated. Unfortunately, the survey teams have suffered 
mine casualties during this operation. 
Malaysian Border 
Conflict along the Thai-Malaysian border between the 
British/ Malaysian military forces and the Communist Parry 
of Malaysia (CPM) began in the 1950s, ending in 1989. 
T he CPM considered mines an important part of its 
strategy. It used factory-manufactured mines and locally 
produced, improvised mines/booby-traps to support irs 
operations. Both British/Malaysian and CPM forces used 
mines to protect units operating in border areas in Sonkhla 
and Yala provinces. These operations included the 
protection of patrol and staging bases for counter 
insurgency and guerilla operations. Mine laying activities 
by all parties peaked during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. 
T he CPM also established tunneled base areas in 
remote jungles along the border. These areas were 
inaccessible by road when initially establi shed. 
Infrastrucmre development in past years, including road 
construction in these remote areas, has brought the 
population in contact with mined areas. 
The CPM ceased hostilities in 1989, formally signing 
a treaty. The use of land mines has ceased on both sides of 
the border since implementation of the peace treaty. The 
C PM has claimed that most of the landmines and booby-
traps were removed in the 1980s. However, landmine 
accidems continue to occur in border areas. 
Myanmar (Burma) Border 
In 1945, Burma gained independence from the British 
government. However, in 1948 minority groups claimed 
independence from the cemral Burmese government and 
set up resistance groups. Fighting among resistance groups 
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and the Myanmar governmem continues today in border 
areas, frequently spilling over into Thai territory. Currently, 
the federal governmem's State Law Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC) military units are engaged in an ongoing 
conflict with minority groups. The intensity of this conflict 
significantly changed in 1995 when some of the minority 
groups joined with the governmem and increased military 
activities. Meanwhile, there have been frequem clashes in 
the border areas opposite Kanchantaburi, Rarchaburi, Tak, 
Mae Hong Song, and Chiang Mai provinces. 
As in other border countries, mines produced in 
Myanmar are used ro deny access to both border passes 
and residential areas. With military conflicts raging on, 
high numbers of ethnic minorities are fleeing for sanctuary 
in Thailand. Many of these refugees, along with animals 
such as elephants, have become casualties of mines laid by 
Myanmar government forces to interdict ethnic minority 
guerilla groups. In addition, mines and improvised devices 
are causing casualties in Thai agricultural areas, seriously 
affecting farming communities. 
The conflict along the Myanmar border will continue 
for the foreseeable future as mine laying has increased. A 
record of the past and present mine situation is needed to 
ensure that these hazardous areas are identified for future 
humanitarian clearance operations. 
Mine Action in Thailand 
The combination of terrain and mine threats challenge 
mine action efforts in Thailand, especially with the 
country's combination of three-canopy jungles, mountains, 
laterite soils, the monsoon season, and a host of tropical 
diseases. The scattering oflow-metal content AP pressure 
mines over a 30-year period also provide for a very 
dangerous environment for mine clearance operations. The 
solution to these situations is integration of the latest 
technology and techniques to safely deploy deminers and 
equipment. 
The Royal Thai Army and Navy began demining 
border areas in 1987. Field units clear an average of2,500 
to 3,000 mines each year along all four borders. The First 
Army's Burapha Field Force (responsible for the security 
in Sa Keao province) is making one such effort. Abom 63 
sq. km of Sa Keao are suspected to be mine-infested. From 
1994-99, a total of2,837landmines (including AT mines, 
AP mines, and UXO) were cleared and destroyed by the 
Burapha Field Force in both general EOD and small 
clearance tasks, which are normally conducted using tactical 
methods. 
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) recognizes that 
landmines are and will continue to be a major obstacle to 
development and economic growth in rural border 
• 61 • 33
JOURNAL: The Journal of Mine Action Issue 5.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2001
communities. Thailand acknowledged the importance of 
the mine threat along its own borders by signing the Ottawa 
Convention on Dec. 3, 1997. The country has readily 
demonstrated its will to prohibit the use, stockpiling, 
production and transfer of AP mines, and to destroy all of 
its stockpiled AP mines. Thailand has also undertaken to 
identify, demarcate and destroy all AP mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction. On Nov. 27, 1998, Thailand 
deposited its ratification instrument at the United Nations, 
becoming the 53 nation, and the first in Southeast Asia, to 
ratify the Ottawa Convention. 
The National Mine Action Committee 
In August 1998, an order from the Office of the Prime 
Minister ofThailand was issued forming the National Mine 
Action Committee (NMAC). The prime minister directs 
and chairs NMAC, which was formed to address landmine 
issues. NMAC membership consists of al l major 
government ministries and departments of the RTG. 
NMAC monitors the obligations set forth by the 
Onawa Convention and develops policy for the monitoring 
of national strategic objectives, including: 
Implementing laws prohibiting the use of APLs; 
Overseeing demining operations; 
Establishing a minimum quantity of APLs in the 
country for the purpose of education and clemining 
only; 
Coordinating overseas and international community 
support; and 
Disseminating information and providing assistance 
to the population and improving the environment 
for those people affected by APLs. 
NMAC established the Thailand Mine Action Center 
(TMAC) on Jan. 18, 1999, in Don Muang, Bangkok. 
TMAC serves as the central control over all APL issues 
and operations in Thailand. 
TMAC 
On Jan. 18, 2000, TMAC was officially declared a 
working facility under the authority of the Thai Supreme 
Command and with Royal Patronage provided by Her 
Royal Highness Galiyani. This unique bestowing of royal 
patronage demonstrates the level of commitment and 
concern the problem of land mines has stirred in the Thai 
people. 
TMAC serves as the center for the full range of mine 
action issues in Thailand, including coordination with all 
international organizations and donors. TMAC operations 
encompass mine/UX:O awareness, mine/UX:O clearance, 
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mine/UXO survey, and v ictim assistance act iVIties 
throughout Thailand. The mine action organization 
monitors the timelines set by the Ottawa Convention and 
has developed a mine action program to meet the 
convention obligations, includingAP stockpile destruction. 
The first bulk demolit ion of 10,000 landmines occurred 
on May 1, 1999 at a military base in Lop Buri, Thailand, 
followed by a second bulk destruction on January 18, 200 I 
of I ,000 M14 AP Blast mines. 
TMAC is responsible for preparing and coordinating 
the implementation of a national mine clearance plan. 
Thailand d eveloped an initial "Mas ter Plan on 
Humanitarian Mine Action of Thailand" for a four-year 
period (2000-2004). Seven Humanitarian Mine Action 
Units (HMAUs), each with 99 personnel, will be 
established along the problem borders. TMAC has trained 
personnel to work in the HMAUs. HMAU #1 H~ which 
is partially supported by U.S. comriburions to the FY2001 
program, is deployed at Wattana Nakon, Sa Keow province. 
This demining unit includes a mine awareness ream, 
technical survey team, mine detection dog (MDD) team, 
manual demining team and a mechanical assistance team. 
The units are stationed in Nong Ya Keaw village on the 
Thai-Cambodian border. The duties of each HMAU 
include local coordination of mine action activities such 
as public relations, mine awareness, information collection, 
technical survey and demining. 
Humanitarian Mine Action Funding 
The funding for humanitarian mine action in Thailand 
has come from a number of international sources, as well 
as from within the country. The RTG passed a 
supplementary budget in March 2000 of 1.6 million Thai 
Baht (THB) (about U.S.$32,000) to initiate mine action 
by HMAU #1 in Sa Keaw province. An additional16.246 
million THB (about U.S.$325,000) was added to TMAC 
operational capacity for mine action efforts in July 2000. 
The total mine action budget allocation for FY200 1 is 44 
million THB (about U.S.$880,000). In addition, the U.S. 
government has provided funding and support in: 
Infrastructure development and technical advisory 
support; 
training support; 
equipment acquisition and operational support; 
regional capacity development; and 
TMAC capacity training ("train the trainers" and 
mine detection dog team training) 
U.S. mechanical assistance to demining (namely 
HMAU #1) support has been provided through the 
deployment of two mechanical systems for trail evaluation: 
TEMPEST and SDTT (Survivable Demining Tractor and 
Tools). TEMPEST, a remote-controlled machine, clears 
vegetation in support of de mining operations, while SDTT 
also clears vegetation, but requires "hands-on" control. 
Meanwhile, the Canadian Center for Mine Action 
Techno logies (CCMAT) will provide a BRM48 
(PROMAC) for trail evaluation. The BRM48 is an 
attachment mounted on an armored tracked excavator. 
Canada will also contribute explosives that are specially 
des igned for humanitarian demining operations, called 
FlXOR. 
Mine Awareness 
TMAC recognizes that mine awareness is a priority 
for reducing the number of landmine/UXO accidenrs in 
Thailand. TMAC works closely with other organizations 
in developing accidenr-reducing, mine awareness curricula 
at both the local and national level. To date, a total of about 
46,000 civilians in some 40 border-area villages have 
received mine awareness education from HMAU #1. 
Overview 
There is a commonly held view of T hailand as a 
vacationer's haven with spectacular beaches, exotic animals, 
and Buddhist temples. All of these attractions can be found 
in Thailand. However, it is important to note that within 
a few hours driving distance, Thai people are living in mine-
affected communities, watching neighbors lose life and 
limb. Thailand recognizes the importance of a strong 
com mitmenr to ridding it self of landmines, teaching 
people to avoid landmines and in assisting mine victims. 
Initial efforrs by the RTG to mobilize its national assets 
for dealing with this problem are noteworthy. Scarce fiscal 
resources and technical challenges are clear indications that 
no poor country can handle mine problems alone. TMAC 
has started effective mine action coo rdination and 
operations. Although TMAC's efforts are modest in size 
compared to the mine problem, the mine action 
Thailand: The Land of Smiles 
Other International Funding: 
No rway U.S.$320,000 (1 6 million THB) 
* Level 1 Survey (TMAC ) 
United Kingdom U.S.$400,000 (£273,000) 
* Levell Survey (TMAC ) 
Japan U.S.$400,000 (¥48 million) 
* United Nations Vo luntary Trust Fund 
organization's work has formed a basis for future mine 
clearance and awareness efforts. Thailand faces decades of 
challenging work to rid landmines from its soil. All 
assistance to jumpstart this indigenous program is received 
with gratitude and enhances Thailand's determination to 
make strides in this long process. • 
Contact Information 
Dave McCracken 
Mine Action Technical Advisor, TMAC 
Phanpit Court- Suite 616 
160 Piput Soi 2 
Silom Road 
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TMAC- NPA, Ll Preliminary Report, Sa Keao province, 
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• (far left) TEMPEST operates in 
thick brush on the Thai-
Cambodian border. 
• TEMPEST clears  lane. Ban Nong 
Ya Keaw village, Thai-Cambodian 
border. 
All photos courtesy of the author. 
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Born bs Away: A Proactive Approach 
UXO clearance in Guam and the Pacific Islands is considered mostly ~~emergency 
removal." The Journal examines how improper disposal, fatalities and a lack of 
survey or accident data compounds the problem for this region. 
by Lisa M. Vanada, MAIC 
I n 194 I, Japanese forces invaded Guam, making it the only populated U.S. territory to endure foreign occupation. Three years later the United States 
recovered Guam and drove the Japanese from the island. 
The bloodshed from the conflict continues throughout 
Guam, Saipan, Tinian and Palau over 50 years later, due 
to the U:XO and landmines that still pollute the islands. 
Although the United States provides mine clearance services 
to the area, Paul Murray, president of Bombs Away, a U:XO-
specializing firm primarily servicing Micronesia and 
Southeast Asia, expressed his concern that this mine action 
may not be sufficient. 
The U.S. military EOD teams participate in over 225 
emergency U:XO/landmine clearance operations in Guam 
every year. Unfortunately, this figure only reflects situations 
where emergency assistance was specifically requested. The 
Navy EOD unit stationed on Guam sends a six-man EOD 
detachment as a response team only; they are not authorized 
to locate and clear mines under their own initiative. This 
means that hundreds of undetected mines lay in wait. 
Murray demonstrated his frustration with a question: "How 
do you think most of these mines are found?" The mine-
related death and injury statistics provide the answer: 
children and construction workers frequently find these 
mines, often with fatal results. 
The U.S. military estimates that 25 percent of all 
ordnance used during World War II failed to detonate as 
intended. In spite of ongoing clearance, mines still litter 
Pacific Island battle sites. Murray believes the demining 
process could be greatly accelerated with a proactive mine 
clearance approach that encompasses thoroughness, 
historical research and initiative. 
Background 
As a former member of U.S. Navy EOD teams, Paul 
Murray has extensive military demining experience. He 
was awarded the Navy Commendation for Valor after 
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disarming over 60 Iraqi sea mines, demolition traps and 
anti-shipping mines, and he was deployed on numerous 
diving and demolition exercises throughout Asia. After 
being stationed in Guam, Murray decided to settle there. 
In 1994, a friend asked him to help with mine clearance in 
the southern tip ofSaipan. The friend had taken a team to 
survey the region, which was used as a munitions dump 
after World War II. Although a B29 explosion destroyed 
many of the munitions in a 1946 crash, the team found an 
overwhelming amount of UXO, for which it needed 
demining assistance. 
This was the start of Bombs Away, Inc., a multi-service 
firm specializing in U:XO, diving and geophysical testing 
technologies. The UXO services encompass historical 
research, which is used to determine potential UXO 
locations and contamination levels; site assessment and 
surveys; U:XO clearance and disposal; U:XO safety and 
awareness training; and the development of policy and 
procedure manuals for U:XO response. Murray's opinions 
regarding inefficient demining techniques are substantiated 
by his experiences and observations in Micronesia and 
Southeast Asia. 
Past and Future Problems 
Mine clearance activities in the Pacific Islands are often 
unregulated or loosely regulated. The lack of government 
support frequently correlates with improper U:XO disposal. 
Without a designated disposal site, cleared materials are 
simply dumped in a convenient location, which is often 
an empty neighboring plot that will be developed at a later 
date. When a company or individual decides to develop 
the neighboring plot, the mines will need to be moved 
again. This system wastes time, increases danger and could 
easily be avoided with better disposal choices. 
There are no government policies in Palau for the 
disposal of bombs, so contractors find it easy to cut corners. 
Murray related a situation clarifYing that bomb disposal is 
not simply a matter of carelessness, but is one of 
convenience. A Bombs Away team was hired by a civilian 
contractor to clear bombs from a channel. The contractor 
wanted to dredge the channel through the mangroves, but 
it was contaminated with 500-pound bombs. Bombs Away 
divers placed slings beneath the bombs and used diving 
regulators to fill lift balloons and float the bombs to the 
water's surface. It would have been simple to discard the 
bombs in a nearby uninhabited forest. Instead, rhe team 
took the time and effort to transport the bombs across the 
rown to a remote munitions dump. 
UXO disposal problems also exist in Guam. 
Construction companies are rapidly developing the island 
to clear the land for businesses and homes. Because there 
are few regulations, many construction companies focus 
primarily on immediate profit, and little concern is given 
to the next developer. Murray said that the workers "dig 
up U:XO and throw it on the next piece of undeveloped 
property." This method may remove the danger from a 
specific area but it adds to the UXO problems in the 
remaining land. Government regulations and professional 
standards must be altered to consider the long-term affects 
of mine action. 
Initiative with Historical Research 
History and statistics indicate that the Pacific Rim is 
heavily contaminated with UXO, but many of the 
governments lack solid policies and mine action support. 
Guam was the site of some of the heaviest pre-invasion 
bombardment in World War II. The island endured heavy 
bombing and shelling for several weeks prior to the U.S. 
military's land invasion, and millions of ordnance items 
were scattered throughout the Pacific Rim. Dud rates 
conclude that 25 percent of the ordnance failed to detonate, 
and these abandoned items present a high risk to local resi-
dents. If the governments and existing mine clearance 
organizations would adopt a proactive stance, the risk for 
children and civilians would decrease. 
Some of the existing safety policies produce negativity 
among the workers, who consider some of the policies 
extraneous and contradictory. Demining workers are 
exasperated by safety inspections that involve citations for 
workers without a plastic hat or steel-toed boots; they think 
that a government concerned with these types of details 
should focus on the life-threatening potential of the mines. 
M urray thinks the overall safety of the islands could be 
increased if the deminers applied proactive methods. Job 
specifications could be improved with research and should 
include history, terrain and prior mine activity. Reliable 
safe ty precautions, such as UXO sweeps prior to 
earthmoving, should also be incorporated. 
Murray emphasizes the role history plays as a UXO 
indicator and admitted that he has yet to understand why 
the government infrequently initiates clearance operations 
on major battle sires known for UXO contamination. The 
beach es on the west coast of Guam near Agar were stormed 
frequently during World War II. As a known area of 
conflict, the risk for UXO contamination in that region is 
high. After a heavy rainstorm, a C hamorro (native) boy 
found a hand grenade in the sand. Although it was 
compromised by moisture, the grenade began smoking 
when he picked it up. He immediately threw it 20 feet 
away, but the weak explosion injured his foot. Most 
government and military mine operations are formed as a 
response to a recenr call, not a response to the problem 
that was created 55 years ago. Emphasis should be placed 
on initiative, and the governmenrs should use historical 
records and Chamorro repons to proactively clear mines 
and prevent accidents. 
Cooperation and Support 
Although successful demining projects rely on 
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research, the overall success of mine action hinges on 
community support and cooperation. Mine action is a 
humanitarian and life-preserving effort, but if demining 
projects infringe on a resource valued by the community, 
support for demining will be diminished instead of 
increased . The public voice plays a crucial role in 
government decisions and regulations: If deminers seek a 
balance between public opinion and mine clearance 
acrivities, the resulting positive publicity can only benefit 
the global mine action community. 
The significant role of public opinion was 
demonstrated by an incident in Sonsonaya Bay, Rota. As 
part of the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands 
(CNMI), Rota currently flourishes from the diving 
industry. Tourists and divers form a substantial economic 
force that the island depends on for profit. Divers swim 
around sunken ships that have nearly been enveloped by 
coral, bur unexploded depth charges are still partially 
visible. The ships and depth charges are remnants from 
World War II , when two Japanese submarine chasers 
anchored in the bay. Allied forces flying over the bay 
dropped leftover bombs on the Japanese ships before they 
landed at Tinian. These wooden Japanese ships were 
unoccupied when they sank, and as submarine chasers they 
contained the depth charges, which Murray describes as 
similar in appearance to a 50-gallon drum. 
The government of Rota sent a removal request to 
the Navy EOD unit, fearing the depth charges presented a 
risk for the local diving community. The Navy EOD team 
that arrived to survey the depth charges also observed a 
few bombs in the sunken ships. They were authorized by 
Rota to return and blow up the bombs. The Navy returned 
with 25 team members; they destroyed the bombs bur also 
devastated the coral gardens and killed a rare hawksbill 
turtle. The resulting public furor was immense: the diving 
community was outraged and protested the return of the 
Navy EOD team. Unfortunately, six depth charges 
remained on the ships. 
Murray contacted the governor of the CNMI and, 
after providing his qualifications, informed him that if the 
ships were unoccupied and at anchor when they were 
bombed there would be no fuses. Murray relies on historical 
and military research and experience. He knew that 
unoccupied ships at anchor never store fuses with ordnance. 
After diving and confirming the absence of fuses, the 
Bombs Away diving team chipped rhe depth charges out 
of the reef using rebar with a filed edge. The six bombs 
were then rolled onto a tuna net and hauled to the surface 
for disposal. 
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Interestingly, the Sonsonaya Bay project received a 
great deal of nororiety not for the actual demining effon, 
but for the methods used to extract the depth charges and 
preserve the underwater environment. Environmental 
supporters and the diving community lauded the Rota 
government for revising its clearance effort. By cooperating 
with the community and endorsing a mine clearance 
method that maintained the natural tourist attraction, the 
government succeeded in alleviating a known risk while 
promoting env ironment-fri endly demining. Local 
newspapers and journalists further publicized the project 
and the cooperative demining effort raised public UXO 
awareness in a positive way. 
Mine Action for the Pacific Rim 
The lack of government regulations and widespread 
concern for mine contamination in the Pacific Rim leaves 
a problem without a clear solution. The islands and 
Chamorro people are left with a World War II legacy that 
is dissolving slowly, for although mine action is offered as 
a response to injuries and unprofessional discoveries, little 
initiative is taken to locate and clear most of the islands. 
Without efficient UXO removal, Murray's pointed 
question remains, "How do you think most of these mines 
are found?" Hundreds of injured or surviving civilians attest 
to the risk these islanders face every day. To change the 
answer to this question, mine action in the Pacific Rim 
must be proactive, thorough and cooperative. Active 
collaboration between the government and demining 
organizations could promote effective long-term mine 
clearance. By consolidating effort and resources, they could 
accelerate the process of eradicating the remnants from a 
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Photographing Tragedy 
Photographing Tragedy: 
Landmines and Victims 
Tim Grant recounts his experiences capturing the images of landmines and the 
stories of their victims on film. From buckets of AP mines to victims on the 
operating table, Grant sees and tells all about the images that have shaped him. 
By Tim Grant, Landmine Photographer 
L
andmines are insidious devices. A landmine can be 
any munition placed under, on or near the ground 
or other surface area that is designed to be detonated 
or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a 
person or vehicle. Their main purpose is to inflict severe 
injury on the "enemy" so as to hinder advance and 
undermine the morale. Only a few mines are designed to 
kill outright. For every combatant injured it takes another 
two soldiers to carry them, effectively taking up to three 
fighters out of the battle. 
My initial experiences with landmines came as an 
employee of the Land Mine Awareness Programme (LMAP) 
that started in 1990 on the Thai/Cambodian border. After 
testing rhe education materials we had produced, it was 
found that the people wanted to see photographs of real 
mines and of landmine victims. The mines reproduced in 
the photographs were always shown as close as possible to 
their actual size. After several years of working in mine 
awareness, we found that photographs were very popular, 
generating much more interest than illustrations because 
people can relate more to them, especially when the images 
are taken in areas familiar to them. 
Photographing my first mine was an experience I shall 
always remember. At that time, it was illegal for foreigners 
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to enter Cambodia. As we were based 
in Thailand, a neutral country, there 
were no mines readily availab le for 
photographing and measuring. We 
needed photographs for the education 
materials, so we had to rely on viewing 
mines collected by the Thai military 
from their side of the border. 
The Thai soldiers brought out an 
old bucket crammed with a variety of 
AP devices. It was a strange feeling ro 
finally see these objects that we had 
heard so much about. For a second or 
two I forgot all the terror and sadness 
they cause and was eager to examine 
them closely. My colleague, who had 
just arrived from four years of teaching 
landmine awareness to Afghan 
refugees, was quire nervous and kept 
reminding me of situations where 
experts had blown themselves up by 
mishandling mines. 
The soldiers were quite relaxed 
around the live ammunition, wanting 
to show us how "brave" they were and 
how much knowledge they possessed 
about ordnance. One of them started 
to puli, prod and turn anything that 
sruck our. He then proceeded to 
unscrew the top off an AT mine, 
prompting my colleague w rake refuge 
• A 16-year-old monk injured 
by stepping on a landmine 
on his way back from a 
wedding ceremony. 
c/o Tim Grant 
behind a filing cabinet. In hindsight, 
this action seemed useless since, had 
the mine exploded, the whole building 
would have been destroyed. I also 
realized that I was too crusting of the 
soldier's ability in handling these 
devices. It rook a few more visits to 
hospitals and operating theatres before 
I formed a realistic view and healthy 
dislike for any landmine or UXO. 
Photographing the Victims 
Photographs make the plight of 
mine victims more meaningful to 
viewers and starkly reveal the horror 
associated with mine injuries. As the 
program's media coordinator, it was 
my job ro capture these images. 
The first time I photographed a 
landmine victim is still very vivid in 
my mind. It was in the Sire II refugee 
camp on the Thai/ Cambodian border 
in 1986. I was being shown the 
different programs that were operated 
by one of the local NGOs. We came 
to the Disabled Skills Training Center, 
which was run by a Jesuit priest. A 
photo opportunity quickly appeared in 
front of me as I entered the facility: a 
wheelchair bound, double leg amputee 
with his baby sining on his lap. I was 
initially reticent about taking this 
photograph. However, th e center's 
resident priest realized my dilemma 
and assured me it was OK, so I went 
ahead. As I snapped the shot, the man 
smiled and told me he was honored 
that I had chosen he and his child ro 
be photographed-the first of many 
surprises. 
To facilitate the production of 
teaching materials I made many 
excursions to the camp hospitals and 
rehabilitation centers to take photos. 
The power of these experiences in dirt-
floor, bamboo walled rehabilitation 
centers and cold concrete floored 
operating rooms was overwhelming. 
Most of the victims were young men 
in their late teens or early 20s. Despite 
their suffering and traumatic amputa-
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tions, most were quick with a smile and 
a joke. Th is made being there and 
taking photos a mixture of pleasure 
and pain. Here in the hospital, 
surrounded by fellow victims, they 
started to come to terms with their 
dramatic change oflifestyle. I worried 
about what would happen when they 
returned to their villages, where they 
would be without free medicine, 
adequate medical attention and, more 
importantly, the moral support of their 
new friends. 
Upon arrival at rhe International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
in-patient section one day, two new 
victims from Cambodia drew my 
interest. One of them was a woman 
who had had her right leg blown off-
fortunately below the knee. She was 
very frightened as it was all so new to 
her-sealed rooms with concrete 
floors, white-skinned people with 
dangling objects around their necks, 
plastic covered furniture, and, above 
all, life with only one and a half legs. 
The other victim was a man having 
an old wound checked. He seemed 
flattered to have a foreign nurse attend 
ro him and show an interest in his 
recently sown stump, which now 
looked like rhe fluted edge of a 
ptecrust. 
Soon, a busy doctor came in and 
thoughtlessly tugged on a piece of 
gauze that was deeply embedded in the 
wound. The man jumped, then smiled 
and made a joke with the nurse. "How 
can he still find humor in this 
madness?" I asked myself. He was like 
a brave young boy with a grazed knee 
who didn't want to show his friends 
his pain. She was like a terrified little 
girl waiting her turn for an injection, 
twitching and wringing the sarong she 
clasped rightly in her hands. I was so 
distracted by their dilemmas that I 
didn't take any photographs. 
After awhile, I started to enjoy my 
visi ts ro the hospital, as I received such 
a great welcome from the patients, 
who really appreciated a foreigner 
caking such an interest in their welfare. 
It was hard at rimes to remain 
impartial and I had to "turn-off" many 
rimes to enable myself to cope with 
the tragedies before me. The victims 
were generally so young and now their 
lives had been torn apart, more than 
they could possibly comprehend at 
that rime. 
I had received permission from 
ICRC to photograph mine victims in 
Khao-1-Dang Hospital, so I made my 
way there, most days equipped with 
my photographic gear. The head nurse 
knew me well and would greet me. 
One day, I arrived at rhe hospi tal 
and was instantly taken by the arm and 
hustled into the theatre, not knowing 
what to expect. A mask and hairner 
were thrust into my hands as I was 
pushed through the doorway. A 17-
year-old boy had been wounded when 
a landmine exploded nearby. They 
already had his stomach laid out on 
the operating table, expertly searching 
for shrapnel pieces. This was the first 
rime I had wi rnessed an operation, and 
I wondered how I would handle it. I 
trained my camera onto the surgical 
scene. Here in front of me was this kid 
with his insides spilled out, and all I 
• The first land-mine vict im I 
photographed at Site II Refugee 
Camp. 
c/o Tim Grant 
could feel was fascination as I viewed, 
through a lens, the skilled hands of the 
surgeon as he probed his way into rhe 
open cavtty. 
The surgeon eventually located a 
tiny piece of metal, smaller than a 5-
cent piece. I glanced at the cut, which 
started at the top of his chest and 
finished just above his navel, then to 
this tiny inuuder and pondered the 
inhumanity of it. They roughly threw 
his guts back in and stitched the 
wound. "We will just close this up and 
do a routine check of his leg, then he 
should be okay," the doctor informed 
me. 
Following the surgery, I was 
starting to feel that 1 must be fairly 
brave. But in spite of this sentiment, 
when they sentiment, when they 
brought in rhe next victim I began to 
think I had chosen the wrong 
vocation. The second surgery was not 
as easy to handle. This man's wounds 
were older and had become infected. 
The surgeon had to cut off more of 
his stump and dress the wound. I took 
a few images and decided that this 
time I couldn't stay any longer. 
Several days after the surgery, I 
returned to the hospital to follow up 
Photographing Tragedy 
with the photo stories of both victims. 
I found the older man, his wife 
dutifully fanning his body as he slept. 
She was lost in her thoughts and hardly 
noticed my presence. The nurse 
informed me that the 17 -year-old, 
Phon Phea, was in bed no. 45. I 
couldn't believe what I saw as I 
approached. He had only one leg! A 
feeling of shock hit me. When I had 
left him in rhe surgery there was no 
indication that an amputation was 
necessary. He was, after all, only hit 
by rwo small pieces of shrapnel. I 
called the nurse over and asked the 
reason for the amputation. I was told 
that apart from the chest injury, the 
second piece had severed a main leg 
artery. As I drove back to town I saw 
groups ofThai youths, about the same 
age as Phea, enjoying a football 





Website: www.pitt.edu/ -ginie/lm/ 
cambodia.html 
How to Help ... 
Those interested can help the 
plight of landmine victims by 
generating publicity. This can be 
achieved by wri ring a story for a 
magazine, sending a letter to the editor 
of a newspaper, or writing an opinion/ 
editorial piece for your local 
newspaper to express your concern. 
One could also make a website, 
organize an event/exhibition, design 
• 69. 
a poster, go on the radio, raise funds 
or appear on television programs to 
discuss the landmine issues. 
Supporters are also welcome to 
visit my website (www.iinet.ner.au/ 
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U.S. Efforts 
Strengthen Pledge to Vietnam 
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund estimates that 2,000 Vietnamese are killed 
each year by mines and UXO. In response to this, the U.S. government, VVMF 
and Clear Path International are focusing on the country's Landmine victims. 
By Stacy L.Smith,MAlC 
I n November 2000, former President Bill Clinton traveled to Vietnam to celebrate the 25 th 
anniversary of the end of the Vietnam 
War. At a ceremony honoring efforts 
to clear an estimated 3 million land-
mines and 300,000 tons ofUXO scat-
tered throughout Vietnam, Climon 
vowed to help remove mine threats in 
Vietnam, Africa and the Balkans. He 
said: "You will have America's support 
until you have found every landmine 
and every piece of unexploded 
ordnance. This is a tragedy for which 
peace produces no answer." 
In June 2000, the U .S. gov-
ernment allocated $3.1 million (U.S.) 
to support humanitarian demining 
efforts in Vietnam. Of this total, $1.7 
million will go towards the purchase 
of equipment such as vehicles, 
personal safety gear and landmine/ 
UXO detectors; $1.4 million will be 
designated for a level one national 
survey to determine the scope of the 
landmine problem and make recom-
mendations for resolving it; $200,000 
will be allotted to develop a computer 
system to record the locations and 
types of ordnance used during the 
Vietnam War; and $80,000 will be 
used for a computer system to assist 
the Vietnamese in managing their 
demining program. 
Following Clinton's promise ro 
rid Vietnam of landmines, two non-
profit organizations, Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial Fund and C lear Path 
Imernational, introduced projects 
in te nded to stop the deaths of 
innocent civilians from escalating. 
Currently, an average of six deaths 
occur daily in Vietnam as a result of 
landmines/UXO. 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund 
Project RENEW 
On Dec. 4, 2000, the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial Fund (VVMF) 
revealed a plan to form the first-ever 
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comprehensive program targeted at 
saving lives and preventing injuries in 
Vietnam. The two-year pilot project 
in Trieu Phong District of Vietnam's 
Quang Tri province is designed "to 
restore the use of lands of th e 
Vietnamese through education and 
neutralization of the effects of the 
Vietnam war." The non-profit organi-
zation's model for landmine/UXO 
clearance is called Project RENEW. 
According ro Jan C. Scruggs, VVMF 
president, Project RENEW combines 
the efforts of several international 
NGOs, including PeaceTrees 
Vietnam, Catholic Relief Services and 
Counterpart International, with the 
Quang Tri Province People's Com-
mittee in Vietnam. "We plan to show 
that a comprehensive approach 
benefits the people of Quang Tri 
province," Scruggs said, "and also the 
organizations that are assisting with 
this effort. We also hope to show that 
government agencies and non-govern-
mental groups can work successfully 
together." 
Assessing the Situation 
Accordi ng to a Dec. 4, 2000 , 
VVM
F 
press release, Vietnamese 
officials estimate that approximately 
2,000 civilian deaths result each year 
from landmines/UXO . Since the end 
of the war in 1975, approximately 
40,000 civilian deaths have been 
caused by landmines/UXO with 
nearly 1,500 of those occurring in 
Trieu Phong District. VVMF hopes 
that Project RENEW will reduce the 
risks that landmines/UXO pose to 
civilians. 
In the early planning stages of the 
program, VVMF mer with officials 
from international NGOs, the 
Vietnamese government, and the U.S. 
De partment of State to discus s 
Vietnam's landmine/UXO problem. 
"We were told time and time again 
that a single comprehensive effort was 
needed," Scruggs said. With the help 
of international NGOs and the Quang 
Tri Province People's Committee, 
Project RENEW will accomplish irs 
all-inclusive goal through mine 
education and awareness, mine 
clearance, land resettlement and 
victim assistance. "We feel that by 
several different groups helping with 
this effort, we will be able to make 
significant progress in a shorter 
amount of rime and the people of 
Quang Tri will benefit significantly 
from the collaborative system," 
Scruggs said. 
Projections 
With marching $250,000 grants 
from the £*TRADE Group, Inc., a 
global leader in online personal 
financial services based in Menlo Park, 
Calif., and rhe Freeman Foundation 
in Stowe, Vt., an office of international 
cooperation will be established in 
Quang Tri province as a center for 
information exchange between all 
parties. T he center will also address 
potential problems and obstacles 
arising during rhe pilot project. If 
successful, VVMF hopes to imple-
ment Project RENEW in other mine-
affected countries such as Laos and 
Cambodia. "We have a lot of work to 
do in Vietnam before we move on to 
other countries," Scruggs said. "What 
we hope to have after two years is a 
useful approach that can easi ly be 
implemented in other affected lands." 
Clear Path International 
Current Projects 
In December 2000 , Clear Path 
International began a two-year project 
in Vietnam rhar will clear 125 acres of 
land for later construction of housing 
in Dong Ha Town, Quang Tri 
province. During the Vietnam War, 
the clearance site head-quartered rhe 
U.S. 3rd Marine Division and was 
known as Dong Ha Combat Base. 
According to Martha Hathaway, 
project director for Vietnam, this 
project will eliminate the fears oflocal 
• 71. 
children and their families. "For 30 
years, the people ofVietnam have lived 
with the threat of landmines and 
bombs in their communities, " she 
said. "Clear Path International hopes 
to remove these obstacles that stand 
in the way of the health and safety of 
children in Vietnam." The project 
hopes to rid the area of the threat of 
landmines/UXO on two levels: mine 
clearance and victim assistance. 
Mine clearance will be executed 
with the help ofUXB International, a 
commercial humanitarian demining 
company in Ashburn, Va. UXB 
International will provide manage-
ment, technical supervision, equip-
ment and accommodations for 
demining teams. It will also train local 
Vietnamese deminers to carry out the 
clearance of landmines and UXO 
using safe techniques and procedures. 
Hathaway believes that a methodical 
demining process is key to a successful 
clearance project. She said, "Clear Path 
International believes that rhe most 
paramount concerns are safety and 
quality, and in order to ensure safety 
and quality the process of clearance is 
time and resource intensive." 
In addition to the clearance 
project, Clear Path International is also 
working to facilitate accident survivors 
in the area. While the organization 
primarily benefits children who have 
sustained debilitating injuries as a re-
sult oflandmine or UXO explosions, 
the program also provides monetary 
compensation to the families of af-
fected children. With the support of 
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the Committee for the Care and Pro-
tection of Children, Clear Path Inter-
national is able ro give injured chil-
dren emergency medical treatment, 
surgery, long-term health care, nutri-
tional support and special scholar-
ships. Funding for chis project was re-
ceived from a grant from the Freeman 
Foundation and contributions from 
individuals and foundations such as 
the Francis Finlay Foundation. 
The Mission 
Clear Path International is a non-
profit organization founded in Sep-
tember 2000. Its efforts are concen-
trated in the war-torn countries of 
Southeast Asia. The goals of the orga-
nization include raising awareness of 
the landmine/UXO problem, provid-
ing money and resources for demining 
and victim assistance projects, and 
sponsoring programs to remove land-
mines/UXO and assist victims ofland-
mine/UXO explosions. Through these 
goals, Clear Path International hopes 
to accomplish its mission: to clear ob-
stacles that stand in the way of the 
health, safety and development of chil-
dren and their families. 
A Plan for the Future 
Clear Path International hopes ro 
empower local residents and agencies 
in mine-affected countries by creating 
"an in-country capacity that can 
sustain the demining and victim 
assistance activities well into the 
future, independently or with minimal 
support from the international 
community. " By involving local 
residents and agencies from the start, 
"a handover of management and 
implementation of the project(s) to a 
team of qualified domestic deminers 
with only periodic technical 
monitoring from the contractor, but 
with the presence of a full-time Clear 
Path International representative" is 
possible. For the time being, Clear 
Path International's efforts on behalf 
of the health, safety and development 
of mine-affected children and their 
families will be limited to Vietnam and 
Cambodia. In the future, the 
organization hopes to expand its 
project scope to Laos and Thailand. 
Conclusion 
While President Clinton's pledge 
to the Vietnamese government has led 
to dedicated efforts to rid Vietnam of 
landmines/UXO, the Bush adminis-
tration has yet to make a statement on 
the future of U.S. involvement in 
landmine policy. Before leaving office, 
Clinton commented on the progress 
of his administration and encouraged 
the Bush administration to maintain 
U.S. efforts. "While I am proud chat 
we have made substantial progress 
towards eliminating the threat 
landmines pose to innocent civilians 
around the world," Clinton wrote on 
Jan. 19, 200 l , "there is work yet to be 
done. I urge the next administration 
to build on our progress and take the 
steps necessary to allow the United 
States to eventually sign the Ottawa 
Convention, while still meeting our 
security needs and protecting our men 
and women in uniform." • 
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RHINO in Cambodia 
RHINO, a Large and powerful demining tool geared towards Large clearance op-
erations, has been put to the test-both on testing grounds and in the field. The 
result: a Level of performance and operability that alleviates the concerns of critics. 
By Manfred Joehnk, Program Manager 
Background 
T he mechanical demining system RHINO was developed internally by Rheinmetall Landsysteme GmbH (RLS) in Kid, Germany, to provide a more 
cost effective and safe demining tool. It is superior ro 
existing systems in terms of efficiency, safety and clearing 
capacity and is especially well suited for large area de mining 
operations. RHINO is large (9.5 m long, 3.1 m wide and 
3.5 m high), powerful (660 kW caterpillar engine), robust 
(weighs 58 metric tons) and is fully remotely controlled. 
RHINO is a serious demining machine, as opposed to a 
mechanical machine whose purpose it is to assist the manual 
deminers. 
This article summarizes RHINO and the user 
experience during a field test and subsequent demining 
task conducted in Cambodia from August 1999 to May 
2000 . The test and the accompanying demining task in 
support of CARE took place in two remote areas in 
Battambang province. The main objective of the task was 
to accelerate the demining process ro help accommodate 
the need for land for returning refugees. This was a major 
two-year project involving the resettlement of aproximately 
4,000 families. 
The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), asrate 
run organization, is responsible for the conduct of mine 
clearance actions. The CMAC staff is assisted by 
international advisors from the United Nations and NGOs, 
as well as soldiers from countries such as Canada, Australia, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. The test and subsequent 
demining action were managed and performed by CMAC 
with the technical assistance of two RLS employees. After 
the initial training, their role was mainly to provide further 
trai ning on the job for tasks such as unscheduled 
maintenance. Mine clearing in Cambodia represents a 
serious challenge. The environmental conditions are 
tropical and severe. The infrastructure is typical of a 
developing country. The mine problem itself is funher 
complicated by the fact that there are numerous types of 
mines and UXOs, and poorly marked mine-infested areas. 
Operation by Indigenous Personnel 
Training on RHINO began when it arrived by barge 
at Sihanoukville. The RLS technicians trained three 
mechanics and two electricians in the operation and 
maintenance of RHINO. While lacking theoretical 
knowledge, the trainees were skilled workers and eager to 
learn. In a few short days they could handle the day-ro-
day operations and, soon after, maintenance of the vehicle. 
In a few weeks, they operated the system without the 
oversight of the RLS technicians. The five trainees were 
organized in two operation/maintenance teams of two, each 
with the fifth being responsible for supply operations. 
The challenge of leading the demining platoon was 
given to a CMAC technician who was assisted by a former 
leader of a mine marking team. They were initially trained 
and supervised by a French technical advisor. Manual 
deminers, drivers and guards rounded out the team. The 
platoon not only clearly demonstrated that indigenous 
personnel could operate and maintain RHINO, but that 
they also work hard and perform in a highly proficient 
manner throughout the initial test and subsequent tasks. 
• 73. 
• RHINO with dozer 
blade is trans-
ported to the test 
area, just bypassing 
a bailey bridge. 
c/o RHINO 
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There is no question that 
mechanical demining machines are 
huge.The concern is that they are too 
big to be transported and will damage 
the infrastructure of developing 
nations. While the RHINO is a big 
machine, ingenuity will go a long way 
to solve most transportation problems. 
The infrastructure of Cambodia 
is especially weak from our point of 
entry (Sihanoukville) to the test area 
(approximately GOO km) and another 
80 km to the operational site. The 
vehicle made the trip to the test area 
mostly on board a trailer and by rail. 
The critical parts of the roadway and 
undersized bridges were by passed 
through use of the Cambodian railway 
and by driving the vehicle under its 
own power. RHINO traveled some 
140 km of the trip at about 4 km per 
hour. The tiller unit, which weighs 14 
tons but is easy ro remove, was 
replaced by the dozer blade. As a result, 
the trip was made without damage to 
roadway and bridges. RHINO was 
able to row a truck that had been stuck 
in the road and upright a huge truck, 
which had overturned because of 
overloading and very large potholes in 
the road. 
Self-Recovery 
RHINO was bogged down twice 
in muddy, swampy terrain. Two 
methods of self recovery were: 
• In the first case, the vehicle was 
bogged down in a mine-infested 
area. In accordance with regulatory 
procedures, two manual deminers 
had to clear the surrounding area 
before the recovery work could 
commence. An anchor was built by 
means of a steel plate and long iron 
rods. A rope was fixed on the anchor 
as well as on an iron bar, which was 
fixed to the track plates at the rear 
of each track. With this arrangement 
RHINO was able to tow itself out 
of the mud. 
• In the second case, the tiller unit was 
forced downwards in the ground to 
elevate the system while the rear of 
• 74. 
RHINO track formed the second 
base of the vehicle. Stones and 
wooden blocks were placed 
underneath to provide RHINO with 
traction to allow it to be driven our 
of the mud. 
Operation in a 
Tropical Environment 
RHINO was designed to operate 
in a tropical environment, so the high 
temperature and humidity, dust and 
very heavy rain in Cambodia did not 
have an adverse impact on it. RHINO 
proved irs ability to work through 
huge term ire hills as well as dense 
vegetation including any kind of 
bamboo. Trees up to 20 em in 
diameter were processed by RHINO. 
All materials are ground between the 
two tilling drums. Some of the 
vegetation was worse than anticipated, 
almost inaccessible due to thick vines 
and trees up to 30 em in diameter. 
RHINO was slowed down but not 
stopped. The grinding process 
continued. While our customer in 
Croatia clears 20,000 m 2 per day, 
RHINO was able to clear 4,000-6,000 
m 2 per day in a very challenging 
environment. This is significantly 
more than a platoon of manual 
deminers can clear in a week. We 
learned that RHINO's level feelers, 
which control the clearing depth, 
needed stronger protection for driving 
in reverse in such a challenging 
environment as Cambodia. 
Quality Rate 
The situation in Cambodia con-
firmed the operational results of our 
customer in Croatia who has cleared 
some 2 million m2 in just over a year 
without a single mine found intact in 
the treated soil. PMN mines without 
boosters were used in the Cambodian 
test to get information regarding the 
size of residuals of mines, which could 
not detonate. All mines treated dur-
ing the special rest were destroyed com-
pletely. All parts in rhe treated soil are 
passed through the small gap between 
rhe rotating drums. After successful 
completion of the test, CMAC's Risk 
Assessment Committee agreed to place 
the system into operation. 
After RHINO cleared the first 
area, the area was checked completely 
by manual deminers in accordance 
with regulatory procedures. As a result 
of this first recheck and test results, 
the manual recheck was reduced by 50 
percent. Only harmless mine residuals 
and fragments were found by the 
manual deminers. 
Survivability 
RHINO got a chance to demon-
strate its survivability characteristics 
early in the severe conditions in 
Cambodia. During the first week of 
operation, a booby trap consisting of 
two AT mines detonated at 
approximately 30 em under RHINO's 
left track. Later, a single AT mine 
detonated between the two tiller 
drums near the bearings, and another 
AT mine detonated under RHINO's 
right track. In less than two days, the 
detonations from the single mines 
were repaired in rhe field by the 
CMAC maintenance personnel. The 
double mine explosion caused more 
severe damage to mechanical parts and 
was repaired in rhe field in about a 
week. 
There was no threat to human life 
with these explosions because RHINO 
is unmanned and remote controlled. 
An operator sitting in the cab of any 
manned clearing system would have 
been severely injured or killed by the 
double mine explosion. 
Too Costly to Operate? 
RHINO's deployment tn 
Cambodia has demonstrated that if 
the system is used as intended and is 
operated in a day-to-day demining 
operation, its clearance speed is 
outstanding. Our cost study can 
demonstrate the cosr effectiveness of 
RHINO when compared to a manual 
demining operation. RHINO is 
superior in that it: 
• can be operated and maintained by 
indigenous personnel after a 
qualified training on the job. 
• can be transponed without 
damaging the infrastructure, even 
under rhe conditions of a 
developing country, by smart and 
flexible use of the available 
resources. 
• disposes of sufficient self recovery 
means even in real swampy 
ground. 
• is working reliably also in tropical 
environment. 
• is one of rhe first reliable demining 
machines, which is much more 
efficient than manual deminers , 
and which makes manual 
rechecking of the ground 
unnecessary. 
• has an outstanding survivability 
against AT mines, UXO and 
booby traps and offers excellent 
safety due to its remotely 
con trolled operation. 
• will speed up the demining process 




RHINO is a real demining ma-
chine. In the Cambodian operation, 
it has proven to be both safe and cost 
effective. If the world is going to make 
serious progress in solving its mine 
problem in a reasonable time frame, 
cost effective and efficient demining 






systems such as RHINO must be part 
of rhe solution. 
The crucial . reg uirements ro use 
RHINO are an open mind, good 
planning, logistic as well as sice 
management, and the international 
will to sec up a long lasting demining 
project with multinational sponsor-
ship. • 
Contact Information 
Manfred Joehnk, Program Manager 
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Cambodia: A Country Profile 
Through the efforts of CMAC, Mines Advisory Group and HALO Trust, Cambodia is 
working to eliminate the hundreds of contaminated areas within its borders. 
Rohan Maxwell proposes changes in these operations to sustain removal efforts. 
By Rohan Maxwell, Officer, Canadian Army 
Background 
I n the late I960s, communist insurgems known as the Khmer Rouge began operations against the central government of Cambodia, launching three decades of 
nearly continuous warfare. Vietnamese communists 
supported the insurgents, while the government came to 
be supported by the United States and South Vietnam. 
The fighting was exacerbated by the expansion of the 
Vietnam War into eastern Cambodia, including a massive 
American bombing campaign against communist supply 
lines. Battlefield UXO was widely dispersed, while aerial-
delivered UXO was concentrated in the eastern and central 
provinces (ref 1). According to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ref 2), about IO 
percent of the mines in Cambodia were laid during this 
period-most in the central and southern provinces. 
The first civil war ended with the defeat of the central 
government in Apriii975. It was followed by 44 horrific 
months of Khmer Rouge rule, during which more than I 
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million Cambodians died of starvation, disease and murder. 
Approximately 5 percent of the mines were laid under the 
Khmer Rouge regime, mainly in the Thai and Vietnamese 
border regions. 
The second civil war began at the end of 1978 when 
Vietnam, goaded by border provocations, drove its erstwhile 
ally back into guerilla warfare and installed a more 
cooperative government led by Khmer Rouge defectors. 
After a decade of fighting between the cenrral government 
(and its Vietnamese backers) and the Khmer Rouge (and 
various non-communist Cambodian groups formerly 
opposed to them), Vietnam withdrew its forces and peace 
negotiations began. With the concurrence of all parties, 
the U.N. Transitional Amhority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
was mandated to run Cambodia for I8 months (1992-
1993) in order to supervise demobilization and conduct 
elections. The Khmer Rouge chose to resume fighting, so 
demobilization failed, bur elections did rake place and the 
central government gained greater international legitimacy. 
The war continued for the remainder of the 1990s, with 
the central government slowly gaining the upper hand and 
internal and external support for the guerillas ebbed. Most 
of the fighting took place in the northern and northwestern 
provinces, bm there was also significant fighting in the 
central and southern provinces. By the late 1990s, the 
guerillas were a spent force and the last groups gave up in 
1999. 
The majority of the mines, 85 percent, were laid 
during rhe second civil war. All combatants used mines 
extensively, and, ironically, the highly mine-affected 
Cambodian civilians began using them for their own 
purposes-self-defense, protection of property, or brutally 
direct dispute resolution. Few records were kept, bur in 
1994 the United Nations estimated that there were as many 
as I 0 million mines in Cambodia (ref2). In I997, this was 
reduced to 4 million to 6 million (ref 2), an estimate 
supported by the number of mines that were actually being 
• A bridge along National Route 10, the main highway 
connecting Cambodia's second-largest city, Battambang, to 
Thailand. c/o Rohan Maxwell 
located (ref 3). In 1999, the HALO 
Trust rook this empirical approach one 
step further, applying the known 
clearance results to the amount ofland 
thought to still be contaminated: this 
estimate suggested that there had been 
no more than 1 million mines to begin 
with (ref2). 
UNTAC identified more than 
I ,900 potentially contaminated areas 
(ref 3) totaling approximately 3,600 
square kilometers (refs 2 and 3). By 
1999, subsequent survey efforts had 
reduced this to 2,800 sq. km (ref 3) . 
O f this total, 656 sq. km were known 
to be contaminated (ref 4), leaving 
2, 144 sq. km in doubt. Since on 
average only 35 percent of suspected 
terrain is actually mined (ref 2), it is 
probable that a further 750 sq. km of 
contaminated land will be identified, 
for a total of approximately 1,400 sq. 
km. This total will require a significant 
amount of clearance, since on average 
each square kilometer of contaminated 
land contains more than 1,000 mines. 
In 1993, the UNTAC force 
commander estimated that it would 
take 30 to 40 years to demine 
Cambodia (ref 5). In fact, given the 
current clearance rate of approximately 
15 sq. km per year (ref 2), it would 
take 93 years to clear I ,400 sq. km. If 
only high priority land is considered-
land needed for resettlement, 
agriculture and critical development-
the task becomes more manageable. 
For example, the HALO Trust 
estimates that all high-priority land in 
Cambodia could be cleared in five to 
1 0 years at the current rate of progress 
(ref 2). This estimate depends on the 
definition of high-priority land, but 
the key point is that with continued 
international assistance it should be 
possible for most Cambodians to live 
a mine-free existence within a 
reasonable period of time. Once that 
has been accomplished, a smaller-
scale, long-term effort can deal with 
the remaining areas. 
The Mines 
Of all mines in Cambodia, 99 
percent are AP: 68 percent blast, 26 
percent fragmentation, and 5 percent 
bounding fragmentation. The Russian 
PMN-2, whose 115-gram charges 
inflict great damage, accounts for 
approximately 80 percent of the blast 
mines. Smaller blast mines include the 
Vietnamese MD 82B and MN 79, the 
Russian PMD-6 and the very low 
metal content Chinese Type 72A and 
B (the B model incorporates an anti-
disturbance device). Most fragmen-
tation mines are Russian POMZ-2 or 
POMZ-2Ms, while the Chinese Type 
69 is the bounding fragmentation 
mine of choice. AT mines are almost 
all Russian; many of them are buried 
in stacks of two or three more than a 
meter down with a bamboo pole to 
conduct pressure from the surface to 
an AP mine placed atop the first AT 
mine (refS 3 and 4). 
Casualties 
In 1994, Handicap International 
determined from the number of mine-
related amputations per month that 
there were approximately 500 
casualties per month from 1985-1994, 
or a total of 60,000 casualties (ref 5). 
In contrast, a 1998 estimate by the 
U.S. government gives a smaller figure 
of 37,428 casualties for the longer 
period of 1979- 1996, including 
13,328 fatalities (ref 1). The most 
comprehensive and recent information 
is that gathered by the Cambodian 
Mine Incident Database. This source 
provides a figure of 48,842 mine and 
UXO casualties from 1979 to the 
present (ref 8). Adding 15 percent for 
pre-1979 casualties (based on the 
proportion of mines laid before 1979) 
increases this to perhaps 56,168 
casualties since the fighting began, as 
many as 28 percent of which may have 
been fatal (15,727 deaths-refs 1 and 
8). This is by no means a worst-case 
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analysis-at present a majority of the 
estimated 49,846 Cambodian 
amputees (ref 1) are casualties of mines 
and UXO. As amputations represent 
27 to 40 percent of all injuries (refs 5 
and 8), there could have been as many 
as 124,615 ro 183,281 casualties. 
Discrepancies on such a large scale are 
• A mine detecting team ready for the mine field. 
c/o Rohan Maxwell 
difficult to fathom until one recalls 
that a much larger figure-the number 
who died under the Khmer Rouge-
has not yet been narrowed down to 
the nearest million. 
The Mine Incident Database 
provides excellent derail on the current 
situation. At present, 91 percent of 
casualties are civil ians, 38 percent of 
whom are injured in the course of 
subsistence activities such as farming, 
gathering wood, fishing, collecting 
food, fetching water and herding 
cattle. An additional 15 percent are 
injured while travelling. Adult males 
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account for 63 percent of all victims, 
bur 30 percent are children under the 
age of 18. Tampering causes 42 
percent of casualties, including one-
quarter of the men, three-quarters of 
the children and one-quarter of the 
women. Most of them fall victim to 
mines, but UXO accounts for 41 
percent of all casualties, including 69 
percent of children . There are, on 
average, 85 new victims each month , 
and 1 in 5 do not survive their injuries. 
Demining Organizations 
There are many humanitarian 
organizations that have conducted, 
supported or are pres en tly 
contributing to demining operations 
in Cambodia (e.g. Norwegian People's 
Aid (NPA), Handicap International 
(HI), World Vision, CARE) but this 
article will discuss only those that are 
currently conducting operations: 
HALO Trust, Mines Advisory G roup 
(MAG) and the Cambodian Mine 
Action Center (CMAC). HALO Trust 
has been working in the northwestern 
provinces of Banteay Meanchey and 
Siem Reap since O crober 1991. Tts 
500 Cambodian staff are organized 
in to 16 clearance teams working 
predominantly in the immedi ate 
vicinity of villages-houses, schools, 
water supplies, health facilities and 
paddy fields. HALO 's Cambodia 
operations are funded by the 
governments of the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Finland, Ireland and 
Japan, as well as the United Nations, 
the European Union (EU) and private 
donors in England and Japan. MAG 
Cambodia starred work in 1992. Its 
min e action ream s are presenrly 
concentrated in the northern and 
northwestern provinces ofPreah Vihar 
and Battambang. Like the HALO 
teams, they normally work in 
proximity to villages. The 389 
Cam bodi an staff (including 48 
amputees and 46 woman deminers) 
and nine expatriates are supported by 
donors including the governments of 
the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Austria, as well as the 
Lutheran World Service and Church 
World Services. 
CMAC evolved from the 
UNTAC Mine C learance Training 
Unit in 1993. After initial funding 
• Billboard depicting a cooperative project of CARE, the World Food Programme and CMAC. C/o Rohan Maxwell 
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difficulties, it expanded ro a strength 
of 2,800 Cambodian staff and 50 
expatriates. C MAC is a Cambodian 
agency, but it relies almost entirely on 
international donations and it is 
administered as a project of the U.N. 
Development Programme. Its annual 
budget has peaked at approximately 
$12 million (U.S.), plus numerous 
donations in kind from donors 
including Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan , the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the EU, the 
United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
CMAC's approximate 60 demin-
ing platoons are organized and 
d eployed in groups of four to six 
plaroons plus supporting elements 
(ambulance, radio, guards, etc.), with 
three such groups making up a 
D emining Unit (DU). This type of 
organization mea ns that CMAC 
cannot deal readily with smaller tasks. 
Some flexibility is provided by 
community mine teams whose 
mandate is to take on urgent tasks in 
order to reduce casualties as quickly 
as possible. Ideally, these teams clear 
the most critical areas in a village and 
mark the remaining mined areas un til 
CMAC can mount a larger operation. 
There is also a small development 
demining unit that-has carried our a 
number of high priority tasks with 
funding directly from UNHCR. 
CMAC also deploys EOD, mine 
awareness and mine marking teams. 
Froml993 to 2000, CMAC's 
platoons cleared an average of 10 sq. 
km per year. In mid-2000, three of the 
four DUs were working in the 
no rthwestern provinces of 
Battambang and Banreay Meanchey 
and the fourth was preparing to move 
into northern Cambodia. Unf ort -
unately, CMAC had failed to 
adequately address a multitude of 
concerns about mismanagement and 
corruption, despite increasing donor 
pressure beginning in 1999. As a 
result, funding became steadily scarcer 
an d after scraping by for several 
months, CMAC ceased operations 
and laid off the majority of its staff in 
late 2000. This effectively removed 
three-quarters of the d em ining 
resources in Cambodia. Currenrly, it 
appears that CMAC will resume 
operations at some point in 2001 , 
once donor concerns have been fully 
addressed and funding reinstated. 
Mea nwhile, several co mmercial 
demining companies are currently 
seeking to benefit , in part, from 
C MAC's failings and receive the 
authority to begin demining 
opera nons. 
The Planning Process 
In theory, d emining efforts 
should be preceded by a systematic 
Level 1 Survey. Unfortunately, the 
security situation in Cambodia 
precluded such a survey until the late 
1990s, and as a result the most 
comprehensive data was that collected 
by UNTAC and refined by CMAC. 
Planning was further complicated by 
the fact that many of the most afflicted 
areas were not accessible to demining 
organizations for security reasons. This 
meant that demining efforts were 
frequently directed at areas that were 
accessible, but nor necessarily high 
priority. Now that security levels have 
improved, the plann ing process is 
slowly being refined. In concept, the 
provincial governments should se t 
demining requirements and priorities. 
W here appropriate, NGOs and 
international organizations working in 
the province must also be involved in 
the planning process, as they normally 
provide the resources needed to pur 
the de mined land to best use. Demin-
ing agencies should provide technical 
advice-what can be done, and when 
it can be done-bur they should not 
set priorities. This concept places 
responsibility for land use where it 
belongs. Cambodian political 
st ru c ture at the prov inc ial level 
includes the provincial governor and 
government, the subordinate district 
chiefs, the commune chiefs of each 
district and the village chiefs of each 
commune. The Provincial Rural 
Development com mittee reco m-
mending demining priorities to the 
governor, bur the derailed work is 
carried our by the Land Use Planning 
Unit 
(
LUPU ). Each district has a 
District Working Group (DWG) 
which submits its demining require-
ments and priorities to the LUPU (and 
then to the PRDC) based on input 
from the commune chiefs (who have 
in turn consulted their village chiefs). 
The PRDC then coordinates with the 
demining agencies ro match resources 
to tasks, and the result should be a fully 
coordinated demining and develop-
ment plan. 
This process is sti ll being 
developed . The key is to ensure that 
planners and staff at all levels develop 
the required level of technical 
expertise-for example, the use of 
Geographical Information Systems 
(GIS)-as well as manageme n t, 
organizational and planning skills. In 
Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge 
did its best to eliminate those who 
possessed such skills, planning and 
organizational s tructures are being 
rebuilt very nearly from scratch, and 
it will be some time before the concept 
outlined above can be completely 
implemented. Land riding must also 
become more reliable if de mined land 
is to be pur to its intended use. Finally, 
accurate survey data is still required, 
and to this end a national Level 1 
Survey has finally been initiated, with 
funding from the Canadian govern-
ment. 
National coordination between 
the demining agencies was until 
recently a CMAC responsibility. 
However, the agencies did nor 
normally work in proximity to each 
other, and CMAC and the demining 
NGOs normally concentrated on 
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different types of tasks. There was little 
call for coordination in the field and, 
fo r planning purposes, MAG and 
HALO worked closely with selected 
communities and agencies, while the 
task of working with the provincial 
governments fell largely to CMAC. In 
2000, as part of the response to the 
CMAC crisis, a national demining 
authority was created. The 
Cambodian Mine Action Authority is 
d eveloping policies to regulate rhe 
operation of commercial demining 
companies and to conduct quality 
assurance checks on all demining 
agencies. Its secretary general envisions 
the commercial companies under-
raking mine clearance tasks unsuitable 
for humanitarian organizations. It is 
anticipated that the first such 
operation will be officially licensed in 
March. 
Demining Operations 
Manual demining is the primary 
method in use in Cambodia. The 
equipment is typical for the job 
(tripwire feelers, vegetation cutters, 
mine d etecto rs, prodders and 
excavating tools, varying suites of 
protective equipment), as are the 
phys ically and mentally arduous 
conditions deminers face daily. Rates 
of pay are high by Cambodian 
standards: $ 160 a month for a 
beginner CMAC deminer, in a 
country where the per capita monthly 
income is about $23. These wages and 







The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol5/iss1/1




c/o Rohan Maxwell 
the status associated with being a 
deminer are more than sufficient to 
overcome any concern about death or 
injury, and there is no shortage of 
volunteers. There has been a steady 
trickle of casual ties amon g the 
demining and EOD teams, averaging 
eight or nine a year since 1993, about 
7 percent of which are fatal. The 
variety of soil conditions across the 
country- in particular, che large areas 
in which the soil contains a high 
natural metal content-presents a 
significant challenge, which in 
CMAC's case has been partially 
addressed by deploying two different 
mine detectors. Another challenge is 
the high level of metal contamination 
in many areas- not just o n old 
battlefields, which can be expected to 
contain a great many metal fragments, 
but also on the sites of abandoned 
villages chat are now being resettled. 
Ten miniscule fragments per square 
meter is nor uncommon, and even the 
most experienced dem iner cannot 
differentiate between the signal 
produced by such a fragment and that 
produced by a low me cal con tent 
mme. 
In addition to the manual 
de miners, there are a number of 
mechanical systems that are either in 
service or under evaluation. These 
systems fall into two categories: those 
designed to accelerate the manual 
demining process by removing 
vegetation (and tripwires); and those 
intended to demine on their own, with 
the support of a small number of 
manual deminers. Vegetation cutters 
are well suited co the Cambodian 
situation, where the removal of 
vegetation and checking for tripwires 
consumes up to 70 percent of the 
deminers' time (ref 3). HALO Trust 
has successfu lly deployed seven 
tractor-mounted vegetation cutters in 
support of its 16 clearance teams. 
MAG is currently conducting trials on 
the Pearson Tractor, a multi-functional 
system that can be adapted to clear 
vegetation, cut small trees, and 
conduct area reduction and quality 
assurance tasks. The Tempest is a 
remote-controlled mini-flail, which is 
also being eval uated by MAG for 
vegetation clearance. This machine is 
unusual in that it was built in 
Cambodia by a British charity that 
employs disabled Cambodians. 
Finally, CMAC is testing Japanese 
vegetation cutting systems that are 
essentially tracked excavators with 
brushcutters in place of the excavator 
buckets. 
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The mechanical vegetation cut-
ters described above are either 
operational or show promise; in 
contrast, the two mechanical 
demining systems that have been 
evaluated (both by CMAC) have 
enjoyed less success. The first is the 
Sisu RA-140 flail, originally designed 
to clear scatterable mines from hard 
surfaces or standard mines from open 
terrain. After extensive trials, it" has 
been concluded that this system 
cannot clear terrain to meet required 
standards. Only about 80 percent of 
the mines (at depths of 5 to 20 em) 
are detonated or rendered inoperable, 
and there is a significant risk that some 
mines could be thrown our of the mine 
field into previously safe areas. In 
addition, the system lacks mobility. 
The Finnish government, though, 
remains willing to underwrite the costs 
of d eploying and operating two 
systems, so CMAC uses them as 
vegetation cutters. They enjoy 
reasonable success in this role , 
particularly against thick bamboo, but 
they continue to encounter mobility 
problems. 
T he second system is RHINO, a 
cracked vehicle equipped with two 
heavy counter-rotating drum s 
mounted laterally, one above the other, 
on the front of the chassis. This 
adapted agricultural system is designed 
to till the soil to a depth of 20 em, 
crushing all mines and UXO between 
the drums. At a weight of 48 tons 
(without the 14 ton tiller unit 
attached), it was very difficult to 
deploy RHINO co task sites during 
its trials. Cranes and flatbed trailers of 
the required capacity are not easily 
procured in rural Cambodia, and it 
was sometimes necessary to make 
roure improvements in order to move 
the system. Once on site, the machine 
worked reasonably well when 
difficulties with depth maintenance 
had been resolved. A small number of 
manual deminers dealt with awkward 
spots and provided a measure of 
quality assurance. 
After its initial evaluation, 
RHINO did valuable work in support 
of a multi-village rehabilitation project 
under the aegis of CARE Cambodia. 
The drums survived mine and UXO 
deto nations, but on a number of 
occasions AT mine detonations 
rendered the system inoperable for 
significant periods of time. Spare pans 
were an ongoing concern, because 
most of them had to be shipped from 
Germany. Most critically, RHINO 
was expensive co operate. This can be 
more than made up by the savings in 
manual demining costs, but only if the 
system can be deployed in a series of 
very large, open mine fields in close 
proximity to each other. This was not 
the case in Cambodia, and once the 
funding provided by the German 
government ran out, RHINO 
returned co Germany. 
Finally, CMAC is developing a 
mine detecting dog (MDD) capability, 
funded by the Swedish government. 
The inrent is to use MDDs for area 
reduction and possibly for quality 
assurance , but the training and 
deployment process has been a lengthy 
one. The project began in 1996, but 
there was a significant initial setback 
w hen Cambodian dogs taken to 
Sweden for training proved unsuitable 
for the task, necessitating a fresh start 
using Swedish dogs trained in 
Cambodia. These dogs and their 
Cambodian handlers moved from 
their training facility to Battambang 
province in early 2000. The intent was 
to familiarize the teams with the 
terrain before starting area reduction 
tasks in the spring of 2000, but this 
took longer than anticipated and as of 
mid-2000 there were no operational 
teams. 
Conclusion 
Cambodia remains a heavily mine 
and UXO-contaminated country with 
an extremely high rate of related 
casualties. Humanitarian demining 
wi ll remain a high priority for at least 
another decade, and while the 
demining NGOs can probably be 
relied upon to stay the course and 
successfully nationalize their 
operations, the capability lost by the 
CMAC suspension must be replaced. 
There are various options- retain 
CMAC, create several smaller 
organizations, divert funding to 
NGOs-bm they all require 
continued international support. 
Unfortunately, the recent difficulties 
with CMAC have made many donors 
justifiably wary. The solution is not co 
reduce or withdraw funding, but 
rather to continue to insis t on 
fundamental changes co the way in 
which demining funds are managed 
and demining operations are planned 
and conducted. • 
Rohan Maxwell is an officer in the 
Canadian Army with 13 years 
experience as a combat engineer, 
including mine and UXO clearance 
operations in Iraq and Kuwait. In 
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• Phonsavanh, the 
capital of Xieng 
Khouang 
province, is 
situated on a high 
rolling plateau. 
c/oMCCU.S. 
Munitions and Mines: 
Peace Education for Laos 
From the end of the Vietnam War to 1994, 10,000 Laotians fell casualty to the 
millions of pieces of UXO within their borders. The author recounts the role of 
Mennonite Central Commitee and other NGOs in reversing this situation. 
By Titus Peachey, Mennonite Central Committee 
I t was 8:00 one morning in March of 1998, when Phou Vieng, a villager in the northern Lao province ofXieng Khouang, was preparing his work for the day. Having 
recently built a simple house for his family, his first task 
for the morning was to dig several shallow holes in the 
earthen floor to anchor his bed. After measuring and 
marking the places where his bedposts would lodge, he 
prepared his digging tool and squarred beside the first mark. 
In one short stroke, his life was forever changed. 
AJl Phou Vieng can remember is the sound of the ex-
plosion. Hundreds of shards of steel tore into his body 
from a cluster bomb buried just beneath the soil. One of 
the pieces of shrapnel punctured a nearby can of gasoline, 
and it burst into flames. Fortunately, neighbors gathered 
quickly and carried Phou Vieng to safety, but his house 
and all the family's belongings were burned. 
The bomblet in Phou Vieng's house was dropped as 
part of a massive U.S. bombing campaign that flew more 
than 580,000 missions over Laos between 1964 and 1973. 
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This equals roughly one mission for every five inhabitants 
of the country and an average of one bombing mission 
every eight minutes around rhe clock during the entire 
nine years. Researchers estimate that approximately 90 
million submunitions were dropped during the bombing 
campaign. With a dud rare of I 0-30 percent, well over 9 
million pieces of UXO were left behind. This ordnance, 
much of it cluster munitions, has now lain in the ground 
for over 25 years and becomes less stable and more 
dangerous with each passing year. 
When the war ended, hundreds of thousands of Lao 
villagers who had fled the bombing returned to their homes. 
In most cases, everything had been destroyed. They had to 
rebuild their homes, repair the paddy dikes in their rice 
fields, and open up the soil with shovels and hoes. They 
carried on this imensive work in the midst of a staggering 
array of still-lethal UXO littering the soil. Unknown to 
them, their villages and surrounding fields had become 
one vast, unmarked mine field. With no one to help them, 
these villagers were trapped. In 1994, I asked one villager 
why he cominued to grow vegetables in a location with 
bomblets, or "bombies" as they are often called. He 
responded, "I can't move my garden. There wouldn't be 
any point to it anyway. Ifi moved it ro a new location, I'd 
just find more bombies there. So I might as well keep it 
where it is." 
Thongsavanh, a reacher in Xieng Khouang province 
during the war years, remembers instructing his students 
ro pick up the strange round pieces of ordnance that 
appeared in the forests and hillsides near his school. "I didn't 
know it was dangerous," he recalled. "I thought since the 
bombies hadn't blown up on impact they weren't dangerous 
anymore." 
Typically, when villagers found ordnance in their fields 
and gardens, they simply removed it with their bare hands. 
They found within themselves a courage borne out of 
necessity. Farming was their livelihood and the only land 
available to them was filled with bombs. Indeed, with the 
passage of time, villagers became almost casual in their 
approach to the ever-present bomb lets. An encounter I had 
with Thong Dee, who was plowing his 
field in Lek Village, illustrates this 
attitude. When I asked Thong if any 
bomblets had been turned up during 
the plowing thus far, he matter-of-
factly replied that over 20 had been 
plowed up the previous day. He had 
thrown or placed some of the bomblets 
into a hole at the edge of the plowed 
field. As I walked over to the hole and 
peered over the edge, Thong hurriedly 
pulled away the weeds and scrap metal 
he had placed on top to reveal the four 
or five bomblets underneath. Noticing 
that I was about to take a picture, he 
quickly moved each bomblet into 
clearer view, handling them like they 
were merely billiard balls. 
Sadly, not everyone was as lucky 
as Thong Dee. Between the end of the 
war in 1975 and the beginning of 
clearance operations in 1994, more 
than l 0,000 Lao villagers suffered 
injury or death from UXO. In many 
ways, the stories are remarkably similar 
to the stories of accidents from 
landmines. People are injured or killed 
during their everyday activities such 
as collecting firewood, herding carrie 
or hoeing in their fields and gardens. 
Because of their curious shapes 
and colors, and because many of them 
can be found easily accessible on top 
of the soil, cluster munitions are 
almost irresistible to children. In fact, 
over 25 percent of UXO-related 
casualties happen to children, none of 
whom were born when the bombs fell. 
On Nov. 22, 1993, four Tu Va Chao 
children were walking along a street 
on the edge of Phonsavanh, Xieng 
Khouang province's capital. They were 
raking rhe water buffalo to pasture 
when Kou Ya, four, and Sia Ya, six, 
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noticed a round object in the ditch. It 
looked like the ball boys and girls toss 
to each other during Hmong New Year 
festivities. It was actually a cluster 
bomb. Sia Ya threw it to her brother. 
He couldn't catch it and it landed 
behind him, exploding and killing him 
instantly. Sia Ya died after two 
agonizing days and nights in the 
provincial hospital. 
The story of the Chao children 
illustrates yet another tragic aspect of 
cluster bomb explosions. Compared to 
land mines, cluster bombs have higher 
explosive power and deadly frag-
mentation effects. They are designed 
to kill. In Laos, 52 percent of all UXO 
accidents have resulted in death. 
In the period immediately after 
the war, the Soviet Union assisted with 
the clearance of a large state farm in 
Xieng Khouang province. Aside from 
this effort, rhe only assistance came 
from two North American NGOs: the 
• Bomb craters in Xieng Khaouang 
province. c/o MCC U.S. 
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Mennonite Central Committee 
(MCC) and the American Friends 
Service Committee. These groups 
imported good-quality shovels for 
agricultural use. Shovels were thought 
to be somewhat safer to use than the 
traditional Lao hoe, which was swung 
from high over the head to turn the 
soil. Shovels were gentler and perhaps 
less likely to detonate a hidden 
bombler. There were other experi-
ments in these early years, such as an 
MCC-supplied armored tractor with 
a chain flail device on the front. These 
experiments proved ineffective and 
were eventually abandoned. 
H owever, in 1994 the MCC, the 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and 
the Lao government initiated a UXO 
clearance project. The project quickly 
drew the attention of U.N. agencies 
and other governments. As funding 
Cl uste r munition s are sma ll 
bomblets or submunitions which are 
delivered to their targets in large 
containers or shells. The container 
opens in mid-airoverthe target area, 
often dispersing the bomblets over 
an area the size of several football 
fields. A drop of several cannisters 
became available, the project grew. 
From 1996-1998, over 122,000 pieces 
of UXO were cleared; approximately 
50-75 percent of UXO cleared were 
cluster bombs. 1 By the year 2000, 
eight international partners, in 
cooperation with the Lao government 
and local partners, were clearing UXO 
in nine of the country's 18 provinces 
and educating local people to the 
dangers of UXO. 
As MAG began working in Xi eng 
Khouang province, Laos, the newly 
trained clearance teams encountered 
a curious problem. Each morning, 
when they arrived at the work site they 
discovered, resting on top of the soil, 
new cluster bombs that had not been 
there the day before. The work site was 
a large open area that was the future 
site of a teacher's train ing college. A 
conversation with the villagers across 
the road from the worksite cleared up 
the mystery. 
It seems the villagers, who were 
aware that cluster bombs were being 
destroyed each day, decided to carry 
cluster bombs from their village to the 
clearance site each evening. In this way, 
the bomblets from their village could 
be destroyed, even though their village 
had not been chosen for clearance. 
This action by the villagers, while 
extremely risky, also made a clear 
statement about the presence ofUXO 
in the vast affected areas of Laos. UXO 
is everywhere, and clearance teams can 
can easily create kill zones of a 
square kilometer or greater in size. 
The bomblets may be the size and 
shape of a lawn dart, or an elon-
gated soda can, and are designed to 
explode on or shortly after impact. 
The AP bomblets have fragmenta-
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only begin to create tiny islands of 
safety in a great sea of ordnance. 
MAG and its counterpartS in the 
Lao government responded quickly to 
this action by the villagers. Rather than 
putting all their resources into the sub-
surface clearance of a piece of land, 
which would take months to clear, 
they split the team in two. One team 
remained to clear the site of the future 
school, while the other team traveled 
from village to village to destroy 
bomblets on the surface posing an 
immediate threat to life and safety. 
Roving teams continue to destroy 
bomblets on the surface but do not 
make the ground safe for agricultural 
use. The benefit of a roving team is 
the immediate reduction in risk, 
especially to children who are often 
attracted to the toy-like appearance of 
bomblets. Over a period of t ime, 
however, the Lao rov ing teams 
discovered that they could be called 
back to the same area repeatedly. 
Bomblets that bury themselves on 
impact often work their way to the 
surface as time passes. Through the 
natural expansion and contraction of 
the soil and erosion, new bomblets 
appear where none could be seen 
before. 
In May 2000, I accompanied a 
film crew to Laos to help produce a 
documentary that will be shown on 
public television. I watched as a bomb 
clearance team prepared to blow up 
tion features which can send hun-
dreds of shards of steel at ballist ic 
speeds over a w ide area. Anti-armor 
bombs have shaped charges which 
can penetrate heavy armor. The 
cluster munitions are delivered in a 
bomb by ai rcraft, or launched by 
rocket or artillery projectile. 
nine bomblets that had been found on 
a hillside used for grazing cattle. As 
the team worked, my colleagues and I 
spotted four more bomblets on the 
hillside. The metal shells of the 
bomblets had just begun to appear 
above the soil. This area had been 
cleared before and will certainly have 
to be cleared again. 
April 2001 will mark the seventh 
anniversary of the beginning of 
systematic UXO clearance in Laos. 
Tremendous progress has been made 
since the first team of 20 clearance 
specialists was trained in 1994. 
Hopefully, all the destroyed ordnance 
has resulted in some reduced risk and 
some tragedies have been avoided. It 
is gratifYing to see these developments. 
Despite all this work, there has 
been linle reduction in the rates of 
injury and death. Casualties still occur 
at the rate of about one accident every 
two days. As the Lao population grows 
and the pressure on the land increases, 
new areas will have to be opened up 
for agricul tura l production and 
settlement. Much of this land will 
present a serious UXO problem. 
Ordnance clearance work will have to 
continue in Laos for decades. 
MCC's 25 years of history in Laos 
and ongoing struggle with the 
problem of UXO has led it into the 
arena of advocacy. As a people of faith 
committed to peace and non-violence, 
we could not visi t with families who 
had experienced painful losses from 
cluster munitions without asking the 
larger questions about why and how 
cluster munitions are used. As we 
researched the continued production 
and use of cluster munitions in 
numerous conflicts around the globe, 
we became convinced that serious 
problems exist related to targeting, the 
size of cluster bomb footprints and 
dud rates. 
Over the past 35 years, in places 
like Viemam, Laos, Cambodia, Sudan, 
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kosovo , 
Chechnya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and 
Afghanistan, cluster muni tions have 
had a persistent and tragic record of 
indisc riminate killing. During 
Operation Desert Storm, at least 25 
U.S. military personnel were killed by 
U.S. submunitions, and other U.S. 
personnel we re injured. Cluster 
munitions are an increasingly 
significant o bstacle in various 
peacekeeping operations. 
MCC has joined other agencies 
in issuing a Call for a Moratorium on 
the production and use of cluster 
munitions. As a result of our work in 
Laos and our exposure to the UXO 
problem on the civilian population in 
post-war Iraq and Kosovo, MCC 
believes it is time for the international 
community to ban these weapons. • 
Contact Information 
Titus Peachey 
Director of Peace Education 
Mennonite Central Committee 
21 S. 12'h St., Box 500 
Akron, PA 17501 
Tel: (717) 859-3889 
E-mail: tmp@mccus.org 
Websi te: http:/ /www.mcc.org/ 
clusterbomb 
WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A LANDMINE AND A CLUSTER MUNITION? 
The primary di fference between 
cluster munitions and landmines is 
in their design. 
Cluster munitions are designed to 
explode as a result of their impact, 
so that their effect is felt with in a 
short r ime of thei r delivery. 
Landmines are designed to explode as 
a result of contact with or proximiry 
ro a person. By design, their effects 
may be felt many months after their 
p lacement, depending on when a 
person initiates contact with the 
landmine. 
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Cluster m unitions which fail to 
explode on impact, however, are very 
similar in effect to landmines. 
Since dud rates for cluster munitions 
are often in the 10 perce nr-30 
percent range, most cluster 
munition strikes create the actual 
effect of a mine field . 
• U.S. bomb on 
display in front 
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Mine Detection Dogs At Work 
The Journal profiles mine dog companies ranging from South 
Africa's Mechem Engineering Services to the United State's 
RONCO Consulting Corporation in Washington D.C. 
By Stacy L. Smith, MAIC 
History of War and Mine Detection 
Dogs 
T hrough extensive training in scouting, detection, and search and rescue (SAR), military working 
dogs have proven to be valuable assets to rhe 
defense and safety of many countries. 
Since World War II, the U.S. military 
has deployed over 30,000 dogs in the aid of 
soldiers. In 1943, the Germans attempted 
to deter Allied troops from North Africa by 
placing nonmetallic mines in the ground. 
The British quickly found a method for 
counteracting the Germans' strategic move 
with the help of"M-dogs" trained to detect 
mines encased in plastic or wood. The 
United Stares soon followed with the 
implementation of a mine dog detection 
program with over 100 dogs and 120 
handlers assigned ro a mine detection unit 
under the 228'" Engineer Mine Detection 
Company at rhe Cat Island Dog Center 
(Lemish) . Deployed in 1944, rhe dogs were 
initially unsuccessful in locating mines in 
Algeria and Italy. Key factors included a lack 
of training to prepare the dogs for loud 
• Weitkamp and his German Shepard in front of 
M-Detect's training facility in Ascheberg, 
Germany. c/o Weitkamp 
sounds such as artillery or small-arms fire. 
"Like other crash programs instituted 
during the war, the M-dog program was 
hasti ly conceived withour sufficient 
background knowledge to implement the 
program-finding bones is entirely different 
from locating an explosive mine" (Lemish). 
U.S. efforts to maintain the mine dog 
detection program did not resurface again 
until the Vietnam War. After conducting a 
feasibility study in 1967, the U.S. Army 
Limited Warfare Laboratory (USALWL) 
determined that improved training methods 
and advanced techniques would resolve 
problems occurring during mine detection 
dog (MOD) deployment in World War II. 
Instead of using fear motivation or food 
rewards to promote successful detection, the 
USALWL elected to use positive reinforce-
ment. As a result, MODs performed at a 
high success rate in Vietnam, locating mines, 
trip wires and booby traps. 
Mine Detection Dogs Today 
Today, MODs are used worldwide in 
mine-afflicted countries to locate and detect 
UXO/landmines remaining from internal 
and external conflicts. After intensive 
training, MODs are able to assist in 
demining and clearance efforts efficiently 
and effectively with a proven success rate. 
Following is a brief description of companies 
and organizations specializing in MOD 
training and deploymenr. 
Mechem Engineering Services 
In South Africa, Mechem, a local 
company and division of Denel's Systems 
Group, is clearing much of the country's 
mine- infested areas. Mechem uses the latest 
demining technology to remove mines 
inexpensively and efficiently. 
MODs a re used in the Mechem 
Explosive and Drug Detection System 
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(Medds). The system uses vapor concen-
trations and the nasal sensitivity of demining 
dogs to uncover traces of chemicals from 
explosives. This system can be used for 
detecting both metallic and non-metallic 
explosive devices. 
In March 200 I, Mechem will begin 
demining operations in Mozambique with a 
crew of 16 men and eight MODs. The crew 
will work towards locating and removing 
approximately 2 million mines left over from 
internal conflicts between the Frelimo 
government and Renamo rebels. Operations 
are ex peered to last until October 2001. 
Contact Information 
Kip Shultz, Senior MOD Advisor 
Mechem Engineering Services 
P.O. Box 912-454, Silverton 0127 
Pretoria, South Africa 
Tel: +27 12 826 506883 
Fax: +27 12 808 3533 
E-mail: mecdoc@mechem.denel.co.za 
Swedish Armed Forces Dog 
Instruction Center 
The Swedish Armed Forces Dog 
Instruction Center trains dogs specifically 
for the situation in which they will perform. 
For example, dogs needed to rescue 
personnel from mine field accidents in 
Bosnia are trained for conditions and 
situations they are likely to encounter in the 
coumry. 
MODs from the Swedish Armed Forces 
Dog Instruction Center are currently 
working in Cambodia, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
and the Western Sahara. Operations are 
often accomplished in collaboration with 
local mine action organizations who provide 
background information and region-specific 
project derails. In cooperation with the 
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), 
MODs have been very successful in 
eliminating the dangers ofUXO/Iandmines 
found in Cambodian mine fields . 
Contact Information 
Peter Soderberg, Director 
Swedish Armed Forces Dog Instruction 
Center 
Box 100 
• An MDD surveys the landscape. c/o Martin Weitkamp 
146 22 Tullinge 
Tel: +46 8 778 00 32 
Fax: +46 8 607 35 14 
E-mail: fhtc-international@postbox.mil.se 
Website: h ttp://www.mil.se/ ovrigr/ fh tel 
explosive. hem 
Humanity Dog 
Since the 1940s, Humanity Dog has 
trained MODs in order to aid humanitarian 
demining efforts. Each year approximately 
100 dogs are trained and deployed to locate 
and identifY landmines, mercury, PCB and 
drugs. Demining dogs trained by Humanity 
Dog can detect mines at depths of 50 em, 
in paths 2-3 em wide and in low-level 
concentrations. 
MOOs undergo rigorous training in 
scent analysis. Trained dogs can detect both 
single substances and combinations of 
substances used to create landmines. 
Training is conducted for both dogs and 
dog handlers through rhe Mine Detection 
Dog Handler Training Programme. Dogs 
and dog handlers are paired and taught 
together to ensure a working relationship 
between each team. MODs are required to 
complete 15 months of basic training and 
12 months of specialized training before 
taking a comprehensive exam for fieldwork 
el igibility. During special ized training, 
MODs also complete three weeks of training 
designed to acclimate MODs to their new 
surroundings. Environmental training 
allows dogs to adjust to the density and smell 
of the soil. In addition, some dogs require 
two days of ground adaptation training in 
areas where the clearance soil fluctuates. 
Contact Information 
Anders Bruse, CEO 
Humanity Dog 
50 
S-122 88 Enskede 
Sweden 
Tel: +46(0) 8-39 90 00 
Fax: +46(0) 8-39 94 39 
E-mail: anders. bruse@hundskolan.se 
Website: http://www.humanitydog.se/ 
company.htm 
RONCO Consulting Corporation 
RONCO works under a U.S. Depart-
ment of State Humanitarian Oemining Pro-
gram Office contract. RONCO's current 
mine detection initiatives that utilized MODs 
include participation in the Mozambique 
Mine Detection Dog Program and the Thai-
land Mine Detecting Dog Center. 
In addition, the RONCO Team assisted 
in an international effort after Hurricane 
Mitch wreaked havoc on Central America 
in 1998. In Central America, 12 reams 
comprised of six dogs and six dog handlers 
demined bridge abutments and river 
crossmgs. 
Contact Information 
Ronald Boyd, President 
RONCO Consulting Corporation 
2301 M Street, N.W., Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
Tel: (202) 785-2791 
Fax: (202) 785-2078 
E-mail: roncowash@aol.com 
Website: http:/ /www.roncoconsulting.com 
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Police Dog Institute for Consultancy 
and Management 
In 1995, the Police Dog Institute for 
Consultancy and Management 
(POLDICAM) began training dogs to 
combat and detect crime. Using the latest 
training techniques, POLDICAM trains 
dogs for deployment in detecting explosives, 
landm ines and narcotics . In addit ion , 
POLDICAM also trains dogs for personal 
protection, patrol and apprehension, arson 
detection, crime prevention, and SAR. 
According to POLDICAM director 
Stan Gillham, approximately 15 dogs are 
trained each year for mine detecting 
purposes. The dogs are carefully selected for 
drive and scent abilities, and POLDICAM 
uses imprinting to train MODs to recognize 
scents specific to explosive devices or UXO. 
Currently, POLDICAM has seven 
operating MOD teams consisting of a 
matched dog and handler. Most of these 
teams a re working in Northern 
Mozambique, clearing fields at a rate of 
10,000 sq. m per day. Gillham explains that 
mine detection teams like the ones trained 
at POLDICAM are "able to expedite area 
reduction for landmines" and work towards 
the goal of using "properly trained dogs as 
an important aid in policing." 
Contact Information 
Stan Gillham, Director 
POLO I CAM 
P.O. Box 73768 
Lynwood Ridge 0040 
Pretoria, South Africa 
Tel: +27 12 6513888 
Fax: +27 12 651 1555 
E-mail: poldicam@yebo.co.za 
Global Training Academy 
The Global Training Academy was 
founded in 1984 and specializes in training 
dogs to detect narcotics and explosives as 
well as assist in police patrol, tracking and 
SAR procedures. G lobal Training Academy 
director Dan Hayter said MODs are a 
valuab le asset to mine detection and 
removal. "The dogs' ability to cover a large 
amount of ground in a short period of time 
with great accuracy is a plus," he said, "[and ) 
continued on page 119 
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Asia & the Pacific 
Comparative densities of mines and UXO in clearance operations in the region: 
Region Square meters Mines/UXO removed Square meters 
per mine/UXO 
58 Koch Mine Safe 
NPA, Songo, Cabora Bassa 
Mechem, Massingir 










Source: Mechem, NPA Mozambique, Quarterly Report 4th Qtr, 1999, Koch-M ine Safe, IND, Maputo. 
Working under extended hours, 
the mechanical team was capable of 
bringing the company up to between 
6.5 ro 7 .5 million m2 of land by 
February 200 1. The Mine Collector 
processes 20,000 m2 of ground per 
day, and the manual team covers 
around 12,000 to 12,500 m2 per day, 
potentially destroying over 1,000 
mines per day. 
On average (over both mine 
fields), KMS's teams are lifting and 
destroying one mine per 58 m2 of 
KMS cleared 421,000 m2 . By mid-July 
2000, the team had cleared a total of 
3,809,28 1 m2 of land and 65,185 
mines- one mine per 58 m2. By any 
standards, the current safety record of 
KMS is exceptional considering the 
conditions. 
• No "missed mines" have been reported 
by BacTec, which assesses 10 percent of 
the land cleared. The level of quality 








RHS Associates Ltd. 
33 Ludlow Way 




4'KMS was also strongly criticized for a high accident rate. From March to June 1999, 
12 accidents occurred. Over half of the accidents were incurred during excavation. The 
primary cause of one-third of these was attributed to management error, notably serious 
injuries from handling mines.5" 
ground. In the Cordon Saniwire mine 
field, this broad average rises to one 
mine per 20m2 . The mechanical team 
working in the center of the Cordon 
Sanitaire clears one mine per 12 m2 
on average-spot densities can be more 
than double this figure. 
Two things characte rize the 
current clearance program: 
• The high density of mines and number 
of mines being cleared. In June 2000 , 
{eferences 
1 C hris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Interview 
in Johannesburg, June 6, 2000. 
2 Alistair C raib, EU and Zimbabwe Ministry 
of Defence Consultant, Interview Feb. 6, 2000. 
3 Koch-Mine Safe was using Vallon detectors, 
fine German detectors capab le of high 
sensitivity- bur more complex ro use than 
many comparable models. The QA team was 
using British Guartcl MD8 detectors, a robust 
and simple model. 
4 Temba Kanganga, Mine Safe, Deputy Project 
Manager. The Road Forward: HumanittJrian 
Mine C!etJrtlnce in Southern AfrictJ. SAIIA 
Johannesburg, August 6, 2000. 
s Data from Andy Smith, DDIV database, April 
6, 2000 . 
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Mine Detection Dogs At Work 
continued from page 87 
the [dogs'] ability to detect plastic 
mines when metal de tectors are 
ineffective is even more important." 
The Global Training Academy 
has the capacity to train 30-36 dogs 
per year in mine detection. In 2001, 
18 dogs will be trained for deployment 
in Lebanon, Oman and Thailand. In 
addition, the Academy currently has 
dog teams working in ten countries: 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Bosnia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Croatia, 
Namibia, Thailand and Afghanistan. 
These dog teams often work with the 
host country's military In mine 
clearance operations. 
Contact Information 
Dan Hayter, Director 
Global Training Academy 
P.O. Box 445 
Somerset, TX 78069 
Tel: (21 O) 622-9460 
Fax: (830) 429-3122 
E-mail: Graden@aol.com 
M-Detect 
M-Detect, a mine dog training 
facility in Germany, specializes in 
training MODs for mine detection 
operations in mine-affected countries. 
Each year, M-Detect trains and 
deploys approxim ately eight dogs. 
This year, MDDs are being trained for 
deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia. Martin Weitkamp, 
director ofM-Detect, said MDDs are 
"an imporram part of the international 
demining toolbox" if used as quality 
assurance in unknown areas. 
Weitkamp adds that dogs should not 
be used in a known mine field in place 
of deminers or demining machinery 
but in unknown areas where sweeping 
the fields with an MOD is faster and 
more efficient. 
Contact Information 








Website: http:/ /www.securarec.de 
Conclusion 
MDDs are an effective means for 
mine clearance operations worldwide. 
With proper training from mine dog 
companies and organizations, MODs 
employed in mine-infested countries 
return successful results. Their driven 
success continues co be an asset to 
countries in times of need. • 
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• The training period ends with 
MDD leading the trainer. 
c/o Martin Weitkamp 
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The Challenges of 
Integrating Mine Dogs into Humanitarian Demining 
From sentry duty for Napoleon to mine sniffing in Vietnam, dogs 
have played key roles in war and peace for centuries. More accu-
rate than human beings and many metal detectors, dogs are now 
being used in more and more detection capadties. 
By Margaret Buse, Editor 
T he story of mine detection dogs (MDD) is really the story of the successes and failures of canine use 
in the military. Dogs have been used since 
antiquity by armies, both passively and 
• The relationsip between handler and canine is 
a key component in the success of a working 
dog. c/oAP 
actively. In the 20th century, the Red Cross 
and European military utilized dogs with a 
high degree of success. The establishment 
of organized training facilities, instilling the 
proper training ofboth dog and handler and 
• 88. 
capitalizing, utilizing and understanding a 
dog's skills, are the key eleme nts of a 
favorable canine operation. MODs and their 
users have benefited from lessons learned by 
the earlier use of dogs in the military. While 
there may still be challenges to fully utilizing 
a mine dog's paten rial , they have been 
deployed by commercial companies and 
NGOs with varying degrees of success. Their 
use will continue to be debated in the HD 
community until better scienrific 
understanding of thei r scent detection 
capabilities is demonstrated and the 
relationship between the handler and canine 
1m proves. 
Origins of the War Dog 
Dogs were first used as an offensive and 
defensive weapon of war. Michael G. 
Lemish, author of War Dogs, wrote , 
"Persians, Greeks, Assyrians and Babylonians 
all recognized the tactical advantage of war 
dogs and deployed them as forward 
attacking elements." Even women led packs 
of war dogs against the Romans at the battle 
of Versella, which delayed the Roman's 
victory. The Romans eventually adopted 
dogs as a military tool of their own. The 
Roman dogs, bred for fierceness , were 
encased in body armor with razor sharp 
spikes. Writers of the day reported that these 
dogs would not retreat even against men 
armed with swords. Later, Napoleon used 
dogs for protection and sentry duty by 
chaining them to the walls surrounding 
Alexandria. Europe had a long history of 
using dogs in various working roles. The 
military simply capitalized on this use. 
In America, the Native Americans used 
dogs for sentry, pack duty and as draft 
animals. Early colonists relied on dogs for 
herding. It was Benjamin Franklin that first 
proposed the use of dogs as military 
weapons. He wrote: "Dogs should be used 
against the Indians. They should be large, 
strong and fierce." John Penn, founder of 
Pennsylvania, said, "You will acquaint the 
captains that every soldier be allowed three 
shillings per month who brings with him a 
strong dog for pursuing the savages, put this 
idea into action. Each dog is to be kept tied 
and led by his owner." 
FEATURE 
uti I ization. The Air Force studied the 
practicality of using dogs in the temperate 
climate of Southeast Asia, combining a 
sentry/scout dog, finding the best breed to 
use, and developing an in-country breeding 
program. The initial problems were getting 
the South Vietnamese handlers to accept 
these working dogs. Because of a lack of 
centralized structure, interminent use 
among all the military branches, and a lack 
of careful obedience and tactical training, 
the successes were coupled with problems 
and failures. Lemish attributes this to the 
lack of a centralized program like the DFD 
in World War II, the treatment of dogs by 
the military as superfluous equipment, and 
the inabiliry to demilitarize war dogs. 
• A well camouflaged marine and his dog, Soloman Islands, World War II. c/o AP 
A common thread amo ng both 
European and American forces was the 
concept that a good dog handler can 
capitalize on the assets a well-trained dog 
can bring with it to a military endeavor. The 
best dog handler was considered a soldier 
that could scout and patrol on his own and 
use a dog as an extension of his own talents. 
The foundation philosophy is that canines 
are one of numerous military tools and when 
combined with other instruments, can get 
the job done. These could be the very 
philosophies the humanitarian demining 
community may ne ed to adopt to 
successfully integ rate MDDs into 
operations. 
Dogs were not used by Americans to 
the same extent as the Europeans and 
therefore were not organized by our early 
military into any type of working canine 
units. This lack of central organization, in 
parr, led to the lack of success ofU .S. canine 
military units well into the 20th century. 
Dogs were employed during World War 
I by European armies for ambulatory 
assistance, messenger service, sentry duty 
and as scouts. The Red Cross dogs composed 
the most organized and successful canine 
units. The dogs carried medical supplies and 
canteens to wounded soldiers. They were 
trained to not recognize dead soldiers. lf a 
soldier was found unconscious, the dogs 
would return to their handlers and lead them 
to the location of that soldier. The Red Cross 
dogs often worked at night and relied on 
their olfactory abilities to find soldiers. 
Canines were also used as pack animals and 
could carry up to 40 lb of supplies that 
included water, grenades or ammunition. 
The war dogs successes guaranteed their use 
in World War II. For the Americans, the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor was a catalyst to 
the American military to investigate the 
utilization of canines as a military tool. 
At the time of the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor, the U.S. Army library contained 
only one book about dogs -a field manual 
for canines in arctic regions. The bombing 
of Pearl Harbor mobilized some American 
civilians to contact the U.S. military. Dog 
breeders, trainers and the director of the 
American Kennel Club were well aware of 
the use of canines by the Europeans. They 
formed the Dogs for Defense (DFD) to band 
together volunteer amateurs and professional 
dog handlers and breeders. They assumed 
the military would jump at their offers for 
dogs as offensive military a ides, but the 
military didn't. It was only with the help of 
actress Helen Menken, coupled with the 
increased U.S. activiry in the war effort, that 
the army was prompted to take another look 
at the DFD. 
After a slow start, the U.S. secretary of 
war ordered that the dogs be trained for 
As with other mine clearance 
technologies, dogs are not a replacement for 
deminers and metal detectors. Rather, they 
"A mine dog Licensing test can be compared to a driver's 
license test. Its purpose is to provide confidence in a 
basic capability to detect mines and tripwires. I have 
learned that testing and licensing has a positive side 
effect since the overall quality of the work seems to 
improve significantly." - Harvard Bach, GICHD 
sentry dury, search and rescue, patrol, and 
messenger service. With the DFD as the dog 
recruitment agency, organized war dog 
training centers were soon established. After 
the war, the PFD was disbanded and the 
dogs were retired to civilians. 
Through trial and error the U.S. dog 
operation had varying successes through the 
1950s. It was during the Vietnam War that 
canine use went to the next level of 
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can be an additional mine clearing asset to a 
demining program. Author Rae McGrath 
writes in Landmines and Unexploded 
Ordnance that MDDs are most effective in 
well-defined clearance operations and that 
they "can work more quickly than normal 
clearance teams, such as road and track 
sections containing widely spaced mines." 
McGrath also notes that an MDD is a 
valuable asset in battlefield areas with high 
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metal content. They can speed up the 
detection process because they recognize 
explosive scent, rather than metal. 
In contrast, Harvard Bach, senior liason 
officer of the Geneva International Center 
for Humanitarian Demining(GICHD), 
feels dogs should not be used to verify 
individual mines, but to verify the 
boundaries of a mine field. Eddie Banks, 
director of BiH, supports this. He said: "A 
dog is a location tool. If you already know 
where the mines are, you do not need a dog." 
There have been many challenges to 
effectively integrating MDDs into 
humanitarian mine clearance operations. 
Coordination, timing, cost, availability and 
mismanagement have all been ci ted as 
reasons that dogs have not been effectively 
integrated. Extensive training requirements 
of dogs, handlers and demining 
management is needed for a program to start 
successfully. 
Bach says that coordination, timing, 
and determining the best deployment 
scenario for dogs are also factors. Banks adds, 
"There are two major problems: We cannot 
prove how effective a dog is and many 
managers, at all levels, do not understand 
the advantages and limitations of dog 
teams." 
He feels a major deterrent to successful 
deployment ofMDD's is that many experts 
in this field have no rei evant, practical 
• Two Russian soldiers try to seperate their dogs. c/o AP 
are based on sound management," he says. 
"[They] employ appropriately qualified and 
trained personnel with suitable person-
alities, and adopt an open minded, flexible 
attitude that promotes effective clearance to 
high standards of safery and quality." 
Successful integration ofMDDs can be 
achieved through an effective training, 
purchasing and management program and 
by identifying the dogs' strengths and 
International have all used mine dogs. Many 
commercial companies have proven to be 
serious promoters of MDD endeavors. The 
national dog program in Afghanistan has 
been very successful with more than 130 
dogs and handlers operating in the field. 
Bach feels if the aim is to run a short-term 
operation, expatriate specialists should be 
brought in to the country. If the operation 
is long-term, local handlers must be trained. 
''If you are using a dog you are using it as a primary detector. Based on my experience, 
[if] managed properly, a dog is a more effective than a human being and most metal 
detectors in the detection role. However, dogs have Limitations, therefore the combina-
tion of deminers and dogs can be most effective. Even in the quality control role a dog 
is being used to confirm that an area is clear." - Eddie Banks BiH 
experience using dogs in a humanitarian 
clearance role. "We need to train the 
managers, both internationals and nationals, 
in order that we can manage these and other 
aspects professionally and effectively. The 
challenge is to get all levels of management, 
handlers, team leaders, monitors and 
inspectors to understand how to effectively 
use this tool." 
Banks feels that what an organization 
needs to be successful is the understanding 
of the dog's capability and the understanding 
of how to manage the dogs and the demining 
operation effectively. "Good organizations 
weaknesses and deploying them effectively. 
Coupled with a humanitarian demining 
management system that can integrate varied 
assets effectively, this can result in effective 
dog deployment in the mine field. 
The MDD field has grown in step with 
humanitarian demining. With all levels of 
failure and success, the industry has seen a 
jump in the last 1 0 years from a handful of 
MDD organizations to over 25 
organizations utilizing mine dogs. Very few 
NGOs are currently involved in MDD 
operations though HALO, Norwegian 
People's Aid (NPA) and Handicap 
• 90. 
In general, dogs are more effective in 
environmemal conditions that include a 
degree of soil moisture, which increases the 
transportation of scents from the ground to 
air. Dogs usually work berrer in the morning 
when there is still dew on the ground. As 
the air hears up, the hot air rises along with 
the target seem, making it more difficult to 
detect. It stands to reason that dogs are less 
effective in extreme weather conditions-
be it snow, heavy rains or high winds. These 
conditions all displace scent. 
While a dog wirh good scenting 
capabilities is needed, dogs must also possess 
a good hunting instinct. Whether dogs 
should be bred, indigenous or trained has 
been widely discussed. Benefits and 
drawbacks to all methods have been 
identified and debated. With large-scale 
organizations it could be advantageous to 
breed dogs for mine detection. Smaller 
organizations are better off purchasing 
trained dogs or rraining indigenous dogs. 
The GICHD is currently implementing a 
study to see which dog breeds are most 
su itable for mine detection. Most 
integrating a training and handler education 
program. Once properly established, an 
MDD program can be an effective tool in 
the mine clearing toolbox. With limited 
retraining, it is feasible that an MDD can 
be utilized and beneficial in other scent 
capacities like explosives, forensics, narcotics, 
and search and rescue. 
"I believe that MDDs will become more 
credible and less costly in the future. The 
larrer due to more experience/documema-
rion and less training fai lures. We will have 
Sources 
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Michael G. Lemish 
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"I believe that MODs will become more credible and less costly in the future. The latter 
due to more experience/documentation and less training failures." - Bach 
o rganizations assess individual dogs' 
capabilities and proceed from there. It can 
be considered a given that choosing suitable 
dogs and handlers that meet training and 
operational needs is essential. "Thereafter, 
it is all about initial selection, professional 
tra ining, selection and training of good 
hand lers, a good bonding process and 
ensuring continuation of training," Banks 
states. 
All would agree that MDD programs 
have expensive startup costs and that it is 
vital for donors to understand this critical 
facto r. Also critical for donor support is the 
ability tO understand that it tal<es time ro 
establish an MDD capacity, whether you are 
facilitating breeding, buying dogs, or 
a better understanding of the potential for 
and the limitations to mine dog detection. 
We will also be able to integrate mine dogs 
into a combined demining approach in a 
better way then we currently do," Bach says. 
Banks agrees with these sentiments. "If 
we can improve management of demining, 
including rhe husbandry and operational 
capabilities of MDDs, then I feel we could 
change current procedures in order that dogs 
could be used even more effectively and 
productively," he explains. 
The keys to success with these war dogs 
or humanitarian dogs do not lie so much 
with the individual dog or species in general, 
but with the handling by mankind. • 
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K9 Demining Corp to Aid Clearance Efforts in Lebanon 
The Marshall Legacy Institute, with major contributions from 
the Humpty Dumpty Institute, is contributing six mine de-
tection dogs to the Lebanese Army's mine clearance team. 
by Elizabeth A. Cramer, MAIC 
am of six mine deteC£ion dogs 
MODs), known as the K9 De-
ining Corp, has been sent ro aid 
mine clearance efforts in Lebanon. The dogs 
will be a parr of the Lebanese Army's 
extensive mine clearance throughout the 
country. According ro the Landrnine Monitor 
Report 2000, the U.S. Department of State 
has estimated that there are 35,000 mines 
in Lebanon, nor including the previously 
Israeli-occupied area of South Lebanon, 
where rhe U.N. estimates rhere are another 
130,000 mines causing immediate risk of 
landmine casualiries. 
The United States has already 
contributed $2.3 million ro humanitarian 
demining programs in Lebanon since 1998. 
In an effort to ensure rhe successful 
integration of th e mine dog reams to 
• Lebanese soldiers 
stand in a safe lane 
during a clearance 
operation. 
Operations like the 
one shown will 
soon be enhanced 




humanitarian demining, rhe U.S. Office of 
Humanitarian Demining Programs (HOP) 
has created a partnership with rwo NGOs 
ro fund and deploy the K9 Demining Corp, 
and has provided funds for rhe training of 
Lebanese handlers and for infrastructure 
support. The HOP contracted RONCO 
Consulting Corporation to provide rhe 
MODs, associated training and equiprmenr 
for the Lebanese dog handlers. 
The K9 Demining Corp was created 
with funding contributions ro the Marshall 
Legacy Institute (MLI), a non-profit 
international humanitarian organization. 
MLI is leading a national campaign ro 
increase rhe number of MODs worldwide. 
By combining priva te tax-deductible 
contributions with U.S. government 
funding, MLI is able to help build 
humanitarian programs in mine-affected 
countries. 
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A major contributor ro MLI is rhe 
Humpty Dumpty Institute (HOI) , a non-
profit NGO formed in 1998 by American 
business leaders ro promote private-public 
partnerships ro confront global problems. 
HDI focuses on programs ro strengthen U.S. 
and U.N. relations and on the global 
clearance of landmines. William Rouhana, 
co-chairman of HD I, believes rhat dogs are 
among rhe most effective tools in mine 
clearance. Rouhana, also chairman of 
Winsrar Communications, and his wife Amy 
Newmark are among rhe major contributors 
for the Lebanon project. Rouhana and 
Newmark requested that guests at their 
recent wedding contribute money ro the 
HOT to aid in the training of mine detecting 
dogs, instead of giving traditional wedding 
gifts. HOI funding to MLI has provided for 
the purchase, training, certification, and 
transport of six dogs, each costing $16,000. 
Ar rhe time of rhe donation, ir was 
planned to send a corp of dogs ro Eritrea for 
humanitarian demining. Because of internal 
conflict in the country, the circumstances 
were later considered unfit to send the dogs, 
and a replacement country was needed. In 
June 2000, Perry Baltimore, president and 
executive direcror of MLI, conducted a 
feasibility study on rhe use of mine dogs in 
Lebanon. The study resulted in a request 
from Gen. George Sawaya, president of the 
National Demining Office in Lebanon. 
Sawaya asked that MODs be integrated into 
the Lebanese mine clearance program ro 
accelerate the pace of demining operations. 
T he Lebanese Army is responsible for all 
current demining efforts and reports that in 
areas of difficult terrain, mechanical mine 
clearance methods are nor viable but could 
be replaced by MODs. At the time there 
were no MMDs in rhe country, and it was 
considered an exciting option for mine 
clearance efforts. Lebanon was choosen for 
the K9 Corp and rhe dogs were prepared. 
The MMDs were first trained in Europe 
in obedience and socialization. They were 
then sent ro rhe Global Training Academy 
(GTA) in Texas and there underwent 12 
more weeks of training in explosive scent 
detection, odor, response, positioning and 
search patterns, under the direction of 
trainer Paul Brown. While in Texas the dogs 
became acclimated to the living and working 
environment, including the temperature, 
odors, soil and kennels. At GTA dogs are 
assigned a temporary trainer who rakes them 
through scent training. The biggest challenge 
for the trainer is learning what motivates 
each dog and applying the motivating factor 
in the training. The trainer must teach the 
dog ro associate a reward with a target scent. 
Baltimore believes that the training was 
successful, "The dogs have learned and 
responded well." 
FEATURE 
• Dan Hayter with Peggy, Baltimore, and 
the National Demining Office's Maj. 
Mohammed Jamal El Kaakour, Lt. Col. 
Takieddine El Tannir and Gen. George 
Sawaya with Taz at the Global Training 
Academy, Texas. c/o MLI 
On Nov. 28, 2000 Queen Noor of 
Jordan, an MLI board member, announced 
the K9 Demining Corp program at the U.S. 
Mission ro the United Nations during a 
deployment ceremony for the dog ream. The 
ceremony was attended by officials from 
HOI, MLI, and the State Department. 
During the deployment ceremony Sally, a 
rwo-year old Dutch shepherd, was given the 
chance to display detection skills. Sally was 
able ro detect an inactive APL that was 
buried among many large planters in the 
conference room. At the ceremony, HOP 
Director Pat Parierno stated that he is 
confident that the combination of trained 
dogs and local handlers can create what is 
possibly the most optimal d emining 
technology for Lebanon. He explained that 
no one method is the answer to mine 
clearan ce difficulties, however, the 
challengin g terrain limits the use of 
machinery, making dogs the most possible 
solution. 
The dogs were prepared to depart with 
a series of vaccinations and were deployed 
to Lebanon on Feb. 12, 2000. Reliable air 
carriers delivered rhe dogs in good condition. 
Upon arrival in Beirut the dogs were happy 
ro receive food, praise and play from a 
familiar face, trainer Paul Brown. The dogs 
then began a period of acclimatization, 
becoming accustomed to the new environ-
ment. During this period the dogs are 
rematched with local Lebanese handlers. To 
make the best matches of handler and dog 
several factors a re considered about the 
handler, including their skill level, balance 
and coordination, hand gestures, adaptation 
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ability, use of commands, personality and 
temperament. The rematch rakes some 
adjustment for the dog, but as the handlers 
care for, train with and nurture their dog 
they develop a strong bond. 
Now in rhe mountains northeast of 
Beruit, the dogs will undergo three more 
months of training. T he training is impor-
tant for rhe dogs and their new handlers so 
they can learn to work as a team. During 
the training the dogs wi ll learn to identify 
the rypes of mines that are common to the 
area, and the smells that are associated with 
rhe explosives of the mines. The dogs will 
eventually become exposed to actual mines. 
In April 2001, the K9 Corp will be 
deployed for their first clearance mission. 
Baltimore and Brown believe that favo rable 
environmental co ndi t ions, recept ive 
leadership and a positive military working 
dog experience all support the indigenous 
MOD program. There is only one major 
concern, some sharp prickl y bushes in 
Lebanese fields, which may make it difficult 
to keep the dogs' noses to the ground, and 
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K-9 Dog Academy Takes its Training to the Mine Field 
The Journal senior editor Margaret Buse sits down with dog 
trainer Malinda Julien to discuss the K-9 Dog Academy and 
the future-and present-of mine detecting dogs. 
By Margaret S. Buse, Editor 
Margaret Buse (MB): Can you tell me the 
history ofThunderstorm Canine and the K9 
Academy? 
Malinda Julien (MJ): The academy is 
actually a small part of what we do. 
Thunderstorm Canine is undergoing a 
change. The kennels were originally designed 
to work search and rescue. In our search and 
rescue work we came across the law 
enforcement folks who kept telling me that 
they could really use some good canine units. 
We decided to go into explosives, cadavers, 
So, we decided to dedicate a lot of our 
program ro mine detecting dogs (MODs). 
MB: What is the basic training needed by 
all working dogs before they can be deployed 
into a specific situation? 
MJ: In our view it starts even before the dog 
is born- the genetics. For example, the litter 
we dropped in January is specifically targeted 
for explosives and MODs. They will be seem 
imprinted. This is something that I do with 
all of my litters. Some of the old-timers think 
it doesn't work, but we are convinced that it 
does work. The pups themselves are actually 
reared with certain scents that they will have 
to find later. What we are trying to do is cut 
down on handler error. The handler is our 
number one problem. When pups are scent 
imprinted they will seek rather than be 
taught this scent. MODs will be trained 
using a specific scent like TNT, or other 
types of materials that will be found in 
mines. After that they go through an 
extensive off lead program where they are 
heavily conditioned to do as they are told. 
People refer to that as obedience. We refer 
• Malinda Julien and her canine team member. 
c/o Malinda Julien 
By the time a dog is four to five months old 
they are ready to be introduced to a handler 
and a leash. Our programs have been very 
successful. We have dogs certified and on 
the street before most people begin training. 
Our approach extends the working life of 
the dog, cuts down on handler error, and 
makes a more successful team for handler 
and dog. They work more productively all 
at less cost. 
II Most dogs we train never see a leash for the first five to six months of their lives 
because stupidity goes down the leash and it goes right into the dog. The dogs do not 
know what you want, the dog does not understand. The dog understands one thing: 
survival. If being a part of the pack means food, warmth, security and survival, the 
dog will do anything that is necessary for it." - Malinda Julien 
narcotics, evidence search, along with search 
and rescue. Now we are planning to go into 
mine dogs. Living here in the United States 
and not traveling abroad very much it never 
really dawned on me on how severe the 
problem really is. When I went to the 
conference [Mine Detecting Dog 
Conference, San Antonio, Texas] and got to 
meet the people involved and found out 
more about that situation, J realized that 
there are not enough sufficient dog suppliers. 
to it as tactical obedience. These dogs must 
be able to stop on a dime. They must have 
the ability to do anything we ask them to 
do without being forced by lead or choke. 
Therefore, the dog is compliant. At that 
point the dog is 12 weeks old and the 
training starts immediately. We put them 
with more experienced dogs, dogs that are 
already detection dogs, usually their parent. 
The dogs work with their mom and do what 
their mom says. It gives us a more stable dog. 
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MB: You mentioned that they seek scent 
rather than being taught the scent. What 
does that mean? 
MJ: The training world has not budged 
much from 1950. Most of the people who 
are in this field are using the methods from 
[the 1950s]. We are looking at it from a fresh 
perspective. We want the dog not to have to 
be taught by humans. First, we don't speak 
their language. Second, we can't possibly 
understand what it is that they think. This 
is why many scenr programs fail because the 
handler is teaching them to find the wrong 
thing. They may be thinking that they are 
teaching them to find the desired scent, but 
they are teaching them to find something 
that they tap on or that is in a particular 
container. What we have done is based on 
studies that came out of the 1960s on the 
training and socialization of dogs. It was 
established in the scientific community that 
you could imprint anything onto an animal 
while it is being raised. We are teaching a 
dog to want to find a particular smell. The 
smell is incorporated into everything that is 
good-food, warmth, affection all the things 
that the mother supplies. It's like when we 
have had a grandfather who chewed 
peppermints-everytime we smell that we 
think of him. Dogs in turn seek that smell 
which they associate with what is good. We 
have taken out about six months of the 
conventional training program in which we 
could possibly not do as well as nature could 
itself. So, we imprint the dog with a 
particular seem so the dogs seek the seem 
rather than be taught to find it. 
MB: When a dog has gone through your 
training program how do you measure and 
determine irs competency? 
MJ: I am pretty tough on the dogs that go 
out. I want 100 percent accuracy rate. If a 
MOD was to go out of my academy and he 
is one year old, he has gone through all of 
his training. He has spent six months with a 
handler and is ready to go out in the field. If 
we set up a program, unless he finds 10 
mines in three different areas I 0 times each 
under all terrain and different weather 
conditions reliably, the dog would be put 
back into the program. Many of the current 
programs out there allow for 70 percent 
accuracy. That is not good enough. In our 
academy only the professionals work with 
the dogs through the entire training process. 
The dogs are not handed down to assistants. 
We may not produce a lot, but the quality 
and assuredness of that dog is much higher 
than the dog that is mass-produced. 
MB: I know you work predominantly with 
purebreds, but as the conference revealed, 
some organizations do not have that luxury. 
They are working with stray or abandoned 
dogs. 
MJ: We work with pure breeds for a number 
of reasons. In the United States, we are a 
very visual society and people expect to see 
the German Shepherds in police work. 
However, we have a program that works with 
re-homed dogs, dogs that may be srrays, 
abandoned, nor wanted for whatever reason. 
In rhe MOD field, I feel it may work better 
if we used indigenous dogs. Dogs that are 
already there are climarized and they can 
have their talents capitalized. There may be 
some that wouldn't work bur there will be 
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many that can. Purebred dogs usually have 
more genetic problems than mixed breeds. 
So I don't have anything against these and 
would use dogs that are already in place in 
an area and breed on characteristics that 
would be desirable. 
MB: What advice cou ld you give to 
organizations rhat are working with 
indigenous dogs so that they don't have a 
high washout rare? 
MJ: The biggest probl em in using 
indigenous dogs is we are raking a dog that 
has no socialization skills with humans. 
Unless we can breed them from the 
indigenous dogs that exist we are going to 
be missing the mark. Strays have very little 
positive socialization with humans. We need 
dogs that look at us as providers. Most strays 
have been providing for themselves for some 
rime. Also, some dogs may have too srrong 
a herding instinct and we need a hunter 
• Disaster training 
schooi.Julien 




instinct more than anything else. In setting 
up programs, one of the things I intend to 
do is reach evaluators what they really need 
to look for in a dog. They need to get one 
very young or find good parent dogs and 
breed from them. 
MB: What qualities would you look for in a 
good MOD? 
MJ: Stability, nerves of steel. A dog that can 
handle a great deal of stress without loosing 
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control, running or fighting. I have seen this 
happen many times. Dogs may be able to 
perform the duty in a test environment but 
when they get out in the field their nerves 
fail. That is our number one evaluation tool. 
What can this dog handle? What is his stress 
level? If he has a good stress threshold and a 
good drive to hunt or prey drive then he is a 
likely candidate as an MOD. Size will also 
be important. Small feet, smaller size, easier 
to transport and less dog trotting around a 
mine field. These are the qualities I would 
establish in setting up a program. 
MB: What else in the current canine training 
process would you do differently? 
MJ: Without being involved with specific 
training programs, I can say assuredly there 
• Quat, a stray that became a star working dog. 
c/o Malinda Julien 
are things I would probably change because 
my guess is that they are training an old style 
of training. We need to approach the 
training from a psychological perspective 
and from the dog's and handler's point of 
view. Educate the handler as to what the dog 
is doing and predispose the dog ro find it, 
then we would have a much higher success 
rate than what we have now. I recognize in 
some countries this may be a challenge. 
Basically, we want a program more educated 
on the handler side and less work on the 
canine side. 
MB: You have mentioned about the handler 
playing such a crucial role. Can you tell me 
more about the crucial role the handler plays 
with the dogs? 
MJ: The biggest problem that we have with 
handlers is that we don't speak the same 
language. We see things from a human point 
of view and dogs see things from a dog's 
point of view. As long as the human reads 
the dog through human interpretation, they 
are always going to be wrong. A handler 
must know something about canine or social 
animal behavior. Most dogs have been 
taught correction or praise or a combination 
of both, and usually it is incorrect. It sets 
the dogs up to fail. It is the number one 
problem of all canine handlers. However, if 
we give handlers some education, we set the 
dog up to win by having a handler that is 
better equipped and we set the handler up 
for more successes. 1 often hear I can't get 
the dog to work. The problem is they don't 
understand how to make them work. We 
sometimes expect the handler to do too 
much in a short amount of time. The 
handlers need to be our number one priority 
and they must know how to read the dog. 
MB: What are the three basic foundation 
• Malinda Julien on a drug search. 
c/o Malinda Julien 
MJ: That really does present a problem. I 
have traveled in that part of the world and I 
am aware of the stigma that is attached to a 
vermin animal like a canine. I realize the 
psychological ramifications for them must 
be tremendous. 1 don't think there is a clear-
cut answer. If the MOD program is 
successful and the dogs are successful and 
well mannered it will help in the dogs being 
11We work within the parameters of the behavior and social 
structure of the animals. When we stop throwing on big, 
nasty chains, choking them to death and ... heavy punish-
ments out of our own frustrations, then the dog will work 
better for us." - Malinda Julien 
qualities that are needed in a good dog 
handler? 
MJ: They need to be patient. No egos 
running around out there. They must have 
a true desire to work with the animal. It is 
probably not one of the most respected 
things to say that you work with an animal 
all day so they must have strength from 
within. They must enjoy what they do and 
be good at it. You must have confidence in 
your animal. If the dog says it's there you 
have got to believe the dog. These are 
qualities that can not be taught, they must 
be present within the handler. Slow and 
steady as she goes, that's the handler that we 
want. 
MB: A problem for many organizations 
integrating MD Ds overseas is the cui rural biases 
of the indigenous populations that must be 
trained to be effective dog handlers. 
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received well by the population-at least so 
that they don't disdain them. Evenrually, we 
can overcome the biases-to a point. Trying 
to recruit these individuals will take a lot of 
work. The institution must take pride in 
what they do. Perhaps not seeing the "dog" 
in the situation, but the clearance of fields 
as the mission would help increase the pride 
of working with dogs. 
MB: You and your organization have both 
bred dogs and received dogs from other 
sources. What are the benefits and 
drawbacks to both approaches? 
MJ: When we breed the dogs we know what 
we are going to get, within certain 
parameters. We can scent imprint and do 
everything from a social aspect. The dogs 
are ready to go much faster. The biggest 
problem is that it takes time to raise a dog. 
In the year that it takes to begin working is 
time that a dog from another source is 
already mature. That dog may posses 
everything it needs and we can proceed from 
there. It really depends on your situation. 
How fast is this dog needed? What do we 
have available? Some times your kennel is 
fu ll and other times you have to depend on 
outside sources. That is why we plan to 
dedicate this upcoming litter to MODs. 
MB: Your academy is very integrated. You 
do a lot of different aspects of canine training 
from search and rescue to narcotics. Do you 
think dog training academies should be 
multi-faceted or single use facilities? 
MJ: We really only do one thing. We use 
dogs as a scent detection tool. Whether we 
are looking for explosives, mines, narcotics, 
forensics or live people is really not the issue. 
It is the fact that a dog is being used as a 
detection item. These are the things we have 
specialized in: the ability to utilize the dog 
to find a certain seen t. 
MB: MOD is a small, but strong field. Do 
you think canine academies may begin filling 
the niche for MODs? 
MJ: I don't think so. It is a real hard sell 
publicly. Here in the United States people 
will think that you are sending dogs to be 
killed. I don't think that the average working 
dog training facility will be able to train to 
the parameters that are needed for a 
successful mine dog. This is not like finding 
narcotics or a piece of evidence. This is very 
serious and lives are involved. I think it is 
probably cheaper for them to turn out 
overpriced police dogs. 
MB: You mentioned briefly about public 
outrage. Have you had problems with 
animal rights groups? 
MJ: Yes, because they are misinformed and 
they think we are using the dog without any 
regard to well being. I do nor mess with 
them. I just ask them to leave my facility. I 
have run into a lot of people who have gotten 
their hackles up when MOD's are 
mentioned because they think we are going 
to send Fifi into the mine field to get blown 
up. 
MB: You have often mentioned how little 
the training methods have changed since the 
1950s. Why is that so? 
MJ: Just because they have been doing it 
for 20 years doesn't make it right. There is 
always evolution, there is always something 
new, but the people in this industry really 
are very adversarial. They see and view 
everyone as heavy competition. None of 
these changes will take place immediately, I 
guarantee you, but we are willing to take 
the slings and arrows in order to go out and 
attempt to do this. One of the goals in 
formulating our academy is to allow the 
newer people that are coming into the 
industry to have a broader view. The 
oldrimers have been doing it a long rime, 
but it has stalemated and they just continue 
to do what they think works. 
MB: Can you give me a specific as to how 
• Mal inda Julien in boat with Gypsy. Cadaver search during floods in Texas. c/o Malinda Julien 
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your training methods are different from this 
"old-style 1950s training"? 
MJ: Our training methods are very different 
because they are based on an entirely 
different view. The old phrase used to be, " l 
am the master of my dog," and that's 
typically how it was looked at. It was never 
looked at as a partner, as an entity unto itself. 
The dog was something that we told what 
I 
• Malinda Julien rappelling with Quat. 
c/o Malinda Julien 
to do and if it doesn't do it I will make it do 
it. As we have become more involved and 
more educated we have definitely found out 
that your grandmother was right, you can 
catch a lor more flies with honey than you 
can with vinegar. We work within the 
parameters of the behavioral and social 
structure of the animals. Most dogs that we 
train never see a leash for the first five to six 
months of their lives because stupid goes 
down the leash and it goes right into the 
dog. The dogs do not know what you want, 
j t does not understand. The dog understands 
one thing: survival. If being a part of our 
pack means food, warmth, security and 
survival, the dog will do anything that is 
necessary for it to do. So, we look at it from 
an almost completely 100 degree difference 
from the rest of the world. There are a lot of 
technological advancements such as 
electronic collars that make us more precise. 
There are a lor of things we can do rather 
than tie the dog to us and choke the ai r our 
of it every time it doesn't do what we want. 
All that does is break rhe bond between the 
handler and the animal and makes the 
animal more reluctant to work for the 
52
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol5/iss1/1
FEATURE 
handler. The handler becomes frustrated, rhe 
handler says rhe dog is stupid, the dogs say 
I'm scared of you, and there we have 1950s 
dog training. That's why most people all rhe 
way from pets to law enforcement fail in 
their K9 programs. So, we don't approach it 
dog. I think rhis is a whole new field that 
really no one is looking at and it starts with 
working that trainer and getting those dogs 
where they need ro be, nor necessarily 
together and not necessarily ar the same 
time. Unless we teach these people how to 
uThey still want to do what we call 'Billy Bob' training 
and it does not work. It will work for a little while or it 
will work 60 to 70 percent, but it doesn't give us the 
amount of efficiency and accuracy that we would require 
in a mine detection dog." -Julien 
from that perspective. We approach it from 
a scientific point of view. If we want to get 
the dog ro work for us, we must understand 
the dog and his behavior and his language. 
That's what we reach. 
MB: That rype of change actually occurred 
in the horse industry with rhe horse 
whispering training that has received media 
attention. Ir really revolutionized the 
training methods that had been in place 
since rhe cavalry days. 
MJ: Yes, it has, and it took just a couple of 
people to be visual enough to get the public 
behind them. The United Stares, in its quest 
to have K9 units are still in the John Wayne 
phase of it all. They still want to do what we 
call Billy Bob training and it does not work. 
It will work for a little while or it will work 
60 to 70 percent of the time bur it doesn't 
give us the amount of efficiency and accuracy 
that we would require in a mine detection 
be more educated handlers and show them 
how much they do need to know about 
themselves, about situations, about rhe 
animals, they are not going to be more 
successful. 
MB: I'm sure in all the years that you've been 
training and breeding, a lot of dogs have 
passed through your academy. Do you have 
any unique or favorite success story from 
working with one specific dog? 
MJ: I have a dog and she is still with us. She 
is old and aged at this point. She was nothing 
but backyard garbage, terrible, disgusting, 
everything confirmationaly wrong with this 
dog. I do nor know to this day why, I decided 
to risk life and limb to handle this dog. We 
pumped tons of money into her and made 
her well. I worked with her and to this very 
day she is responsible for finding many folks 
who would be dead without her. She works 
narcotics for me in the school systems, she 
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runs securiry for our properry, and she is 
probably going to retire in the next year or 
rwo . She is probably one of rhe most 
heartfelt, soulful animals char I've run across 
in all of my years. Somewhere in those eyes 
was simply somebody who said, "ff you save 
my life, I promise you, I'll make it worth 
it." And she has. She's very much a part of 
our company. She is very much a part of 
everywhere we go. This dog is usually always 
present and people all over the world actually 
know this dog by name. Her name is Quat. 
MB: With working with a lor of different 
animals, you can have good relationships 
with a lor of animals, bur there comes that 
special one that you just have this unique 
bond with. Nor only do you have a unique 
bond, but they go rhe extra mile for you. 
MJ: It is absolutely incredible and once you 
have that, it opens the way to have others. I 
had a Doberman that was with me in the 
Oklahoma disaster and he has since gone 
on to be in the Pet Hall of Fame. He is now 
retired and lives with a friend of mine in 
Colorado; however, this dog again was a 
s tray, a nothing. He was a beautiful 
Doberman, bur he was extremely mean and 
had been abused. I rook the dog for God 
knows what reason and I trained this dog 
and it would do anything I asked it to do. I 
asked this dog to jump our of the back of a 
fire truck while we were in Oklal1oma. I said, 
"I need you right now!" You know how big 
a firetruck is? The dog jumps right our, it 
pops his jaw on the concrete, gets up, shakes 
his head and keeps right on coming. H e 
wasn't an absolutely extraordinary dog and 
he met his fate not in the disaster areas of 
Oklahoma, bur with a rattlesnake and 
became severely impaired mentally from roo 
many bites to the head and thus was retired. 
If we can ever put dogs like that into the 
hands of these handlers, dog that are special. 
They are there; rhey do exist. 
Handlers that can recognize those 
qualities do exist. It is our job to find them. 
It is our job to seek them our and to show 
them the gift that they have, as handlers, 
and to find the gifted dogs that are out there. 
You can walk through any shelter and one 
dog in that shelter will look at you with eyes 
that say "Take me out of here. I promise I'm 
good, I know I can do this, if you just tell 
me what it is." We've had many of those 
dogs. Many of these dogs are very successful 
in our police program. We have put rhem 
out with units that could not afford the over-
inflated $10,000 (U.S.) fee. These dogs are 
doing marvelous, and they came from 
nowhere, bur it was rhe right dog and it was 
the right handler. I firmly believe that those 
dogs know you saved their lives.Their bond 
with you is much stronger than that with 
the dog that simply came along and had it 
all made. r f you can get those dogs, they will 
work and work and work until they drop. 
That's what we're looking for. That's what 
we want. That loyalry, that bond between 
animal and human, that is only in certain 
people and only in certain dogs and can only 
be done if a person is there to help facilitate 
FEATURE 
• Cobra takes a break from training to play with Julien. 
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the process. That's what we want to 
accomplish. 
MB: What IS In store for you for the 
upcoming year? 
MJ: Hopefully, I will finish all of these shots 
and various pills I'm raking to go over to 
Croatia and Mozambique. I need to go over 
and see what's going on and find out who is 
looking for better ways to use dogs, what 
companies are willing to look at a more 
educated way of dealing with a very difficult 
and timely problem. I'm looking at spending 
a lor of rime overseas. I'm looking at getting 
this program up and running, and seeing 
what we can do. 
I think that 2001 will probably be one 
of our most exciting and rewarding years and 
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I think we can definitely make a change and 
a mark in this industry that will enable us 
to clear those fields, which is our goal. If we 
can do that, I will certainly consider 200 I a 
tremendous year, char's for sure. • 
Contact Information 
U.S Tactical K9 Academy 
Malinda Julien 
7383 East Lake Road 
Abilene, Texas. 79601 
Tel:(915) 672-4840 
Fax; (915) 672-5327 
Cell: (915) 668-0193 
Email:k9sar@rhunderstormcanine.com 
Web:www. rh undersrormk9 .com 
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NOTES FROM UNITED NATIONS 
MINE ACTION SERVICE 
The United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) serves as the focal point 
for all U.N. mine-related activities carried 
out by II departments and agepcies within 
the organization. This coordinated and 
proactive approach minimizes the potential 
for duplication of effort, and ensures clear 
delineation of responsibility and integration 
of work by all involved. To fully address the 
needs and objectives of U.N. mine action, 
UN MAS is responsible for the coordination 
of: 
• Mine action policy development and 
coordination; 
• Assessment and monitoring of the 
globallandmine threat; 
• Mine action program initiation and 
support; 
• Information management; 
• Quality management and technology 
ISSUes; 
• Advocacy and consciousness-raising; 
and 
• Resource mobilization. 
Policy Development and Coordination 
As focal point, UNMAS develops 
policy to guide the cooperative efforts of all 
those involved in U .N. mine action in 
support of humanitarian and peacekeeping 
operations. Mine Action and Effective 
Coordination: The United Nations Policy was 
developed in close consultation with other 
partners in 1998 ro clarify the key principles 
on which mine action is based, and to 
identify roles and responsibilities within the 
United Nations for all mine action activities. 
UNMAS has continued to develop 
further guidelines to augment this policy, 
including a 1999 paper on cooperation with 
indigenous militaries, which establishes the 
range of assistance ro military involvement 
in mine action, and emphasizes the key 
principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
humanity. Other guidelines are also under 
development in close cooperation with 
U.N. agencies and departments and other 
key entities. 
UNMAS also chairs an inter-agency 
consultative and priority-setting mechanism 
within the United Nations, and an 
additional forum involving key NGO and 
international organizations. 
landmine Threat Assessment and 
Monitoring 
UNMAS assesses and monitors the 
globallandmine threat in order to identifY 
needs and develop appropriate responses. 
Inter-agency and multi-sectoral assessment 
missions are deployed to affected regions to 
define the scope and nature of the landmine/ 
UXO problem, identify constraints and 
opportunities affecting the mine action 
response, and formulate recommendations 
for mine action activities. Thus far, 15 such 
missions have deployed. Depending on the 
situation, Level 1 Impact Surveys are often 
developed as a follow-up to such assessment 
missions, with the information gathered 
being used to determine priorities and 
identifY areas with the greatest needs. Impact 
Surveys identify the general location of 
known and suspected mined areas, and focus 
on the evaluation of the humanitarian and 
socioeconomic impact of landmine 
contamination. 
Program lnttiation and Support 
In keeping with the U.N. mine action 
policy, responsibility for supporting long-
term integrated mine-action programs rests 
with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), where UNMAS 
remains involved in an advisory and 
monitoring capacity. In the context of 
humanitarian emergencies and peace-
keeping operations, the involvement of 
UNMAS is more critical and direct. It is 
responsible for the planning, establishment 
and coordination of deploying mine action 
operations, as well as their support. The 
most significant ongoing programs 
implemented under UNMAS auspices 
include Kosovo (FRY), southern Lebanon, 
and the program in the Temporary Security 
Zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
UN MAS is also responsible for supporting 
the effective integration of mine awareness 
and victim assistance activities with other 
mine-related activities. 
Information Management 
Given the scope of the landmine 
problem, the wide spectrum of factors to 
take into consideration and the number of 
actors involved, the development of an 
appropriate information management 
system has been idenrified as a priority to 
support proper monitoring, planning and 
program implementation. As a result, 
UNMAS has asked the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to develop the 
Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA). Thus far a "field module" 
has been developed and has been deployed 
in a growing number of counrries, while the 
second phase-developing a "g lob al 
module," as well as improving the existing 
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version of the field module-continues. 
Additional initiatives are also being 
continued with regard to information 
management issues, including development 
of improved electronic mediums for dealing 
with issues as diverse as donor funding and 
stockpile destruction, as well as cooperation 
with other initiatives in areas such as 
conformity of mine action information 
databases. 
Quality Management and Technology 
UN 
MAS 
is responsible for the 
development, maintenance and promotion 
of technical and safety standards for mine 
action. As a part of this role, with the 
support of the GICHD, the International 
Standards for Mine Clearance Operations 
have been revised, updated and expanded 
to become the International Mine Action 
Standards. Guidelines for mine awareness 
education have also been formulated by 
UNICEF, while the public health aspect of 
victim assistance sees the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in the lead within the 
U.N. system to discuss requirements for 
additional standards with other actors such 
as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC). With regard to technology, 
UN MAS has been called upon to take a role 
through the collection and dissemination 
of appropriate information, and the 
development of standards where required 
and practical. 
Advocacy and Consciousness-raising 
Advocacy, public information and 
consciousness-raising activities are integral 
pans of the international effort to rid the 
world of landmines, and UNMAS is 
involved in stigmatising the use of mines 
and supporting a global ban on these 
weapons. With over 100 States Parties to 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treacy, the 
emphasis is also shifting from advocacy ro 
supporting treaty implementation, as more 
countries face the need ro implement the 
obligations of ratification. UNMAS also 
cooperates with other organizations 
continued on page 107 
NOTES FROM GENEVA INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING 
By Robert Diethelm, Support Director 
GICHD 
The Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was 
established in 1998 to support the mine 
action efforts of the international commu-
nity, in general, and those of the United 
Nations, in particular. The Centre aims to 
promote cooperation in the field of mine 
action in three main areas: research work; 
operational assistance; and support for the 
Mine Ban Treaty. 
The GICHD contributes to the formula-
tion and development of improved 
procedures, practices and technolo-
gies in mine action. 
The studies elaborated by the Centre 
address actual problems brought up by 
practitioners in the field or by donors. With 
its research, the Centre aims co increase the 
safety of demining and the cost-effectiveness 
of mine action programs in the field. 
Examples of the Centre's current studies are: 
• The Revision of International Stan-
dards Project provides practitioners and 
donors with an updated and revised 
framework of technical and procedural 
prescriptions for safe and effective mine 
action. 
• The Mine Detection Dog Study 
analyses existing problems related with 
mine detection dogs (MODs) (e.g. 
training and evaluation) to allow safe 
and efficient usage of the very 
promising potential of these animals. 
• The Socioeconomic Study provides a 
framework for measuring 
socioeconomic impact and value, to 
help program managers to set priorities 
and to allocate resources most 
efficiently. 
• The Donor Guidelines Study aims to 
assist donors in ensuring value for 
money and quality mine action from 
funded programs. 
• The Training Needs Analysis Study 
analyses pre-deployment training needs 
of international experts filling the posts 
of program managers, technical advisers 
or similar key positions in field 
programs. 
• The Use of Military Organizations in 
Humanitarian Mine Action Project 
aims to examine the practicability of 
using military organizations, both 
international and local, for all forms of 
humanitarian mine action. An 
appropriate integration of this potential 
could considerably increase the available 
work force for mine action. 
• The Project on the destruction of PFM-
1 mines shall establish how best to 
destroy stockpiles of such mines, since 
their liquid explosive filling is both roxie 
and corrosive. 
The GICHD provides specific opera-
tional support and assistance for ongoing 
mine action activities in the field. The Cen-
tre develops and disseminates the Informa-
tion Management System for Mine Action 
(IMSMA) in cooperation with the U.N. 
Mine Action Service (UN MAS) and other 
users. One of the key problems in mine 
action is information (e.g. location of mined 
areas , types of mines used, location of 
incidents). The Centre-in close co-
operation with UN MAS, and supported by 
ETHZ Zurich-develops and disseminates 
IMSMA. IMSMA consists of: 
• The "Field Module," which provides a 
ready-ro-use cool for mine action centers 
at the national and regional level , to 
cover their data collection and 
information management needs, and 
• The "Global Module," which refines 
and collates data from the field and 
provides the United Nations with 
improved capabilities for decision-
making related to mine action. 
To date, IMSMA is being used in 
Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Chad, Estonia, 
Somaliland, Southern Lebanon, Eritrea, 
Nicaragua, Thailand and, on the regional 
level, in Cambodia. 
The Centre provides operational 
support by providing shore-term operational 
and technical assistance for newly estab-
lished U.N. mine action programs by 
deploying members of its staff. In addition, 
the Centre carries out evaluation missions 
and provides the framework for the annual 
UNMAS Geneva Conference, which as-
sembles mine action practitioners in the 
field, as well as at Headquarters level and 
provide for a comprehensive exchange of 
information and experience. 
The GICHD supports the implementa-
tion of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
The Centre also hosts meetings within 
the intersessional work to implement the 
Mine Ban Treaty. These meetings of the 
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relevant Standing Committees bring 
together representatives of States Parties, 
non-States Parties, of international organi-
sations, of NGOs and other experts in or-
der to ensure effective implementation and 
to report co the States Parties. The Centre 
also provides technical input to theses activi-
ties in the area of mine clearance, victims 
assistance, stockpile destruction and 
technology. 
The Centre is an independent and 
impartial specialist organisation. 
It is supported by 17 governments, and 
the Republic and Canton of Geneva. The 
Centre's budget foresees expenditures of 
some 7.5 million CHF (about U.S.$4.6 
million) for 2001, covered by major 
contributions from Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom, as well as by project 
o riented funding provided by Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, the United States, UNDP 
and the UNTF. 
The Centre Staff 
The Centre has 20 permanent staff 
members, including five seconded staff 
members sent by the Governments of 
France, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Additional experts work for the 
Centre on a case-by-case basis. • 
Contact Information 




Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining 
7 bis, avenue de Ia Paix 
P.O. Box 1300 
CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland 
Phone: +41 22 906 16 60 
Fax: +41 22 906 16 90 
Website: www.gichd.ch 
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Asia & the Pacific 
The U.S. Army's Countermine Training Support 
Center and Humanitarian Demining Training Center 
In response to former President Clinton' s Landmine policy directives, the U.S. Army 
Engineeri ng School formed the Counte rmine Training Support Center and the 
Humanitarian Demining Training Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. 
By Joseph M. Donahue, Survey 
Action Center, VVAF 
Background 
T he U.S. D epartm ent of Defense (DoD) possesses a mine action resource whose 
existence is nor widely known in the 
humanitarian demining commu nity. 
In May 1996, the U.S. Army Engi-
neer School (USAES) at Fort Leonard 
Wood, Mo., established the Counter-
mine Training Su pport Center 
(CTSC). In September of that year, 
rhe Office of th e Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Special Operations and 
Low Intensity Conflict (SOIL! C) es-
tablished the Humanitarian Demin-
ing Training Center (HDTC) at Fort 
Leonard Wood, Mo. Both were cre-
ated in direct response to the Presiden-
tial Land mine Policy Directive of May 
1996. This document directs "lrhe] 
Department of Defense to ... signifi-
cantly expand its hum an itarian 
demining program to train and assist 
o ther countries in developing effective 
demining programs." It further ex-
plains that the "government program 
is to tra in the trainers, includ ing 
equipping rhe host nations to sustain 
their own demining programs. The 
U.S. Department of Stare [DoS] and 
the Defense Department coordinate 
rhe funding and priorities to meet the 
demin ing needs of each individual 
nation." 
CTSC is a countermine training 
and information center, and although 
d iscussed in rh is article, ir is not the 
focus. The p rimary subject of th is 
p iece is HDTC, the U.S. military's 
CTSC/HDTC Mission Statement 
primary center for humanitarian mine 
action knowledge and skills. The rwo 
centers share facili ties and a joint 
mi ssion s tatem en t and provide 
suppo r t to U.S. governm en tal 
agencies, international organizations, 
and other institutions involved in 
counrermine operations and humani-
tarian demining. Recently, H DTC 
hosted the author as rhe first member 
of an NGO to attend training there. 
I came to attend HDTC because 
of continuing efforrs by members of 
the NGO and U.S. m ilita ry com-
munities aimed at creati ng more 
opportunities for positive interaction 
and mutual support. The HDTC basic 
demining course is tailored for each 
mil itary ream attending the course to 
e nsu re that the team has the 
knowledge it needs to conduct a 
successful "train-the-t rainer" program 
in the host country that includes 
knowledge of the NGOs working in 
that country. Richard Kidd, program 
manager for SAC, said, "By initiating 
collaborative efforts in the classroom, 
members of various sectors in the mine 
"The mission of CTSC/HDTC is to serve as training and informat ion centers concerning 
countermine and demining operations, demolitions, UXO and mine awareness, and 
booby traps. The centers research the latest lessons learned, tactics, techniques and 
procedures, and the use of mines by the United States and foreign countries. The 
centers incorporate acquired information into current lessons and provide innovat ive 
and realistic mine training tailored to a unit's needs. The centers also develop training 
and training aids in support of countermine and demining operations/ training." 
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action community will be much better 
equipped to interact and cooperate in 
the field. " Collaboration between 
military and NGO mine action 
organizations is essential to resolving 
rhe global landmine contamination 
problem with greater efficiency and 
speed. This collaboration should begin 
at rhe training institutions within these 
communities. 
Staffing 
CTSC/HDTC has an expen-
enced and diverse staff consisting of 
eight civilian (including rwo RONCO 
contractors) and three foreign military 
personnel. Two periodically seconded 
by USAES to support CTSC, while 
SO/LIC funds the HDTC school and 
personnel. HDTC sraff is drawn from 
the special operations, explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD), combat engi-
neering and commercial communities. 
The three foreign military exchange 
personnel, Maj. Griffin and Warrant 
Officers Esrall and Clegg, are from rhe 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Australia, respectively. These instruc-
tors have extensive experience con-
ducting humanitarian demining and 
related operations in countries that 
include Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambo-
dia, Estonia, Kosovo, Mozambique, 
Swaziland and the Solomon Islands. 
RONCO 
RONCO Consulting Cor-
poration is an international services 
firm that provides advisory, training, 
implementation and man agement 
assis tance to private and public sector 
cl ients. RONCO is the only U.S. firm 
rhar has developed and uses "free 
runn
i
ng " explosive detecting dogs 
(EDD). In August 1999, RONCO 
was awarded a humanitarian demining 
contract by rhe DoS. DoS's Office of 
Humanitarian Demining Programs 
(Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) 
d irects RONCO through task orders 
for specific mine act ion services. 
RON CO was tasked by DoS to 
provide HDTC with rwo experienced 
mine action technicians ro serve as 
in structors. During the author's 
attendance at HDTC, a large portion 
of th e technical instruction was 
provided by these RO NCO 
instructors: "Bart" Bartholomew, a 
former Special Forces soldier, and 
Clarke George, a former Navy EOD 
technician. They have co nducted 
humanitarian demining operations in 
Bosnia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kuwait and 
Nicaragua. Participation in the 
HDTC program is an important parr 
of the larger RONCO contribution to 
the broad range of U.S. government 
mine action actiVIties. 
rraining 
CTSC/H DTC provides several 
different mine action courses. T hese 
co urses a re targeted ar different 
audiences, and may be taught either 
at Fort Leonard Wood or by Mobile 
Training Team (MTT). 
ountermine Course 
CTSC conducts a two-day 
coun term ine sustain ment-trammg 
course for U.S. military engineer units 
preparing ro d eploy overseas. T his 
training may be provided at Fort 
Leonard Wood or through an MTT 
ar the unit point of origin. CTSC 
maintains up-to-dare info rmat ion 
regard in g counre rmine training, 
doctrine and mine awareness. This 
course focuses o n mil itary units and 
personnel. 
vtme Awareness Training 
Mine awa re n ess trai nin g is 
integrated into both rhe CTSC and 
HDTC programs of instruc tion. 
However, chis training may also be 
provided as a stand-alone course and 
is available to all U.S. military and 
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CTSC & HDTC 
government personnel deploying to 
mine affected countries. The training 
may be received either at Fort Leonard 
Wood or through an MTT. 
)emining 
The Humanita rian Demining 
O perations O rientation Course is a 
two-week program of instruction 
aimed at preparing U .S. Army Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) to train 
foreign military and government 
civilia n personnel ro implem ent 
national mine action programs. These 
SOF personnel travel to numerous 
countries to train their hosts how to 
set up and co ndu ct demining 
operation s. The humanitarian 
demining training team consists of 
several SOF elements: Special Forces 
personn el co nduct the train-the-
trainer portion for host nation de-
min e rs, Civi l Affairs personnel 
conduct mine action center training 
and Psychological Operations 
personnel conduct mine awareness 
training. EOD personnel from all U.S. 
military services are also included if 
rhe mission requires their participa-
tion. HDTC conducts an average of 
two courses each month and has 
trained more than 850 student trainers 
since inception. Countries that have 
benefited from rhe program include 
Armen ia and Azerbaijan (Beecroft 
Initiative-see page 113), Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Chad, Djibomi, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Egypt, Geo rgia, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Oman, Peru, Thailand, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Practical Exercises 
Several practical exercises (PE) are 
conducted during the course , and 
students are tested daily by written 
examination and/or evaluated PE. 
These exercises follow a simi lar 
progression to ch ar of real world mine 
action operations. The students are 
tasked to work thro u gh a mine 
contamination problem from initial 
survey through co mpletion, with 
everything from mine field accidents 
to media visits in between. The mine 
action PE focuses on a specific mined 
area in the notional country of "Fort 
Leonard Wood" following a protracted 
insurgency and is woven into the 
curriculum throughout the course. 
According to Col. Barry Shapiro, chief 
of Joint U. S. Military Advisory 
Group-Thailand (JUSMAG-THAI), 
"The Humanitarian Demining 
Operations Orientation Course has 
been a key element in the United 
State's efforts in development of the 
T hai Mine Action Center [TMAC]. 
T he course has ensured that the U.S. 
Special Forces instructors and advisors 
are providing the approp riate 
knowledge and expertise ro the Thai 
program. Humanitarian demining 
assistance is an important part of our 
engagement program with Thailand, 
and t he course has provided a valuable 
Special operator 
working in a training 
lane during a 
Practical Exercise at 
HDTC. 
. . 
means of maintaining quality control 
over our efforts." 
rraining Products 
CTSC/HDTC is recognized for 
production of high quality mine 
act ion training aids. The centers 
develop training products to support 
mine awareness, counrerm ine and 
demining activities. Among these 
training a ids are se ts of mine 
information cards for Bosnia, Korea, 
Rwand a, Mozambique, Er it rea, 
Ethiopia, Angola, and Central and 
South America. Each card has a picture 
of a landmine on one side and 
app licable technical data o n the 
reverse. CTSC/HDTC has also 
developed three-dimensional mine 
boards. Each set of boards is a country, 
with individual boards showing several 
landmines found there. In addition, 
CTSC/HDTC staff assembles demin-
ing toolboxes that include demining 
han d-rools, inert landmines and mine 
boards. T hese toolboxes are provided 
to Special Forces teams deploying to 
conduct train-the- trainer missions. 
Finally, CT SC/HDTC produces inert 
training mines for recognition and 
famil iarization training. 
he lmplementers 
I attended the HDT C cou rse 
with an Operational Detachment 
Alpha (ODA or "A-Team") from 2"d 
Battalion , I" Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), as well as Navy EOD tech-
nicians. Based at Fort Lewis, Wash., 
1" Group's area of operation is Asia 
and the Pacifi c Rim . The members of 
this "A-Team" have international 
experience in countries that include 
Thailand, Korea and Madagascar. The 
ream worked with TMAC for nearly 
th ree months from O ctober th rough 
D ecember 2000. 
Traini ng provided to T MAC 
included primary first aid for all 
pe rsonnel and ad vanced m edica 
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• Joe Donahue using a Guartel MD-8 
mine detector in the Fort Leonard 
Wood training lanes. C/o Joe Donahue 
(paramed ic) skills for TMAC medics. 
General, technical and clearance 
survey operations were also taught, as 
were UXO identification and 
demolition. 
The two Navy personne l 
attending the course were preparing 
fo r a deployme nt to Yemen. Their 
commanding officer said, "U.S. Navy 
EOD technicians support U.S. 
Humanitarian Demining Operations 
(HDO) worldwid e. Following HDTC 
training, these technicians are normal-
ly assigned as team members of larger 
SOF contingents sent ro conduct 
HDO in su ch places as Yeme n, 
Thailand, Vietnam and Bosnia. Navy 
EOD technicians focus upon training-
the- trainer, and work with other 
military forces and NGOs to meet the 
demining needs of a given country. 
The experience ofHDTC has signi fi -
cantly increased the sensitivity of U.S. 
Navy EOD operators to rhe unique 
needs of humanitarian operations, and 
specifically, the teamwork requi red 
among host nation, foreign mil itary 
andNGOs to train and educate local 
forces to create a safe environment ." 
Numerous SOF personnel have 
conducted humanitarian mine action 
rotations sin ce the program began 
more rhan four years ago . These 
deployments rypically last for three 
months and are part of a "building 
block
" 
approach to mine ac tion 
training and capacity bui lding. In 
other words, a deploying ream will 
build irs program of instruction upon 
The Beecroft Initiative 
To speed the pace of reducing the 
landm in e t h reat that endangers 
popu lations in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, and to strengthen 
confidence and security in the southern 
Caucasus, the DoS implemented the 
"Beecroft Init iative," an innovative 
mult ilateral program. Under th is 
initiative, U.S. military personnel 
conducted simultaneous humanitarian 
demining uaining of select groups of 
Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani 
soldiers and civilians at a military base 
in Georgia. They caught their fellow 
sold iers up-to-date humanitarian 
demining skills, allowing those trained 
to serve as force multipl iers by 
returning home to train others. Robert 
M. Beecroft devised this initiative while 
he served as Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary in the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs at the DoS, proponent 
of the Office of Humanitarian 
D emining Programs. 
The DoD O ffice of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 
(SOLIC - Peacekeeping and Human-
itar ian Affairs) is charged with 
overseeing the U.S . military's "train-
the -tr ain er" program. Under this 
program, Special Forces personnel train 
foreign deminers at overseas sires in 
modern humanitarian demining 
techniques. To dare, approximately one 
quarter of the world's humanitarian 
deminers have been trained under this 
program o r ar rhe U.S. Army's 
Humanitarian Demining Training 
Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. 
The Government of Georgia 
hosted this innovative training 
program at the Gori military base near 
Tbilisi, Georgia. Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan each contributed 20 sold iers 
and civilians (for a total of 60 students) 
to be educated regarding modern 
humanitarian demining techniques by 
70 U.S. Army demining experts. The 
70 U.S. soldiers were primarily Special 
Forces operators ("Green Berets") from 
the I Orh Special Forces Group. T he 
U.S. contingent also taught the 
conduct of informacion campaigns for 
supporr of mine awareness education. 
The HDTC program is logically 
structured to cover all mine action 
subject areas, from "digging in the 
weeds" to national policy. HDTC 
standard practice is to teach methods 
and techniques in accordance with the 
U.N.-administered International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). Blocks of 
instruction are rotated among faculty 
members based upon areas of expertise 
and experience. Students are 
en couraged to provide input and 
comment. Because the primary target 
CTSC & HDTC 
audience of special operators may not 
have previous mine action experience, 
HDT C facu lty provide broad 
background regarding pol ic ies, 
standards, area of operat ion and the 
sectora l distinctions between the 
humanitarian, military and com-
mercial mine action communities. 
Among the blocks of instruction taught 
are: 
• Global Landmine Situation 
• U.S. Demining Policy 
• International Demining 
Organizations (Military, United 
Nations and NGOs) 
• International Mine Action 
Standards (Under development by 
the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) 
• National Mine Action Org. 
• Survey, Levels 1-3 
• Manual Demining Equipment and 
Clearance Techniques (Equipment, 
planning and execution, and 
demolitions (including live-fire) 
• Program Management 
• Explosive Detecting Dogs 
• Mine Awareness 
• Mechanical Clearance 
• Accident Investigation 
• Country-specific Brief 
• Public Affairs 
that o f a preceding ream , where 
app licab le . One of 1" Gro up's 
detachments recently began another 
deployment with TMAC. 
David D. Baker was recently the first 
FBI empl oyee to attend the 
Humanitarian Demining Operations 
Orientation Course. Asked why the 
FBI perceives a need to send agents to 
HDT C , h e said, " Internat iona l 
o pera t ional co mm i tmen ts ro 
invest igate and collect evidence o n 
terro r ism-re la ted attacks agai n st 
Americans have significantly increased 
in areas of the world chat have mine 
problems. The FBI saw a need for a 
more formal safety training program 
for irs personnel." 
ederal Agencies 
HDTC courses are open to nor 
only military servicemen and women, 
bur to members offederal agencies and 
other organizations. Federal Bureau of 
I nvest igat ion (FB I) Special Agent 
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SA Baker said that although the 
FBI does n ot cond uct demini ng 
operat ions, the HDTC course "was 
very beneficial, as it p rovided the FBI 
w ith trai n ing on the threat of 
landmines, m ine field recognition and 
emergency action drills if a mine field 
is accidentally entered." Now the FBI 
will be bett er able to coordinate with 
military, international and N GOs in 
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The Mineseeker Airship: 
~supporting the U.N: 
The Lightship Group and the Defense Research and Evaluation Agency team up to 
help survey mine fields from above. Airship completed its flagship mission in 2000. 
by Elizahl>th A l"rarru•r MLH( 
From October to November 2000, people in Kosovo may have looked skyward and seen 
the large wh i te airship titled 
"Mineseeker.com, Supporting the 
UN ." For nearly two months the 
Mineseeker Airship flew over regions 
of Kosovo collecting information 
about the mine fields below. The 
airship was completing its debut 
assignment as the first in aerial mine 
field survey technology. Over the 
course of six weeks the Mineseeker 
team collected over 60 hours of 
videotape and 500 digital images of 
mine sites, completing the airship's 
first mission- an aerial optical survey 
collection of30 mine fields in Kosovo. 
Background 
The idea of aerial mme field 
survey grew from rhe continual 
advancement in demining technology. 
Currently, the most reliable method 
for clearing a mine field involves 
manually probing the ground. By this 
method, a man with a probing device 
can clear 20-25 m per day. This 
method is both costly and timely. 
Experts in demining have been 
looking for a more time and cost-
effective method of clearing the U .N. 
estimate of800,000 square kilometers 
of land that is unusable due to the 
suspected presence of mines. The 
United Nations estimates that over 80 
percent of the land worldwide 
currently restricted as mined is actually 
mine-free. In order to release restricted 
land for agricultural and residential 
development, it must first be surveyed. 
The original objective for an aerial 
survey was to complete a fast and 
accurate Level Two survey of the land. 
The goal of The Lightship Group 
(TLG) and the Defense Research and 
Evaluation Agency (DERA) using the 
II 
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Mineseeker is to reduce the land to be 
mined by 20 percent. 
he Lightship Group 
TLG was formed in 1995 as a 
partnership between Lightship 
America, the operating division of 
American Blimp, and Virgin 
Lightships, part of Sir Richard 
Branson's Virgin Atlantic Group of 
Companies in Telford, UK. TLG 
currently operates 17 of23 worldwide 
airships, making it the largest 
operating airship company. The 
Lightship Airship was created in 
response to the need for low-cost, high 
performance airships for both 
advertising and aerial survey. The 
group is known for its robust, cost-
effective airships. The Lightship crew 
has combined for over 100,000 hours 
of flying experience. The Mineseeker 
Airship is an A60+ lightship that 
measures 150 feet long and 55 feet tall. 
With a gondola 14 by 5 feet long, it 
can hold up to five people. 
DERA 
The ground breaking new 
technology that makes aerial radar 
survey possible is called the Ultra Wide 
Ban Synthetic Aperture Radar (UWB 
SAR). The UWB SAR was first 
developed by the U.K. Ministry of 
Defense for use in finding AT mines; 
it was originally intended to find large 
objects. In the last fi ve years the 
Defense Evaluation and Research 
Agency (DERA) has taken over serious 
development. The radar is designed to 
penetrate foliage and ground to create 
a high-resolution image of metal and 
plastic mines. T he radar was developed 
to find smaller targets, maki ng it 
suitable for survey of mines and cluster 
bomb units (CBUs) . The UWB SAR 
is currently the world's highest 
resolution radar of irs kind. 
The Mineseeker Project 
In response to the need for more 
advanced demining technology, TLG 
and DERA joined together to study 
the use of airships in humanitarian 
demining. T hey began to study the 
feasibility of joining two technologies, 
TLG's A60+ airship, and DERA's 
UWB SAR, to create a mine-seeking 
airship. Both organizations believe 
that the airship is the most practical 
a ircraft for aerial survey primarily 
because an airship is stable, vibration-
free and nonmetallic. 
An a irship has the following 
features that make it an ideal aerial 
platform for the use of a sensitive radar 
system: 1 
•a mobile, stable platform; 
•long endurance; 
•low noise and vibration; 
•no rotor downwash; 
•relatively large payload capability; and 
•a good operator environment. 
Airships also have a low rate of 
critical failure. Even when shot at the 
airship can withstand several buller 
holes before it sinks to rhe ground, 
never crashing. The payload of the 
aircraft is also important because the 
electric equipment can be both heavy 
and sensitive. 
The Lightship Gro up's A60 
airship has a half-ton payload, making 
it ideal for the sensor equipment like 
the UWB SAR. Using a helicopter 
instead of an airship was considered 
for the aerial survey, but was decided 
against fo r several reasons. When 
working in military zones, helicopters 
can be perceived as a threat, whereas 
airships are "friendly" to the public 
eye. Although helicopters have the 
ability to hover like airships, they also 
have rotor downwash, which causes 
strong downward 
air pressure that 
could cause mine 
detonation. 
In January 
2000, TLG and 
DERA officially 
rook steps in their 
partnership to 
create and develop 
the Mineseeker 
Airship. DERA was 
already developing 
a prototype UWB 
SAR. The develop-
ment continued 
until January 2000, 
when the prototype 
system was fitted in 
the Mineseeker air-
ship, a Lightship 
A60+, recently 
diverted from an 
advertising assign-
ment in Germany. 
The most serious 
concern that engi-
neers faced was to 
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The Mineseeker Airship 
make sure the radar energy did not 
interfere with the electrical power of 
the airship, causing possible airship 
failure. 
(1-r) John Flanagan, 
MACC program 
manager; Mark 







tion Center; and Dr 
Paul Bishop,DERA. 
c/o The Mineseeker 
Foundation 
• Wescam sensor fit. 
c/o The Mineseeker 
Foundation 
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Testing 
In January 2000 the first erial run 
of the Mineseeker was held at a DERA 
sire in Worcestershire, UK. The trials 
proved promising for the technology, 
deminers, discuss the requirements for 
Level One and Level Two surveys and 
to gain understanding of specific 
te rrain iss ues invo lved in mine 
clearance in order to give the ream a 
more rounded view of the mine 
MINESEEKER.COM 
as the radar was able to detect surface 
metal and plastic mines wirh at lease 
the accuracy of ground level surveying. 
With aerial survey, the ream detects 
and maps mines and UXO, including 
plastic mines as small as I 0 em. The 
Mineseeker was found to be able to 
scan an estimated I 00 sq. m per 
second, a dramatic increase from the 
amount of land char can be covered 
per second during typical ground 
survey. By using aerial survey, large 
areas can be mapped in a short time 
and mine-free land can chen be 
released for use, eliminating the need 
for an actual physical search. 
Deployment in Kosovo 
In order ro d evelop a bette r 
overall understanding of the mine 
probl em , the Mineseeke r t eam 
planned a rrip to visit several mine-
affected countries, including Thailand, 
Cambodia and Kosovo . The crip 
objectives were ro meet experienced 
problem and demining techniques. 
In August 2000, rhe ream visited 
Kosovo, wh ere it met with John 
Flanagan , program manager of the 
U.N. Mine Action Coordination 
Centre (MACC) in Kosovo, to discuss 
current mine clearance. T here are two 
types of ammunition chat need to be 
cleared from the land in Kosovo. One 
type is landmines laid by Serb armies. 
During an ini tial Level One survey, 
maps with mine field locators were 
collected from the Serb Army and 
delivered co MACC. However, the 
maps do nor always make the mine 
clearance work easier; the information 
is often incomplete and vague. Mine 
fields are not GPS referenced and the 
field locarors are physical points such 
as scone piles, cement walls, or sticks. 
Using these maps ground deminers 
may have to prod through large areas 
of brush or forest to find the locators 
before they could begin clea ring, 
wasting valuable rime. 
T he ocher type of ammunition 
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left in Kosovo is the NATO-dropped 
CBU, a more d iffi cul t to d etect 
munition. After some struggle to gee 
clear, often classified informacion, 
NATO shared some coordinate maps 
with MACC. However, the coordi-
nates were often unclear. For example, 
on some maps are a series of crosses, 
bur there is no speci fic key to tell what 
the crosses indicate. A cross could 
stand for a known mine field o r a 
reponed mine field. Without more 
detailed information, deminers spend 
valuable t ime searching in areas chat 
may not contain mines, instead of 
spending time in areas certain co be 
mine- infested. 
During the Mineseeker team's 
visit to Kosovo it became evident chat 
there was an immediate n eed in 
Kosovo for an aeria l observati o n 
platform char could be used co 
pinpoint both landmines and CBU 
strikes and their UXO. Upon 
Flanagan's reques t the Mineseeker 
team began to prepare for immediate 
d eployment of the Mineseeker to 
complete an extensive optical survey 
of the land. T he MACC's statement 
of requirements for Mineseeker were:2 
• Locate and ident ify existence of 
recorded mine fields and identify 
reference poi ms; 
•Confi rm extent of mine fields; 
•Strategic planning regarding rhe use 
of assets (dogs, machinery and access); 
•Confirm char fences and mine-
markers are still intact; 
•Confirm land use and prioritization 
of casks; 
• Ident ify C BU strikes with known 
coordinates, and search for identifying 
strike areas not related ro known 
coordinates; 
• Produce derai led records, define 
bound aries and enabl e st rategic 
planning for clearance; and 
• Ensure all d ata collected, where 
appropriate, is entered into MACC's 
Information Management System for 
Mine Action (IMSMA). 
Aerial Optical Survey 
There were two phases of the 
Mineseeker work in Kosovo. The first 
phase of work was an aerial optical 
survey, begun Sept. 13, 2000. The 
airship flew over known mine fields 
and cluster bomb sites using Wescam 
camera equipment to cake derailed 
photographs of che fields below. For 
six weeks rhe Mineseeker flew over 30 
mine fields us ing maps and old 
sketches co find and zoom in on fields 
below. Steve Saunders, MACC threat 
assessment officer, flew with the ream 
during the optical survey. Using 
previously collected information about 
mine field indicators, Saunders and 
p il ots Mark Fin ney and Andy 
McDonald were able to zero- in on 
ta rgets co cake pictu res and make 
records. By viewing the mine fields 
from an overhead view, the crew was 
able co spot mine locators more easily 
than ground deminers. The locators 
were chen refe renced for use by 
dem ining reams. From an overhead 
view, areas of cluster bomb strikes were 
also more easily spotted and recorded. 
One of the greatest challenges in 
completing the aerial survey was flying 
the a irship so low to rhe ground. 
Saunders and the pilot had to navigate 
hazards such as electricity pylons and 
moumains char usually were far below 
the airsh ip. Another concern was rhac 
in case of an emergency the airship 
might have to land near or in a mine 
field. About chis, David Partridge, 
project direcror, gives assurance: "In 
the event of a major system failure or 
hostile action, airsh ips are remarkably 
robust and would float to (relative} 
safety. T his aspect has been well 
researched and formed parr of the risk 
register for our deployment. " 
adarTesting 
Th e second phase of the survey 
was a testing period for the prototype 
ground-penetrating UWB SAR. The 
radar was reseed over a former mine 
dog rest sire-its first erial in an actual 
mined area. The area was on a hillside 
in a former war zone, and contained 
boxes buried with several types of 
mines and UXO. The resr site gave the 
Mineseeker team a chance to analyze 
the accuracy and system limitations of 
the radar. The radar had already 
proved co be able co penetrate foliage 
during rhe resting in United Kingdom. 
The team wamed to learn more about 
rhe highest level of performance of the 
radar. From resting ir was confirmed 
that the radar can detect plastic and 
metal mines up to I 0 em below rhe 
ground-a reassuring fact for borh 
DERA and TLG. 
The results of chis 
prototype resting will 
be used to develop 
the radar and design 





team also attempted 
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The Mineseeker Airship 
to promote public awareness of rhe 
Mineseeker in Kosovo through a three-
part campaign. The team used a three-
parr m ethod to promote public 
awareness. The first parr was getting 
local television and rad io coverage in 
the areas of surveying. The media 
explained that the Mineseeker was 
there for mine survey and not any type 
of military action. The second part 
consisted of sending a mine awareness 
ream to speak with local people ro 
reinforce the positive nature of rhe 
project. The third part involved 
conversing with village elders and 
inviting them to look at the airship 
and equipment on the ground at its 
base. T his gave the people a chance to 
Post conflict battle 
damage can be 
assessed for UXO 
risk, and associated 
mined areas 
pinpointed using 
aerial images and 
provided military 
records. 
do The Mineseeker 
Foundation 
The canister from a 
cluster bomb 
strike identified 
from 1 ,000 feet. 
c/ o Wescam 
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(1-r) Mike Kendrick, 
CEO Lightship 
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see the equipment up cl ose and , 
acco rding to Partr idge, prob abl y 
contributed to the fact that none of 
t h e equipment was in tention a ll y 
damaged while at its base in Kosovo. 
Dr. Paul Bishop , DERA proj ec t 
director, said that overall m edi a 
coverage was very pos itive and 
extensive and public reaction to the 
project was supportive. 
Kosovo Results 
After completing irs 103.2 hours 
of aerial survey t he tea m put irs 
extensive collection of information 
onto C Os, which were delivered to 
MACC in November 2000. The C Os 
contain video footage and still pictures 
of specific areas of mine restriction. 
The photographs taken by the airship 
make visible previous ly unknown 
tracks and paths running through the 
mine field areas of interest-where the 
tripwires are most likely found. T he 
C O s are avai lable for NGOs for 
assistance in their mine clearance. 
Providing NGOs with aerial photos of 
the land they are d emining is 
considered by Saunders to be the most 
successful part of the mission. "All the 
companies we provided with infor-
mation said it was very useful; so yes, 
it_ was a success," Saunders stated. 
T he results are currently being 
integrated into the MACC's IM SMA. 
At the time of the delivery of the COs, 
local mining had stopped for the 
winter, so there was no immediate use 
for the information in the IMSMA. 
Benefits of Mineseeker 
Besides completing aerial survey, 
there are other great benefits to the 
Mineseeker Airshi p project-
increased global awareness of the mine 
problem, a move towards commercial 
sponsorship for humanitarian de-
mining and rhe positive contribution 
of mil itary demining resources to 
human itarian demining. The Mine-
seeker h as bee n fu lly funded by 
sponsors Virgin Atlantic Ai rlines, The 
North Face, Wescam and Linde Gas. 
T hrough these sponsorships, the 
commercial world has been intro-
duced ro the mine problem and taken 
part to h elp. The Mineseeker 
Foundation will continue to look for 
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commercial funding ro support the 
project, bel ieving that it is important 
to keep mine action in the public eye. 
T he commercial support brings new 
h ope that more humanitarian 
dem ining support will come from 
sponsors other than the government 
and U.N. programs. Mine awareness 
and support will continue to be raised 
in both rhe public and commercial 
sectors. 
This does not discoun r the 
benefit of redirecting former military 
resources and techno logy towards 
humanitarian demining. The UWB 
SAR is the product of many years of 
development under the M inistry of 
Defense. "The most significant thing 
achieved by the Mineseeker is that it 
is providing media glare, and that we 
now have the license to use technology 
that was re leased from inherent 
mi litary demin ing for humanitarian 
demining," Partridge explained. 
Future Plans 
The Mineseeker Foundation was 
launched on Jan. 27, 200 1, as a joint 
partnership of DERA and TLG and 
includes patrons Nelson Mandela, his 
wife Graca Machel Mandela, Sir Ri-
chard Branson and Noor-al-Hussein, 
Queen of Jordan. The fo undation will 
continue to seek commercial support 
for rhe M i:1eseeker project for rhe next 
two years of development and for fu-
ture airships. Under the direction of 
Chairman Mike Kendrick, rhe foun-
dation hopes ro raise approximately 
$ 14 m illion (£10 million) for the 
cause. Bishop says, "The Mineseeker 
Foundation is committed to looking 
ar new technology nor just in mine 
clearance bur in mine action, to using 
rhe airship for mine awareness." He 
poincs our rhar the Mineseeker can be 
used for tasks such as road surveys, 
monitoring the movement of refuges, 
and even dropp ing li ght parcels, 
should the need arise . 
The immediate task ar hand is to 
assess preexisting technology and the 
potential developmenc of demining 
technology. The Mineseeker Foun-
dation strives to determine precisely 
what mine action requires now and 
what it will require in rime. Partridge 
says that TLG's goal is to make the 
Mineseeker a cost-effective aid ro rhe 
global mine action community. 
Future plans for rhe Mineseeker 
include a two-year development 
program. The first 18 months will 
include development to increase the 
performance of the radar. DERA is 
curren tl y wo rking on a new 
technology rhar would enable the 
radar to scan the ground surface in 
layers. With this capability, the team 
can take a set of pictures of the surface, 
then take another set at 2-5 em below 
the surface, and another set at I 0 em 
below. 
DERA and TLG are also looking 
into the development of a more 
complex, automated system to manage 
rhe collected data from surveys. 
Currently, rhe information is difficult 
to analyze and can rake a long rime to 
be organized. The information is 
stored by individual mine. However, 
the ideal management system would 
provide on the spot, organized output 
of specific mined areas, in rhe fashion 
of an advanced Level Two survey. 
After the advanced development 
stage will come a six-month period of 
intensive testing. The resting will rake 
place in the U .K. and various other 
active mine testing sires throughout 
the world, possibly including Croatia. 
The Mineseeker ream aims to meet the 
standards of the International Testing 
Evaluation Program (ITEP ) for aerial 
mine survey. The tests will be done on 
various types of soil, water content, 
mines, and detection characteristics. 
DERA recognizes the importance of 
resting in actual mined areas in order 
to prove rhe capabilities of rhe radar 
before i r can be deemed accurate 
enough for extensive use . The 
Mineseeker team wants ro provide at 
least the same accuracy of current 
Level Two ground surveys. 
After the Mineseeker meers the 
prescribed accuracy standards, T LG 
will develop the Mineseeker II. The 
goal of the Mineseeker Foundation is 
to eventually deploy flve airships, one 
or two per year. TLG will provide and 
operate the technology at the request 
of NGOs, nor as a replacement ro all 
current clearance methods, but in 
hopes of radically improving mine 
clearance. As Partridge explains about 
the project, "New technology is 
important in terms of speeding up 
demining. But the most important 
thing is that we are nor standing on a 
soapbox saying 'We've got the answer'; 
it's not a silver buller. We've just got a 
program enhancement system that can 
be improved and used." With this in 
mind, the Mineseeker Foundation and 
its sponsors join the efforts of 
humanitarian demining with a whole 
new approach- from rhe sky. • 
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The Mineseeker Airship 
Contact Information 
David Parrridge 
Mincseeker Project D irector 
The Mineseeker Foundation 
I Stafford Park 12 
Telford, SHROPSH IRE 
TF23 3BJ, U.K. 




Dr. Paul Bishop 
Mineseeker Project Director 
The Mineseeker Foundation 
Room C501 
St Andrews Road 
Malvern, Worcestershire 
WR I4 3PS 
Tel : 0 1684 897306 
Fax: 01684 896137 
E-mail: pkbishop@dcra.gov.uk Website: 
www.dera.gov.uk 
'Christoforaro, Bishop & Thornhill. 
D ERA. The ftasib;!ity of operating an Ultra 
w;deband Synther;c Aperture Radar (UWB 
SAR) from an airship for the detection of 
mh1ed areas ;n a humanitarian role. h ttp:/ 
/www.mineseeker.com/press-info/docs/ 
dera/dcra.html. July 3, 2000. 
1First Mineseeker Airship Deployment 
Declared a Success in Kosovo. http:// 
www.mineseeker.com/pr-archive/kosovo-
dcployment-success.html. Nov. I 0, 2000. 
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Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon 
Sanitaire Clearance Program 
Through the work of Koch GmbH and Mine-Tech, the 359 km-long Cordon Sanitaire 





I n 1993, the European Union (EU) funded a survey of the Cordon Sanitaire in Zimbabwe, 
a series of six border mine 
fields covering 766 km. The 
contract for the survey was 
won by the mine clearance 
NGO Mine-Tech, who had 
three months to perform the 
survey in late 1994. 1 Mine-
Tech did not survey all of the 
mine fields because the fields 
and a major portion of the 
adjacent service road had not 
seen maintenance for two 
decades. However, maps were 
available at the Zimbabwean 
Army Engineer's Head-
quarters at Pomona Barracks, 
and Mine-Tech completed 
the survey and handed over 
the final report. The report 
included maps, diagrams and 
a broad assessment of the problems 
and difficulties in clearance. While the 
report also contained some significant 
inaccuracies, it did present a broad 
overview of the mine fields. 
Of all mine fields, the top priority 
was a 359 km-long one in the 
northeastern corner of Zimbabwe. To 
advise on the tendering process for a 
clearance contract, the EU hired 
consultant Patrick Blagden. The 
European Development Fund 
provided funding for the project, while 
the Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence 
handled financial contro l and 
contractual issues. The invitation to 
tender was issued in late 1997, and was 
comprised of two contracts: main 
works (clearance) and quality 
assurance (QA). 
This was one of the humanitarian 
demining industry's first major 
contracts offered to international 
competition for a project of this scale. 
The issues of assuming risk and the 
disclosure of information were not 
fully explored. The Zimbabwe 
Ministry of Defence, as the client, 
provided the bidding companies with 
very limited information, while the 
tender documents defined the scope 
of work as the clearance of 10,000,000 
m 2 of mine-infested land in 18 
months. It also required the bidding 
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companies to bid with a fixed price. 
Six companies expressed interest 
in performing the clearance. Mine-
Tech was one of the companies 
allowed to bid-an unusual action for 
a company that performed the initial 
survey. The bidding companies were 
allowed to visit the mine field at the 
Mukumbura end for two days under 
the supervision of the Ministry of 
Defence, but high vegetation hid 
much of the visible detail within the 
mine field. Four companies (Mine-
Tech, Koch GmbH, Royal Ordnance 
and Mineclear) then presented 
technical accreditation and bids that 
were judged by a technical threshold 
and by price.2 Koch made its bid in 
partnership with Mine Safe, a 
Zimbabwean company owned by 
retired Zimbabwean army officers. 
After passing the technical pre-
qualification, Koch Mine Safe (KMS) 
won the contract with the lowest bid. 
And while Koch couldn't provide a 
performance guarantee, it was 
successful in finding backing for 
deployment from a major Dutch 
salvage and dredging company, Royal 
Boskalis Westminster NY, a group that 
owned the German subsidiary 
company Heinrich Hirdes GmbH, an 
EOD company. The QA contract was 
issued to BacTec. 
The Cordon Sanitaire 
The Cordon Sanitaire mine field 
consisted of a 25 m-wide strip of 
ground laid with three rows of blast 
AP mines at a density around 5,500 
mines per kilometer. The mine field 
was fenced on both sides by a game 
fence of three strands of steel wire 
supported on thin steel posts set in 
concrete and was cleared of vegetation. 
The bottom strand held a thin wire 
mesh game fence. Also attached to the 
fence was an intruder alarm system 
linked to control points rhat fed 
information to patrol teams. By 1997, 
virtually all the fencing had been 
removed by local peop le or had 
disintegrated. Three lanes of mines 
were laid using knotted ropes. Within 
the three rows, patterns were only 
discernable over short distances. The 
majority of mines in rhe Cordon 
Saniraire were the South African 
R2M2 and the Portuguese M969. The 
Italian VS50 was also laid. Due to 
breaches of the mine field and animal 
incursions, there was a good level of 
in-filling with more random patterns 
and different landmines. 
The Cordon Sanitaire was backed 
for most of irs length by a second 
"ploughshare" mine field containing 
three rows of large fragm entation 
mines mounted on pickets one meter 
above rhe ground. The fragmentation 
mines were laid with 30 m tripwires 
and three additional blast mines 
Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon Sanitaire 
Schematic Diagram of Mine Fields - NOT TO SCALE 
MOZAMBIQUE 
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protected each mine. The mine density 
in this field was around 100 
fragmentation mines and 300 buried 
blast mines per kilometer. The rows 
were unevenly spaced and the 
vegetation was not cleared, so the mine 
field contained substantial trees and 
dense thorn bush. The field was 
subject to a great deal of in-filling and 
randomly spaced APLs, and had a 
service track running behind and 
parallel to it to allow patrolling and 
maintenance. Amazingly, the Cordon 
Sanitaire was even found to run up to 
8 km into neighboring Mozambique 
-indicating the hasty nature of its 
deployment. 
Under its contract, KMS was 
restricted to three working teams, 
though mechanical methods were 
allowed only if the land was manually 
checked. The contractor had to ensure 
that environmental damage was 
minimal. 
c/o Henry Thompson 
he Clearance Operation 
KMS planned to deploy its 
clearance operation in October 1998, 
but it actually deployed six months late 
at Mukumbura in March 1999. The 
mine clearance outfit experienced 
problems assembling manual teams 
because the available pool of 
experienced deminers in Zimbabwe 
was minimal, meaning KMS had to 
do more training than anticipated. As 
a result, there is now a small outflow 
of KMS-trained deminers joining 
other companies. Also, in March, 
Alistair Craib gained control of the 
demining operation from Patrick 
Blagden and made his first visit to the 
project. 
After an initial halt to reassess 
procedures following some early 
accidents, work recommenced in April 
1999, and clearance efforts moved 
slowly for four months. Metal 
contamination forced clearance rates 
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Minebuster takes to a mine field. do Andy Smith 
to be about 30 m2 per two-man lane 
per day. By the end of May, eight 
months into the contract, 0.25 percent 
of the 10,000,000 m1 ofland had been 
cleared. Efforts were then furt her 
slowed by heavy rainfalls, which led 
to o utbreaks of cho lera a n d the 
suspension of work by local health 
authorities. Due to the force majeure, 
KMS was granted a two- month 
extension to irs 18-month contract. 
Meanwhile, BacTec had deployed on 
schedule in October 1998, bur was 
in trouble because irs contract had 
been negotiated o n the basis of 
payment per unit of land verified. 
More flaws in KMS's bid and 
the terms of the contract arose 
early in the p rocess. The dem iners 
were spending the bulk of their rime 
locat ing false signals fro m p ieces of 
scrap m etal in the mine field.3 T h is 
scrap metal came from the remains of 
fencing and rubbish found in the mine 
field. T he demin ing company had 
originally estimated the level of 
contamination at one false alarm per 
20 m2 and had worked this estimation 
into its bid. In reality, though, it was 
finding up to 30 signals per sq uare 
meter in close proxim ity co fence 
lines.4 
T he contract does nor specify 
clearance of all metal bur requires 
clearance to U.N. standards of 99.6 
percem of mines rem oved down ro a 
depth of 20 em . In p ractice, KMS 
Mine buster griddle-rack from the rear. do Andy Smith 
cleared all metal from the ce nter 
mined lanes and was encouraged by 
the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence 
and BacTec ro clear all metal, which 
makes area verification a much simpler 
task. However, the dem iners had 
u n deres t i m a t ed th e logist ical 
difficulties of the operation. The so il 
in winter is very hard, so by July 1999, 
the manual teams required 7,500 liters 
of water per day tO water the mine field 
before prodding or excavating. KMS 
also had to build access roads to rhe 
mine field. T he M ine-Tech survey 
document (and subsequently the 
Ministry of Defence c ontrac t) 
specified that there was a service track 
runn ing about 50 m behind the m ine 
field. In reality, rhe track was between 
300m and 1.7 km from the m ine field 
and no longer existed in certain areas. 
iafety 
KMS was also strongly criticized 
for a high accident rate. From March 
w June 1999, 12 accidents occu rred. 
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Over half of the accidenrs were 
in curred dur in g excavat ion. The 
primary cause of one-third of these was 
attributed to m anagemen t e rror, 
notably serious inju ries from handling 
mines.5 A total of 20 people were 
injured in 18 accidents from February 
1999 to July 2000. Two of t h e 
se riously injured subsequently died in 
the hospital-one from pneumonia 
contracted in recuperation. Only one 
accident occurred as a result of 
stepping on a deep-buried mine on 
land nor yet offered for QA. 
The accidents show a number of 
clear features: 
• Onl y one d eminer was seriously 
injured while clearing m ines and 
adhering to all Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP); 
• Nine out of 14 (64 percent) of those 
injured were back at work with in 10 
days of rhe incident; 
• The two fatalit ies both occurred off-
sire and under medical care; and 
• N o one was killed or injured by a 
ploughshare fragmentation mine (no 
ploughshare mines were found intact 
with detonatOrs). 
Two of the ser ious handling 
incidents were partly the result of m ine 
neutralization (taking the deconaror 
out of the mine casing), a p rocedure 
that was specified as a SOP under the 
init ial contract. More than 4,000 
mines were d isarmed in ch is way, bur 
fo llowing a review of SOPs, the 
p ractice was abandoned and, hence-
forth, all m ines were destroyed intact. 
One way of assessing accidents in 
mine clearance is to look at the density 
of mines and UXO (based on the fact 
that no mines and n o UXO equals no 
a ccidents) . KMS 's teams were 
handling very large quantities of 
minimum-metal APLs under a broad 
ran ge of conditions, including 
excavating them from down to 35 
em-well beyond the depth required 
by U.N. srandards.6 
In May 1999, Craib recom-
mended a change in management. As 
a result, Herman van der Vorm was 
appointed to replace the previous pro-
g ram d irector. The appointment 
proved an immediate success as criti-
cal management decisions were imple-
mented and efficiency improved rap-
idly. By August 1999, the project was 
operating productively and safely. In 
September 1999, KMS a lso intro-
duced alcohol (Breathalyzer) and d rug 
resting and a pay increase. 
Mechanical Clearance 
Soon after deployment in March 
1999, KMS explored the potential for 
mechan ical clearan ce and 
co mmissioned an environmental 
impact assessment of m echanical 
clearance of t he Co rd on Sanitaire 
mine field. T he study concluded that 
approximately o ne-third of the mine 
Koch Mine Safe and the Cordon Sanitaire 
field was suitable for mechanically 
assisted clearance, one- third was 
suitable for clearance with following 
remediation to reduce erosion and 
one-th ird was not suitable for 
mechanical clearance. 
KMS subsequently purchased a 
Vei lhaben Minebuster. The 56 ton 
machine arrived in Zimbabwe in July, 
at which point it was renamed the 
"Mine Collector" and was rested and 
evaluated to develop working 
parameters SOPs. These procedures 
were put inro operation in October 
1999. Two of the dem ining teams 
remained as manual teams working on 
the ploughshare mine field, and the 
third ream followed the Mine 
Collector. 
The Mine Collector is like a heavy 
potatO harvester built around a crawler 
tractor with a heavy mi ll added before 
the lifting and sifting apparatus. This 
machine can process a 3m-wide swath 
down to a depth of 50 em. Soil is 
m ixed up by a carbide-toothed grinder 
and deposited onto a set of three large 
nylon-finger rollers char break up clods 
of earth and separate our solids from 
loose soil that escapes through the 
rollers. Any sol id items such as stones, 
roots and mines are deposited on a 
slatted conveyor that deposits them 
back on the surface some 7 m behind 
the fron t mill. Mines and UXO are 
left on the surface, ready for the 
manual teams. It was found that roots 
of some trees would be picked up and 
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bound in the nylon rollers, so working 
depth (and forward speed) is parrially 
varied according to vegetation . In 
practice, the Mine Collector works 
beh i nd two orher machines: a 
bu ll dozer that removes t rees and 
shrubs and a heavy mine-protected 
tractor with steel wheels and a ripper 
chat loosens soil and breaks up roots. 
When running efficiently, the 
machine processed 12,000 to 15,000 
m2 of land per day. When following 
the machine, individual deminers 
could process 400 to 500 m 2 per day-
about 10 times the normal manual rate 
per person. The Mine Collector ran 
successfully for a few weeks until the 
heavy rains retu rned. The M ine 
Collector broke down on a number of 
occasions and several frustrating weeks 
were spent awaiting spare parts from 
Germany. From March to May 2000, 
the productivity declined significantly 
due co downtime. 
roductivity 
In February 2000, 17 months 
into the 18 month contract, the KMS 
management team looked at its 
prospects. The reams had cleared less 
than one-third of the contract area (2.6 
million m2 ou r of a total of I 0 million 
m2). The need for a contract extension 
became obvious. Luckily, the EU and 
the Zimbabwe M inistry of Defence 
agreed to exte nd the company's 
conrracr to February 200 l. 
Grinding teeth 
and nylon finger 
rollers of the 
Minebuster. 
c/o Andy Smith 
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Comparative densities of mines and UXO in clearance operations in the region: 
Region Square meters Mines/UXO removed Square meters 
Koch Mine Safe 3,809,281 65,185 
NPA, Songo, Cabora Bassa 738,180 12,072 
Mechem, Massingir 89,634 349 
Mechem, Corrunana Dam 1,700,000 3,600 
Mozambican average 
Source: Mechem, NPA Mozambique, Quarterly Report 4th Qtr, 1999, Koch-Mine Safe, IND, Maputo. 
Working under extended hours, 
the mechanical team was capable of 
bringing the company up to between 
6.5 to 7.5 million m2 of land by 
February 2001. The Mine Collector 
processes 20,000 m2 of ground per 
day, and the manual team covers 
around 12,000 to 12,500 m2 per day, 
potentially destroying over 1,000 
mines per day. 
On average (over both mine 
fields), KMS's teams are lifting and 
destroying one mine per 58 m2 of 
KMS cleared 421,000 m2 • By mid-July 
2000, the team had cleared a total of 
3,809,281 m2 of land and 65 , 185 
mines- one mine per 58 m2• By any 
standards, the current safety record of 
KMS is exceptional considering the 
conditions. 
• No "missed mines" have been reported 
by Bac Tee, which assesses 10 percent of 
the land cleared. The level of quality 
achieved under these conditions is very 
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:ontact Information 
Henry Thompson 
RHS Associates Ltd. 
33 Ludlow Way 
Finchley London N20JZ 
Tel: 44-208-444-3496 
Fax: 44-208-883-2399 
E-mail: henry@rhsassociates.co. uk 
"KMS was also strongly criticized for a high accident rate. From March to June 1999, 
12 accidents occurred. Over half of the accidents were incurred during excavation. The 
primary cause of one-third of these was attributed to management error, notably serious 
injuries from handling mines. 5 " 
ground. In the Cordon Sanitaire mine 
field, this broad average rises to one 
mine per 20m2• The mechanical team 
working in the center of the Cordon 
Sanitaire clears one mine per 12 m2 
on average-spot densities can be more 
than double this figure. 
Two things characterize the 
current clearance program: 
• The high density of mines and number 
of mines being cleared. In June 2000 , 
eferences 
1 Chris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Interview 
in Johannesburg, June 6, 2000. 
2 Alistair Craib, EU and Zimbabwe Ministry 
of Defence Consultant, Interview Feb. 6, 2000. 
3 Koch-Mine Safe was using Vallon detectors, 
fin e German detectors capable of h igh 
sensitivity- but more complex to use than 
many comparable models. The QA tearn was 
using British Guartel MD8 detectors, a robust 
and simple model. 
4 Temba Kanganga, Mine Safe, Depury Project 
Manager. The Road Forward: Humanitariart 
Mine Cleamnce in Southern Africa. SAIIA 
Johannesburg, August 6, 2000. 
5 Data from Andy Smith, DD!V database, April 
6, 2000 . 
Mine Detection Dogs At Work 
continued from page 87 
the [dogs') ability to detect plastic 
mines when metal detectors are 
ineffective is even more important." 
The Global Training Academy 
has the capacity to train 30-36 dogs 
per year in mine detection. In 200 I, 
18 dogs will be trained for deployment 
in Lebanon, Oman and Thailand . In 
addition, the Academy currently has 
dog teams working in ten countries: 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Bosnia, Costa 
Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Croatia, 
Namibia, Thailand and Afghanistan. 
T hese dog teams often work with the 
host country's military 1n m1ne 
clearance operations. 
Contact Information 
Dan Hayrer, Director 
Global Training Academy 
P.O. Box 445 
Somerset, TX 78069 
Tel: (21 0) 622-9460 
Fax: (830) 429-3122 
E-mail: Gtaden@aol.com 
M-Detect 
M-Detect, a mine dog training 
facility in Germany, specializes in 
training MODs for mine detection 
operations in mine-affected countries. 
Each year, M-Derect trains and 
deploys approximately eighr dogs. 
This year, MODs are being trained for 
deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia. Marrin Weitkamp, 
direcror ofM-Detect, said MODs are 
"an important parr of the international 
demining roolbox" if used as quality 
assurance in unknown areas. 
Weitkamp adds that dogs should not 
be used in a known mine field in place 
of deminers or demining machinery 
bur in unknown areas where sweeping 
the fields with an MOD is faster and 
more efficient. 
Contact Information 










MODs are an effective means for 
mine clearance operations worldwide. 
With proper training from mine dog 
companies and organizations, MODs 
employed in mine-infested countries 
return successful results. Their driven 
success continues ro be an asset to 
countries in rimes of need. • 
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• The t raining period ends with 
MDD leading the trainer. 
c/o Martin Weitkamp 
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The Direct Approach from Kosovo: 
Mine Awareness Education 
HMO Response's Philip Dive sees the inherent value in the direct approach in mine 
awareness training and urges the mine action community in Kosovo not to look past 
this approach. 
By Philip Dive. Senior Mine 
Awareness Educator 
C ollectively, the managers of mine aware ness educati on programs (MAEP) have 
helped rhe people ofKosovo focus on 
rhe mine threat through a compl ex 
web of approaches. These approaches 
include child-to-child , sold ier-to-
child , moth er- to-child, puppet 
theaters, road shows and summer days. 
Other MAEP ini tiatives utilize soccer 
p layers a nd mosque !ma ns as the 
messengers of mine awareness. Sti ll 
another program educates reachers 
about m ines in preparation for the 
arrival of mine awareness in school 
curriculums. All of rhe above programs 
have been accredited by the U.N . 
M ine Action Coordination Centre 
(UNMACC), and rogerher form one 
of the most comprehensive mine 
awareness packages in the world. 
Among a ll t hi s c reat ive, 
progressive and radical thinking, there 
may be the danger rhar rhe so-called 
"direct" app roach h as been made 
redundant in the ru sh for an 
" i nt e ract ive" MAEP. The direct 
approach simply explains rhe situation 
co ncerning nearby mine fields and 
offers advice on safe behavior to the 
adults of a community in the hope rhar 
they and their families can avoid these 
areas until demining agencies are able 
to clear them . 
While the initial estimates fo r 
landmine clearance in Kosovo 
predicted that UNMACC would be 
busy fo r many years, more recent 
studies lean toward a less pessimistic 
ou tlook , perhaps requiring only 
another year to clear the vast majority 
of mine fields. After January 200 I , ir 
is calcula t ed that o nly about 20 
percent of the known mine-affected 
areas wi ll remain. All of these locations 
are in rhe mountainous border areas. 
In Kosovo, the highest- risk groups 
tend to b e m en-usual ly you n g 
agricultural workers-who live non-
technical, rural lives. For this group 
AWARENESS TEAM 
the direct app roach is the on ly 
guaranteed way to exchange mine-
related informat ion and therefore 
should form the foundation for a 
national strategy. 
T his article acknowledges chat 
during the evolution of a MAEP the 
direct approach often lacked sensitivity 
ro local concerns, tended ro be "ad 
hoc " and offered no alternatives to 
help change people's risky behavio r. 
These concerns focus on the lack of 
man age men t during the early 
programs, ra ther rhan the innate 
potential of the direct approach itself. 
To be fair, though, any approach will 
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fail if poorly implemented. As for 
viabl e a lte rnat ives, I kn ow of no 
current program, direct or commu-
nity-based , rhar actually offers the 
people ofKosovo a sustainable second 
option that allows for a real change ro 
their dai ly mine-affected routine. 
T he MAEP presented by H MO 
Response in this art icle views the 
simplicity of the d irect approach to be 
of lasting importance because mine 
aware n ess docs not need to be 
complicated. Th e direct approach can 
demo nstra te a very high level of 
awareness of local conditions and can 
be swi ft to im plemen t. W ith 
competent management, the direct 
approach ca n also be easy to 
administer, control and evaluate. 
THE DIRECT APPJDACH-A 
MAEP OUTLINE 
Program location 
HMO Respon se's MAEP is 
located in the MunicipalityofDragash 
in the south of Kosovo. Dragash is 
linguistically, politically and culturally 
divided into two pans. Irs' 34,000 
residents are divided into the Albanian 
speaki ng majority residing in 19 
villages ro the north (an area called 
Opoja) and t he n o n-Alban ian 
speaking minority (the Goranis) who 
live in 19 villages to the south. Within 
the mountains that surround D ragash, 
many of which reach altitudes of up 
ro 2,500 meters, these 3 8 villages 
coexist with few points of contact 
ocher than their faith in the Koran. 
Purpose 
HMO Response MAEP exists to 
help the people ofOpoja and Gora to 
avoid becoming casualties of mines 
and UXO throu gh education, 
awareness and other relevant 
informacion. 
Structure 
The program consists of four elements: 
1. Informacion Center 
2. Village Mine Education T earns 
3. C learance Information Liaison 
4. Mine Awareness Truck 
Activities 
Static Display: 
Provide a static UXO and mine 
display for the public to visit at any 
rime. 
!MSMAMaps: 
Inform the public of known UXO 
and mine locations. 
Dangerous Area Reports: 
Process UXO and mine information 
provided by members of the public. 
MateriaLs: 
Design, test and produce additional 
and appropriate UXO and mine 
awareness materials. 
Establish dialogue: 
Talk with president and/or religious 
leader. 
Data Gathering: 
Compile a questionnaire to find our 
the local level of mine awareness. 
Group Presentation: 
A 25-minute formal presentation. 
Mingle: 
A three-hour village visit stopping 
people in the street /coffee bars to 
discuss the mine si tuation. 
Liaison: 
Visit demining operations. 
Information Exchange: 
Help both the demining organization 
and the public with the exchange of 
mine related information. 
UNMACC: 
Com pletion of UNMACC forms 
clarifying public awareness of 
clearance operations close to their 
homes. 
Maintain Public Interest: 
Use a 4-ton truck as a large mobile 
platform from which mine related 
information is offered to the public. 
T he truck is parked at sports events, 
market places and busy road junctions. 
Curnculum 
Through the four program elements 
the public should be able to do the 
following as a result of the HMO 
Respomse MAEP: 
Respond to the mine/UXO threat: 
• Be able to recognize dangerous areas 
through warning clues. 
• Be able ro recognize mine fields 
through the presence of warning 
stgns. 
• Be able to take appropriate action 
From 38 villages, 600 mine awareness 
quesionnaires were collected for 
program evaluation purposes. This w ill 
be repeated in May 2001 as an 
indicator of the program's impact . 
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The Direct Approach from Kosovo 
after real izing that you are in a mine 
fi eld. 
Understand safe behavior: 
• Understand that the best solution is 
to stay our of mined areas. 
• Understand that safe paths must be 
used at all times. 
• Understand chat mines and UXO 
must nor be touched. 
• Be able to recognize above ground 
and below ground mines. 
• Be able to recognize cluster bombs 
and grenades. 
• Be able to recognize ammunition, 
fuses and rockets. 
Know the local mine field situation: 
• Know the agencies that are demining 
Dragash. 
• Know rhe locations of mine fields in 
Opoja and Gora. 
• Know that mine warning signs must 
be left in place. 
• Know chat clearance is a slow and 
dangerous activity. 
Management 
The above results are implemented via 
three sequential objectives: 
tl 
I. Organize, equip and train a specific 
team for a public information program 
in the Dragash Municipality. 
2. Implement a public information 
program that is focused on MAE to the 
many communities within Dragash. 
3. To depart from Dragash in an 
organized and planned manne r 
ensuring char, where possible, non-
technical tangible assets are disposed 
of in the best possible way. 
Each objective has associated 
performance indicators chat are tested 
by the director of HMO Response 
during his three planned visits to the 
program. T hese verification visits are 
copied to our donor. 
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Team Size 
The program employs the following: 
Position Nationality 
Kosovo Programme English 
Manager 
MAEP Coordinator English 
Opoja Team Leader Albanian 
Gora Team Leader Bosnian 
Opoja Team: 
MAE Teacher Albanian 
MAE Teacher Albanian 
MAE Teacher Albanian 
/Turkish 
Gora Team: 
MAE Teacher Go rani 
MAE Teacher Go rani 
MAE Teacher Go rani 
Artist Go rani 
Cemer cleaner Gorani 
Guard Albanian 
Guard Albanian 
T he two MAE teams deploy under the 
supervision of their ream leaders. From 
Dragash the teams go to their areas to 
undertake the sequential tasks shown 
below. Each village has irs own file and 
as the tasks are completed within each 
location, the rel evant boxes are 
checked off. A task can be repeated 
several times if deemed necessary by 
the team leader. The MAEP 
coordinator monitors the teams 
through unannounced visits through-
out the week. 






6. Truck visit 
? .Clearance briefing 
HMD Response mine awareness coordinator formal presentation. HMD Response teachers 
demonstrate parts of packing boxes in a village from the Opaja area. 
In addition to this simple program 
structure, four more complex issues are 
now addressed: political awareness, 
local capacity building, clearance 
integration and program evaluation. 
These have been chosen because they 
are areas of weakness often associated 
with MAEPs, irrespective of the 
chosen approach. 
~olitical Awareness 
Since the conflict touched 
Dragash there has been a steady 
outflow of Goranis. This is due to 
security concerns followin g their 
suspected compliance with the Kosovo 
Serbs, and for economic reasons as 
they are becoming increasingly 
isolated and economically limited. 
T he Albanian border to the west 
also adds to security concerns as cross-
border smuggling of guns, drugs and 
girls has become a viable source of 
income to many entrepreneurial 
villagers who have a love- hate 
relationship with the new U.N.-
financed administration. 
UNMACC was concerned that 
many NGOs working in the south were 
recrui ting mine awareness trainers that 
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were exclusively Albanian. Not surpris-
ingly, irs delivery of MAE in whatever 
form was biased towards the Albanian 
majority. This situation had become 
unacceptable within a U.N. adminis-
tration that promotes equal access to 
information and human rights to all the 
citizens ofKosovo. HMD Response was 
tasked with remedying this imbalance 
within the Oragash Municipality. One 
option was to recruit Goranis and tar-
get only the Gorani villages. However, 
this would have been a mistake as we 
considered a neutral position to be borh 
politically correct and physically safer. 
A bener solution was to run two teams 
alongside each other- a team of Alba-
nians and a team ofGoranis. Although 
two teams ensured our neutrality and 
guaranteed access to all the communi-
ties across Dragash, ir did raise the po-
tential for internal conflicts within our 
own organization. In part because of 
the following actions that we rook at 
the very start of our program, we expe-
rienced few conflicts: 
• Integration with other neutral 
agencies. 
Advice was requested and noted 
from the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
prior to the selection and training of 
local staff. The OSCE field office was 
asked to help us recruit sui cable people 
from both the Albanian and Gorani 
communities. Also, ocher agencies 
were given the opportunity to make 
recommendations, such as the Red 
Cross, HANDIKOS and the Balkan 
Peace Team. Through these liaisons, 
HMO Response was able to obtain the 
support of organizations chat were 
already respected by both communi-
nes. 
• Location of the program office. 
After long negotiations with the 
Oragash U.N. Administered Council, 
HMO Response was allocated office 
space within the municipal 
administrative building of the 
education department. Located in the 
same corrido r as the director for 
education, we can be clearly observed 
working alongside the existing civil 
structu res of the municipality. The 
town of Oragash is also the political 
and economic focus for both 
Albanians and Goranis, so any other 
location, be it to the north or south of 
Oragash, would have been totally 
unacceptable. 
• English as a core office language. 
All the teachers passed an English 
test before being recruited, allowing 
our office to be an English only area. 
T his ensures that everyone 
understands all the discussions and 
that no single linguistic group can 
dominate the proceedings. This also 
eliminates the need to use interpreters 
in the office, helping the international 
staff assess developments quickly. 
• Mine awareness materials. 
In keeping with earlier observa-
tions, the vast majority of posters 
produced within Kosovo are written 
only in Albanian. For rhe Gora team 
it was necessary to translate existing 
posters into local languages. 
• Mobile displays. 
When using our 4-ton truck as a 
mobile platform for mine awareness 
education in the multi-ethnic town of 
Dragash, it is necessary to deploy 
representatives from both reams at the 
same time. This is important to ensure 
that both communities feel they have 
equal access to m ine-relared infor-
mation. It is encouraging to observe 
our teachers openly working alongside 
each other, mixing and reaching across 
ethnic groups. The local representa-
tives ofOSCE and the U.N. admini-
stration have praised their example. 
• Avoidance of political rallies. 
We plan our visits schedule 
several weeks in advance and try hard 
to stick to our program. Often, 
however, political gatherings some-
rimes clash with our visits. When a 
clash occurs, the teams are under strict 
instructions to leave the village and 
return to the office. This avoids any 
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unintentional association with a 
political party. 
The two teams have learned tO 
work together and provide a good 
example to those who continue to 
express pessimism about the future of 
a culturally divided Kosovo. Within 
their own communities they are 
communicating effectively and 
ensuring that mine awaren ess 
education can take place without any 
unnecessary political/ ethnic dis-
trac tions. This has been achieved 
because we approached th e two 
communities in a manner appropriate 
co their situations and retained our 
sense of balance. 
While other direct approach 
MAEPs may have lost their sense of 
balance, HMO Response has been 
very careful not tO do so. This suggests 
that failure to be politically sensitive 
is a fault of program managers, rather 
than an inherent flaw in the direct 
approach itself. 
ocal Capacity Building 
As a part of the former Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo's education, training and 
management style was summed up by 
the Soviet doctrine "order is preferable 
A 4-ton truck is 
used as a mine 
awareness 
platform and focal 
point in town 
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to change because change infers a 
risk." Many agencies in Kosovo, both 
large and small, usher in well meaning 
albeit fundamentally new ways of 
working immediately upon arrival in 
Kosovo. To ensure "appropriateness" 
and to aid local capacity building, local 
staff are quickJy hired, trained and 
returned to rheir local communities 
with progressive methodologies that 
may or may not be fully undersrood 
either by the staff or the recipient 
communities. The lack of employ-
ment opportunities and the cultural 
acceptance of the all-knowing "boss" 
will ensure that teaching takes place 
even if learning does not result. 
To its credit, the direct approach 
is immediately transparent to suspi-
cious people who are in a state of total 
upheaval, where change is frightening 
and Western organizations are slow to 
reveal their funding and possibly their 
hidden agendas. All too often, those 
who criticize the direct approach's lack 
of sensitivity miss a far deeper con-
cept-gaining the trust and respect of 
the local population by giving them 
the information they want in a man-
ner that they recognize as agenda-free. 
For HMD Response, the direct 
approach has enabled strong-minded 
international members of staff to 
quickly establish an ordered 
program that is objective-led, 
tightly focused and immedi-
ately understood by the local 
members of staff. From this 
starting point local members 
of staff feel confident ro take 
some responsibility within a 
highly structured program 
that they are able to culturally 
endorse. The positions of 
team leaders and that of office 
The technical supervisor for 
the charity HELP briefs the 
awareness teams from HMD 
Response on the location 
and types of mine fields 
along the Albanian border. 
managers were not advertised, but 
rather internally appointed from the 
initial mine awareness education 
teachers within our own pool. The 
professional growth of the team leaders 
and the office manger in the second 
half of our program is a mutually 
beneficial, realistic "capacity building" 
goal. These three individuals will very 
soon be running the program for short 
periods in the absence of the two 
international managers who will be 
needed to assess other proposals for 
MAEPs. 
Concepts like authority, autono-
my and trust are all inexplicably 
contained within the concept of 
capacity building and they are 
achieved slowly with very small steps. 
Random MAEPs, typically with only 
12 months of funding, cannot expect 
to have the impact of long term 
developmental agencies such as 
Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) or 
the Peace Corps, who hope to observe 
local human resource advances over a 
period of two or three decades. If any 
capacity building can occur within 
short, isolated MAEPs, it would 
probably be an improvement of 
existing methods, rather than newly 
developed teaching methods. 
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~learance Integration 
Mine clearance and mtne 
awareness must be integrated. 
Agencies that work in the same 
geographic areas on these activities 
need to talk to each other, exchange 
information and follow agreed upon 
procedures to ensure that the local 
people are given every opportunity to 
stay safe. HMD Response has been 
able ro establish a good relationship 
with the clearance companies working 
in the south of Kosovo for the 
following reasons: 
• HMD Response prioritizes work that 
relates to assisting clearance 
operations. UNMACC procedures 
insist that clearance operations require 
mine awareness be undertaken in 
nearby villages before, during and after 
the demining has taken place. For 
HMD Response, these villages 
immediately become the main focus 
of our activities and due to the 
simplistic nature of our approach, we 
can react within hours of being 
informed of a new clearance operation. 
Also, the rapid checking and 
processing of "Dangerous Area 
Reports" that are received from the 
villagers are given rop priority. In both 
cases, we try to emphasize a service 
philosophy. 
• HMD Response invited demining 
agencies to help in our training course 
for local staff. Deminers and medical 
teams from demining companies 
within our area taught our awareness 
teams about the technical aspects of 
their work, which was followed up by 
several educational visits to clearance 
operations. When information 
concerning a clearance operation is 
gathered for a village briefing, we 
encourage our teams to talk directly 
with the deminers in order to prevent 
any misunderstanding. The cross 
checking of IMSMA maps is now a 
standard procedure. This physically 
puts our staff alongside the deminers 
and alongside the mine fields. Without 
such visits, our credibility with the 
demining companies and the local 
people would be lost. 
In short, HMD Response is 
implementing a program that 
clearance agencies can relate ro very 
easily. Deminers rend to view the 
direct approach as a clear and simple 
way to deal with a clear and simple 
problem- a view that HMD 
Response in Kosovo accepts. 
Evaluation 
In each village about 20 adult 
interviews are carried our before any 
MAE teaching occurs to better 
understand the aptitudes and previous 
knowledge of locals. The interview 
subjects are always asked if they wish 
to be interviewed and no attempt is 
made to challenge those who decline. 
A trained member ofHMD Response 
staff is present throughout the entire 
interview. The questionnaire forms the 
basis of the discussion, and the 
questions are read out slowly and 
clearly and repeated as often as the 
subject requests. The interviewer is 
allowed to explain the questions to the 
interviewee if necessary. The 
interviewer checks the appropriate 
responses as the discussion takes place. 
At the end of the discussion, the 
interviewer shows the completed 
questionnaire sheet ro the interviewee 
and checks that the answers are a fair 
reflection of the interviewee's 
responses. If the interviewee has made 
mistakes, then those questions are 
discussed again and, where necessary, 
HMD Response staff will explain the 
reasons for the corrected answers. 
Prior ro going inro the villages, 
HMD Response staff practiced their 
interviews with OSCE staff members 
at its NGO Resource Centre in 
Prizren. These practice sessions served 
to check and modify the draft 
questionnaire; ensure that HMD 
Response staff understood the need to 
explain any corrections to the 
interviewees after the interview; and 
to adjust rhe approaches and styles of 
all the interviewers so that they 
presented the questions in a similar 
manner. 
The final questionnaire was 
carefully prepared in English, 
Albanian and Gorani. See AnnexA for 
the English version. 
Every village in the Dragash 
Municipality has now been visited and 
600 interviews have been recorded. 
The results have been analyzed and are 
displayed in our information center in 
Dragash. 
In May 200 I, HMD Response 
staff will return to these villages and 
undenake the same number of 
interviews using the same 
questionnaire in order to make a 
before and after comparison. The 
outcome of this comparison will form 
the basis of a report rhat will evaluate 
rhe effectiveness of our MAE teaching. 
To organize 600 interviews in 38 
different villages requires good 
management and far-sighted vision, 
something that UNICEF and the 
Landmine Monitor have both recently 
recommended for all MAEPs. 
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:onclusion 
All MAEP approaches have a 
place within the mine action toolkit, 
and no single approach can offer all 
the answers to every situation. 
However, if managed well, the direct 
approach can make an important 
contribution. 
In Kosovo, the direct approach 
can be used even when the normal 
routines of children and adults are 
disrupted. It also has the potential to 
reach high-risk groups, in this case 
young men and adult agricultural 
workers, who do not typically interact 
in conventional social structures. 
The direct approach should not 
be disregarded because it appears to 
be roo easy, too cheap and too 
simplistic. If a good Needs Assessment 
exercise leads to the outcome that a 
direct approach will be the most 
effective and efficient solution for a 
particular landmine problem, then a 
direct approach should be utilized and 
respected as a reliable commonsense 
approach. 
This article has been written to 
give the direct approach renewed 
credibility at a rime when many 
MAEP managers may be opting for 
unnecessary, albeit innovative, 
complexity in mine action. • 
:ontact Information 
Philip Dive 




Chief Executive, HMD Response 
23 Pembridge Square 
London W2 4DR 
Tel: +20 7229 7447 
Fax: +20 7229 3434 
All photos courtesy of the author. 
65
JOURNAL: The Journal of Mine Action Issue 5.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2001
Asia & the Pacific 
Annex A: 
H\1D Rec;ponse MAEP QLES I IONNAIRE 
1. Age 
a) 16-24 
b) 25- 34 
c) 35 - 44 
d) 45- 54 
e) 55 - 64 
f) 65 plus 
2. Home village: _____ _ 
3. Sex: Male I Female 
4. Please describe the signs that are put on either 
wires or on poles to warn people of an area that 
contains landmines. (interviewer ticks as 
appropriate) 
a) No Idea 
b) Red Triangle 
c) Skull and crossed bones 
d) VJ sign with "Mine" painted on wood. 
e) White, yellow, red rape 
f) More than one sign described 
g) There are no mine signs 
5. Please list the possible clues I items that may 
help you to realize that you have ventured into a 
dangerous mined area. (interviewer checks as 
appropriate) 
1. Exposed mine 
2. Trip wire 
3. Fuses 
4. Safety pins 
5. Mounds and hollows 
6. Bullet casings 
7. Dead animals 
8. Packing boxes 
9. Military cloth ing 
6. How many times have you been educated 
about the threat of mines by professional mines 




c) three rimes 
d) four times 
e) five times 
f) more 
g) never 
7. Have you observed I studied a map that shows you 




8. If you have unfortunately walked into a mine field 
please select that best action to take. (interviewer ticks 
as appropriate) 
a) Slowly and carefully re-trace your steps. 
b) Stay still, warn others and call for help. 
c) Find a long stick to check the ground and slowly 
find a safe route out. 
d) Run very fast back the way you came into the 
minefield. 
9. If you find an item that you do not recognize but 
guess that it is maybe something that was left by a 
person within the military, probably during the 
conflict, what is the best action to take? (interviewer 
checks as appropriate) 
a) Remember irs location and tell UNMIK police 
or KFOR. 
b) Pick ir up and take it to UNMIK police or 
KFOR. 
c) Just leave it and forget about ir. 
d) Pick it up and show your friends who served in 
the military and rry to find out what it is. 
10. In this area the problem of landmines is which of 
the following: 
a) A big problem 
b) A problem 
c) A small problem 
d) No problem 
U.S. Office of GHD 
U.S. Office of Global Humanitarian Demining 
Works Toward Demining 2010 Goals 
Since 1994, the United States has committed approximately $400 million to worldwide 
humanitarian demining efforts. With its sights set on 2010, the U.S. Office of Global 
Humanitarian Demining is working to establish partnerships in the private sector. 
By Elizabeth Cramer, MAIC 
T he United States has long been committed to the universally shared vision to rid the earth of the threat oflandmines. On Nov. 28, 
2000, U.S. Special Representative of rhe 
President and Secretary of State for Global 
Humanitarian Demining Donald K. 
Steinberg addressed the U.N. General 
Assembly, outlining U.S. Global 
Humanitarian Demining (G HD) plans for 
2001. The plans include nearly $I 00 million 
(U.S.) in funding for rhe upcoming year, and 
continued work with over 36 nations toward the 
goal of making the world "mine safe" for civilians 
by rhe end of this decade. The address was a 
continuation of the U.S. "Deminin g 20 I 0 Initiative," first 
announced in 1997. 
Demining 2010 Initiative 
On O cr. 31, 1997, former Secretary of Stare Madeline 
Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
jointly announced President Clinton's "Demining 2010 
Initiative," with the goal of creating a mine safe world by 
the year 2010. The initiative was created in response to 
the severe threat to civilians posed by landmines. In 1997, 
it was estimated that I 00 million landmines in over 64 
countries cause about 26,000 casualties per year. The goal 
of the 2010 Initiative is to accelerate demining efforts, 
increase international coordination, and increase public and 
private resources dedicated to demining. 
The initiative included several elements. The first 
element of the initiative was rhe appointment of a Special 
Representative of the President and Secretary of State for 
GHD and the creation of the Office of the Special 
Representative to oversee the 2010 Initiative. One element 
was a conference held in Washington D.C. in May 1998, 
ro develop specific goals and strategies for achieving the 
initiative. The most obvious element was rhe continuation 
of U.S. funding, with the United States commirting $80 
million for 1998, a two-fold increase from its $40 million 
in contributions in 1997. The final element was to 
encourage and support public-private partnerships to 
augment government and international organization 
activity. 
Creation of GHD 
The Office of the Special Representative for GHD 
and the new position of special representative of th e 
president and secretary of stare for GHD were established 
in October 1997, with the announcement of the Demining 
2010 Initiative. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs Karl F. lnderfurth was assigned as the first special 
representative. 
T he position of special representative was designed to 
provide the international demining community with a 
coordinator to bring together donors, deminers, landmine 
accident survivors and mine victims with governments, 
international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector 
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HMO Re~ponse MAEP QUESIIONNAIRF 
1. Age 
a) 16- 24 
b) 25- 34 
c) 35-44 
d) 45- 54 
e) 55 - 64 
f) 65 plus 
2. Home village: _____ _ 
3. Sex: Male I Female 
4. Please describe the signs that are put on either 
wires or on poles to warn people of an area that 
contains landmines. (interviewer ticks as 
appropriate) 
a) No Idea 
b) Red Triangle 
c) Skull and crossed bones 
d) VJ sign with "Mine" painted on wood. 
e) White, yellow, red tape 
f) More than one sign described 
g) There are no mine signs 
5. Please list the possible clues I items that may 
help you to realize that you have ventured into a 
dangerous mined area. (interviewer checks as 
appropriate) 
l. Exposed mine 
2. Trip wire 
3. Fuses 
4. Safety pins 
5. Mounds and hollows 
G. Bullet casings 
7. Dead animals 
8. Packing boxes 
9. Military clothing 
G. How many times have you been educated 
about the threat of mines by professional mines 




c) three times 
d) four times 
e) five times 
f) more 
g) never 
7. Have you observed I studied a map that shows you 




8. If you have unfortunately walked into a mine field 
please select that best action to take. (interviewer ticks 
as appropriate) 
a) Slowly and carefully re-trace your steps. 
b) Stay still, warn others and call for help. 
c) Find a long stick to check the ground and slowly 
find a safe route out. 
d) Run very fast back the way you came into the 
minefield. 
9. If you fmd an item that you do not recognize but 
guess that it is maybe something that was left by a 
person within the military, probably during the 
conflict, what is the best action to take? (interviewer 
checks as appropriate) 
a) Remember irs location and tell UNMIK police 
or KFOR. 
b) Pick it up and rake it to UNM IK police or 
KFOR. 
c) Just leave it and forget about it. 
d) Pick it up and show your friends who served in 
the military and try to find out what it is. 
10. In this area the problem of landmines is which of 
the following: 
a) A big problem 
b) A problem 
c) A small problem 
d) No problem 
U.S. Office of GHD 
U.S. Office of Global Humanitarian Demining 
Works Toward Demining 2010 Goals 
Since 1994, the United States has committed approximately $400 million to worldwide 
humanitarian demining efforts. With its sights set on 2010, the U.S. Office of Global 
Humanitarian Demining is working to establish partnerships in the private sector. 
By Elizabeth Cramer, MAJC 
T he United States has long been committed to the universally shared vision to rid the earth of the threat oflandmines. On Nov. 28, 
2000, U.S. Special Representative of the 
President and Secretary of State for Global 
Human itarian D emi ning Donald K. 
Steinberg addressed the U.N. General 
Assem bly, outlining U .S. Global 
Humanitarian Demining (GHD) plans for 
200 1. The plans include nearly $100 million 
(U.S.) in funding for the upcoming year, and 
continued work with over 3G nations toward the 
goal of making the world "mine safe" for civilians 
by the end of this decade. The address was a 
continuation of the U.S. "Demining 2010 Initiative," first 
announced in 1997. 
Demining 2010 Initiative 
On Oct. 31, 1997, former Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright and former Secretary of D efense William Cohen 
jointly announced President Clinton's "Demining 2010 
Initiative," with the goal of creating a mine safe world by 
the year 2010. The initiative was created in response to 
the severe threat to civilians posed by landmines. In 1997, 
it was estimated that 100 million landmines in over G4 
countries cause about 2G,OOO casualties per year. The goal 
of the 2010 Initiative is to accelerate demining efforts, 
increase international coordination, and increase public and 
private resources dedicated to demining. 
The initiative included several elements. The first 
element of the initiative was the appointment of a Special 
Representative of the President and Secretary of State for 
G HD and the creation of the Office of the Special 
Representative to oversee the 2010 Initiative. One element 
was a conference held in Washington D .C. in May 1998, 
to develop specific goals and strategies for achieving the 
initiative. The most obvious element was the continuation 
of U.S . funding, with the United States committing $80 
million for 1998, a two-fold increase from its $40 million 
in contributions in 1997. The final element was to 
encourage and support public-private partnerships to 
augment government and international organization 
activity. 
:reation of GHD 
The Office of the Special Representative for GHD 
and the new position of special representative of the 
president and secretary of state for GHD were established 
in October 1997, wirh the announcement of the Demining 
2010 Initiative. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth was assigned as the first special 
representative. 
The position of special representative was designed to 
provide the international demining community with a 
coordinator to bring together donors, deminers, landmine 
accident survivors and mine victims with governments, 
international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector 
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to improve the effecriveness of the global humanitarian 
demining effort. 
The Special Representative's primary responsibility is 
to coordinate and lead the 20 l 0 Initiative. This is achieved 
by working with other nations and organizations to 
coordinate and accelerate international demining efforts. 
The Special Representative also works to increase the 
public and private resources dedicated to identifying and 
clearing mines, promote public awareness about mines, and 
improve the means of detecting and removing mines. 
GHD Mission Statement 
The Office of the Special Representative for G HD 
seeks to create conditions that will eliminate the threat of 
landmines to civilians around the world by the year 2010 . 
The office supports efforts in the U.S. and abroad to 
accelerate landmine detection and clearance programs, 
promote landmine awareness in affected nations, assist 
survivors of landmine accidents, enhance research and 
development of new demining technologies, and develop 
public-private partnerships to support these programs 
(From the Office of the Special Representative of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of Scare for Global Humanitarian 
Demining). 
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:iHD Objectives 
The objectives of GHD are achieved through the 
combined efforts of U.S. government agencies, foreign 
governments, nongovernmental agencies, private corporations, 
international agencies and the United Nations. The ultimate 
goals are to empower mine-affected countries to assume their 
own leadership over mine action programs and to speed the 
pace of demining. 
The goals ofG HD depend upon partnerships with the 
private sector and the availability of adequate resources from 
appropriated U.S. funds. While, contriburions have already 
been made to mine action by corporations, NGOs, 
philanthropic foundations, civic foundations, educational 
institutions and other private groups, public-private 
partnerships are needed both presently and for the future to 
speed the demining efforts. 
Ambassador Steinberg's Recent Address 
On Nov. 28, 2000, rhe current special representative, 
Ambassador Steinberg, addressed the U .N . General As-
sembly with an update on the progress in the fight against 
landmines. Ambassador Steinberg reassured the audience 
that the United Scare s is pleased to support the effort to 
reduce the danger of over 70,000 land mines that threaten 
individuals and the peace, democracy, and national recon-
ciliation of one-third of the world's nations. He outlined 
GHD's progress since 1997 . Since then, the United Scare s 
has destroyed 3.3 million landmincs. In 1997, rhe coun-
try unilaterally banned the export and transfer of APLs, 
and by 2003 it will end the use of all APLs outside Korea. 
Ambassador Steinberg also stated that the Unit ed States i  
seeking alternatives to landmines. The United States has 
committed to joining the Ottawa Treaty by 2006 if effec-
tive alternatives can be found and deployed by char time. 
H e stated that the United Scares is currently working 
with more chan 36 nations in mine clearance, mine 
awareness education and mine clearance training. Although 
the programs cake place worldwide, the largest programs 
are in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Central 
America, Laos, Mozambique, and Rwanda. The United 
States is using the best scientific talent available to identify 
new demining and clearance techniques. GHD continues 
to advise and support mine action centers such as the 
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) and James Madison University's Mine Action 
Information Center. 
In his speech, Ambassador Steinberg also outlined 
some of the exciting efforts of GHD to help establish 
public-private partnerships to support the Demining 20 l 0 
Initiative. The United Nations Association of the USA's 
(UNA-USA) Adopt-A-Minefield program generates private 
contriburions to de mine the 100 worst mine fields in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique, 
in coordination with Ted Turner's U.N. Foundation. The 
U.N. Foundation is also supporting the Survey Action 
Center to produce mine surveys of a dozen countries. DC 
Comics created more than 1 million mine awareness comic 
books for children in Bosnia, Central America and Kosovo. 
An especially exciting operation is the joint effort of the 
Marshall Legacy Institute and the Humpty Dumpty 
Institute to purchase, train, and deploy mine detecting dogs 
worldwide, including a dog team recently sent to Lebanon. 
Wheelchairs for the World is helping disabled people regain 
mobility throughout the world. 
GHD Efforts m 2000 
Besides spearheading efforts to promote private-public 
partnersh ips, Ambassador Steinberg worked to raise 
domestic awareness of the landmine issue. In December 
2000, he addressed over 600 high school students from 27 
schools at the 17th Prince William Model United Nations 
Conference ar C.D. Hylton Senior High Schoolin 
Woodbridge, Va. In his speech tided "Humanitarian 
Demining: To Walk the Earth in Safety," Steinberg 
described U .S. and U.N. mine clearance efforts. The 
conference was designed for students to model actual 
foreign delegations to the United Nations in attempt to 
address world issues through diplomacy, debate, negotiation 
and parliamentary procedure. 
An ongoing partnership arranged by the special 
representative between the U .S. Department of State and 
Roots of Peace, a California-based NGO, has evolved into 
a new mine awareness campaign. Passengers of public 
transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area are now seeing 
bright orange advertisements with the message "What if 
landmines were in the USA?" The signs are designed co 
provoke commuters to imagine the effects of landmines 
and provide information about how they can participate 
in making the Balkans mine-safe through Roots of Peace 
and the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining 
and Mine Victim Assistance. 
The District of Columbia Students Against Landmines 
(DC SALaaM) Project was created in January 2000 as part 
ofTed Turner's U.N. Foundation outreach program to the 
District. This project incorporates the UNA-USA Adopt-
A-Minefield Program. On Nov. 16, 2000, Ambassador 
Steinberg was the keynote speaker at Bell Multicultural 
High School to helplaunch DC SALaaM's campaign to 
raise funds to clear a mine field in Mozambique. The 
U.S. Office of GHD 
ambassador shared his experiences in Angola and Kosovo, 
where he saw firsthand the effects oflandmines on civilians. 
Two Texas chapters of the UNA-USA also launched drives 
to clear select mine fields in Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
part ofUNA-USA's Adopt-A-Minefield program. On Sept. 
21, 2000, Ambassador Steinberg was a keynote speaker at 
the GHD conference held by the Austin Chapter of UNA-
USA to promote public awareness for humanitarian 
demining, particularly to "adopt" a mine field in the village 
of Praca, Bosnia and Herzegovina. T he Ambassador then 
proceeded ro help the Houston Chapter launch its Adopt-
A-Minefield drive to clear another mined area in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. He also spoke at four schools while in 
Texas. The ambassador and GHD cominue to plan evems 
to promote public awareness of the landmine problem. 
GHD Plans for 2001 
Since former President C limon's 1994 call to the 
United Nations to eliminate the threat of landmines, the 
U.S government has donated about $400 million to 
humanitarian mine action efforts worldwide. In his address 
to the U.N. General Assembly, Steinberg announced that 
the United Stares is committed ro conrinue support through 
the provision of approximately $100 million in 2001. 
As 2001 gets underway, GHD is working with Warner 
Brothers on a pilot project for public service announce-
ments using animated Looney Tunes characters combined 
with real footage from mine affected countries. The purpose 
is to foster greater mine awareness among threatened 
populations, particularly children, and to demonstrate that 
mine victims continue to be valued citizens. 
Following up on Ambassador Steinberg's public 
outreach in Texas last summer, G HD is now working with 
a consortium of leading citizens from Austin to galvanize 
that city's practical support for mine action overseas. 
Through these and other efforts the GHD strives to build 
public-private partnerships to support the Demining 2010 
Initiative and to create a mine-safe world for all. • 
~ontact Information 
John Stevens 
Office of the Special Representative for Global 
Humanitarian Demining 
Tel: (202) 647-0676 
Fax: (202) 647-2465 
E-mail: stevensje@r.state.gov 
Website: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/pm/hdp 
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A Model for Other Global Challenges? 
A FEW SHORT YEARS AGO the humanitarian 
demining task seemed insurmountable. Not only was 
the prospect of eliminating landmines as a global 
threat deemed unachievable, but the political and or-
ganizational landscape was new, diverse and un-
charted. 
A Brave New, and Complicated, World 
Humanitarian demining, if not a new phenom-
ena, was new ro a global community which had only 
just shed its Cold War cloak and was trying to cope 
with emerging regional threats to stability, indepen-
dence movements, c ivil warfare, refugee surges, fac-
tional antagonisms and border challenges. The orga-
nizations involved in demining were as varied as the 
kinds oflandmines and UXO, which dotted the land-
scapes of so me 60 threatened countries. Newly 
formed, bm highly motivated and effective NGOs 
such as Halo Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, and the 
Mines Actions Group (MAG) were soon joined by 
other NGOs, for-profit corporations, international 
organizations, mil itary task forces, donor nations and 
concerned individuals. 
The problem was that such diverse organizations, 
performing a plethora of what we now call mine ac-
tion functions, were engaged all over the world in an 
uncoordinated and sometimes dysfunctional process. 
Everybody wanted to do well, bur there was no co-
ordinating mechanism to maximize, integrate, record, 
implement and evaluate overall p lans and operations. 
Even worse, the modus operand i of these various or-
ganizations rarely brought them into contact wi th 
congruent organizations. Whatever cooperative glo-
bal, regional, or concerted eff orcs were devised had 
to be engineered with little precedent and even less 
authority. 
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The Success of the Humanitarian Demining 
Model 
What has happened in the past five years has 
been just short of a political miracle. Out of the chaos 
of many individual organizations just trying to "do 
good" has emerged a community of humanitarian 
mine action activists and operators which has collec-
tively, professionally, and quietly created what may 
be a model for other international efforrs. 
The newly assigned Director of th e U.N. Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS), Martin Barber, observed 
this new state of affairs in his address to the Fourrh 
International Meeting of Mine Action Directors in 
Geneva on Feb. 5, 200 I. Having the perspective of 
one "return ing to the vineyard," he remarked upon 
the extraordinary cooperation of many groups and the 
seamless nature of operations as a matter of course 
in mine action today. 
I must admit to some shock at hearing that ob-
servat ion, and yet it rook me only a few moments' 
reflection to real ize that he was absolutely correct. 
Having been involved in th is issue from 1994, !-
like many others immersed in the challenges and ev-
eryday stickiness of demining issues- had failed to 
appreciate the great organizational, operational, man-
agement, and informational strides which have char-
acterized this great cause in the recent past. It is worth 
the time to catalog some of the great, but perhaps 
unnoticed trends, which have emerged and become 
part of this process. 
10 Innovative Approaches to Mine Action 
Conftrences and Workshops. T he acceptance of a 
new challenge dictated that a series of conferences, 
seminars, and workshops, needed to be held to both 
frame the challenges of demining and to get to know 
the players. As a result of an aggressive schedule of 
such meetings, many partnerships, all iances, d ialogs, 
concerns and plans for action have resulted. These 
gatherings have targeted various demining groups, 
functions and issues, and have become "real-time" 
clearinghouses for ideas and "next steps" and have 
often framed such hot demining topics as the use of 
mine detecting dogs, geographical systems require-
ments , donor concerns, standards, management 
questions, etc. It is this kind offorum, which has fos-
tered the trust and camaraderie, that has become a 
hallmark of the mine action community. 
UN. Leadership. Several U.N. agencies, such as 
UNDP, UNOPS, UNHCR , UNICEF, UNDPKO 
and WHO, have an abiding interest in mine action. 
Over the past several years these organizations, work-
ing with the U.N. agency specifically charged with 
the comprehensive oversight of mine action-
UNMAS-have coordinated their eff orcs and facil i-
tated a structured and organized U.N. approach to 
meeting the entire scope of landmine-relared chal-
lenges. 
Advocacy Groups. While the "anti-personnel 
landmine ban" organizations are often recognized for 
their devotion to advocacy, they have also been very 
active in supporting humanitarian demining, mine 
awareness and victim assistance projects. Besides per-
forming ground breaking survey and database work, 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
through the publication of its monumental Landmine 
Monitor Report, has produced an invaluable resource 
relied upon by the entire mine action community. 
R&D. One of the most frustrating aspects of 
mine clearance is the lack of what has been called the 
"silver buller" solution to the problem. Perhaps a 
greater challenge is that the market and procurement 
path for tech nologies designed for humanitarian ap-
p lications are murky. Despite the difficulties, how-
ever, many donor nations have developed creative 
approaches to the problem. As a result, new demining 
technologies are continually being developed. Of spe-
cial note is the effort to unify much of the work be-
ing done around the world under the rubric of the 
International Test and Evaluation Program (ITEP). 
The ITEP approach promises to be an effective way 
to avoid R&D duplication and point the way to an 
impartial and effective evaluation process. 
Coordination and Information Services. The new 
millennium is already characterized by a realization 
of the importance in the processing and management 
of rel iable information. Whether geo-spatial, narra-
tive, or quantitative, the identification and use of 
information is one of the keys to carrying out effec-
tive mine action programs. The creation of the 
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) was Switzerland's contribution 
to this critical outreach effort. The GICHD has be-
come a chief clearinghouse for studies, committee 
meetings, and developing methods for implementing 
U.N.-directed standards and electronic information 
processes. James Madison University was asked by the 
U.S. Department of Defense to supplement the 
GICHD outreach with conference, web page and 
journal activities. Perhaps the most effective real-time 
and informal communications network has been the 
always interesting and relevant chat room managed 
by Menschen Gegen Minen (MgM), an NGO. 
Civil-Military Cooperation. The role of militar-
ies in supporting mine action has for some time been 
controversial. Nevertheless, many nations-both 
those providing assistance and those afflicted with 
landmines- have re-configured and tra ined various 
elements within their militaries co accept this mission. 
A recent conference of militaries providing these ser-
vices has revealed improved coordination efforts with 
NGOs, host-nations, recipients and other organiza-
tions. Military humanitarian assistance roles are not 
essentially in the mine clearing areas, but in provid-
ing technical advice and training, mine awareness sup-
port, victim assistance, research and development ven-
ues, and the procurement of equipment and supplies. 
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Surveys. In determining the kinds of mine action 
required, as well as to arrive at a meaningful priori-
tization and development plan, it is critical that an 
appropriate survey be conducted. However, there are 
many surveys and methodologies to measure. The 
humanitarian demining community has developed a 
number of excellent instruments to measure various 
relevant data on suspected landmine-contaminared 
areas and the resulting socioeconomic impact. These 
surveys have yielded invaluable data, which can sug-
gest the proper scope of a campaign and greatly in-
crease the efficiency of an operation. The impact sur-
veys now being conducted by the Survey Action Cen-
ter (under the control and guidance of the Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation and UNMAS, re-
spectively) are producing just such data. 
Public-Private Partnerships. A novel concept for 
maximizing public participation and support of hu-
manitarian demining activities has been the identifi-
cation of private or educational organizations to par-
ticipate actively in the process. This approach has the 
benefit of allowing private donors to get more directly 
involved. It increases the number of people who gain 
a realistic and "up-close" perspective into the nature 
of the effort, while, at the same time, raising much-
needed funds and increasing the range of activities 
countenanced with in mine action . Both the Adopt-
A-Minefield project and the Superman and Super-
woman comic books are examples of U.S. efforts to 
invigorate the demining process through the active 
participation and support of private organizations. 
National Input. The demining issue confronts 
many nations in many ways. Some nations are do-
nor countries; within this group donations can con-
sist of funds, human resources, training, equipment, 
or logistical support. Afflicted nations have varying 
needs: money, training, organizational and manage-
ment skills, ere. The mix and match of requirements 
and resources and the interplay of the application of 
those resources is a very tricky game. Many of the 
nations involved use some of the processes noted 
above as ways to get involved. However, there are 
other mechanisms. Twenty-three donor countries 
have formed a sounding-board group called the Mine 
Action Support Group (MASG), which frequently 
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reviews the state of play in the mine action arena and 
recommends policy guidance. Signatories to the O t-
tawa Treaty meet semi-annually under the auspices of 
UNMAS and the GICHD in Geneva to stay abreast 
of current trends and suggest various plans of action. 
The bottom line is that virtually no nation goes with-
out the opportunity to gain access or inpuc into the 
various groups within the demining community. 
Academia. At an important demining conference 
held in Helsingor, Denmark, in 1996, it was noted 
that universities bad much to contribute, but were 
silent in their application to the landmine issue. To-
day, many universities are key players in the mine 
action community: Cranfield University in England 
is conducting a highly successful mine action 
manager's course; JMU acts as a major mine landmine 
information hub; and the University ofWesrern Aus-
tralia has become a leader in rbe development oflow-
rech, but highly effective protective gear for deminers. 
A whole host of schools are now involved in clearance 
R&D, while others are offering courses directly re-
lated to landmine challenges. 
It is inreresting to note that these approaches to 
meeting the unique challenges posed by the landmine 
threat have been accomplished in a very quiet and 
unobtrusive way. Very little in the foregoing list 
smacks of authority or command. Instead, they point 
to a voluntary and flexible way of organizing various 
capabili ties into a plan that uses each application for 
the good of the whole. In many instances, roles have 
been defined by trial and error, or by default. There 
is no claim here that each of these efforts is proceed-
ing without friction or even efficiently. 
Still, it is amazing that such a wonderful quilt 
could have been made our of so many different fab-
rics, with so many designs. One cannot help but won-
der if the same kind of coordinating mechanisms are 
possible (desirable?) in other international endeavors. 
• 
[Note: The Director does not claim that the above pro-
cesses comprise a complete list. He invites readers to add 
to this list of mine action processes to make a more com-
prehensive reporting of this "model" sometime in the near 
foture.} 
Landmine News Around the World 
UK firm begins demining in Taiwan 
Bactec International L&D began demining work March 6, 
2001 on the Republic of China's frontline island ofKinmen. The 
demining work on what is to be a new merchant port is expected 
to be completed in 200 days. The 8,400 sq. meters coastal region 
was heavily mined in the 1950s. 
U.N. mine action program to receive $2.5 million in 
additional funds 
The U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) 
recently received $2.5 million in new funding from Austria, Den-
mark, Germany, the Netherlands and the Adopt-a-Minefield pro-
gram. The additional funds are expected to make up for a budget 
deficit that had caused mine clearance operations to be suspended, 
leaving only 64 percent of clearance and 68 percent of mine aware-
ness objectives met. 
Landmine explosion in Sri Lanka kills 11 soldiers 
At least 11 soldiers were killed when a landmine exploded in 
Sri Lanka's northern J affna peninsula on Jan. 23, 200 1. T he sol-
diers were on a clearing operation when the blast occurred. 
Three U.S. soldiers injured in Bosnia explosion 
Three members of the NATO peacekeeping force in north-
ern Bosnia were injured in November 2000 while handling explo-
sives at the Stabilisation Force's (SFOR) Camp Bedrock. The vic-
tims, members of the Marine Corps EOD team, were all reported 
to be in stable condition following the incident. 
Two UK companies awarded $6 million mine 
countermeasure contracts 
The UK firms Hunting Engineering of Ampthill, Bedford-
shire, and Ultra Electronics of High Wycombe, Bucks, were each 
awarded $6 million contracts in November 2000 to develop AP 
and AT mine countermeasure technologies. Under the MOD Mine 
Detection, Neutralization and Route Marking System (Minder) 
program, the companies are expected to develop a system com-
bining ground penetrating radar, ultra wide band radar, thermal 
imaging detectors, metal detectors and chemical systems for ex-
plosives detection. The Minder system is designed for operational 
use and can also be used in peacekeeping and peace-support. 
U.N. forces dear one-third of Lebanon 
1,520 explosive devices were cleared from southern Lebanon 
in 2000 by U.N. specialist forces. In a zone formerly occupied by 
Israel, which withdrew in May 2000, 130,000 mines still remain 
as remnants of the occupation. Since the withdrawal, 64 Lebanese 
civilians have been killed or injured by mines. 
Mozambique to receive $1 million in aid from United 
Methodists 
The United Methodists Board of Global Ministries an-
nounced in October 2000 it has committed $1 million to mine 
clearance efforts in Mozambique. T he clearance project will focus 
on returning agricultural land, transportation routes and social 
institutions to working capacity. Through its own company, the 
United Methodists will use state-of-the-art equipment and hire 
experts to train locals in removal techniques and protocol. 
Mine removal delayed in northern Iraq 
According to the U.N. Office for Project Services, mine re-
moval efforts in northern Iraq have slowed due to equipment dif-
ficulties and the mountainous nature of the mine fields. At the 
current rate of demining, it is estimated that the clearance efforts 
could continue for decades. 
Elephant maimed by landmine faces death threats 
The Thai elephant maimed by a landmine in August 1999 is 
now facing human threats on her life. Motola, who was forced into 
early retirement while working in a heavily mined camp on the 
Thai-Myanmar border, is reportedly the target of threats from jeal-
ous animal welfare organizations and elephant traders, according 
to trainer Soraida Salwala. Soraida told the Associated Press she 
received telephone calls from people saying they want Motola dead. 
Harris sings for landmine victims 
After visits to heavily mine-affected areas of Vietnam and 
Cambodia, country singer and Grammy Award winner Emmylou 
Harris decided in 2000 to form ConcertS for a Landmine Free 
World, a singer-songwriter benefit tour featuring Harris, Steve 
Earle, Mary Chapin Carpenter and others. The tour, presented by 
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), featured 
concerts in Ottawa, Toronto, Burlington, Vt., and Somerville, 
Maine, in an attempt to raise awareness of the global landmine 
problem. 
Three killed, two injured in landmine blast on Tajik-Uzbek 
border 
Two men were killed and three injured recently while trying 
to illegally cross the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan border. Some 20 civil-
ians have been killed trying to cross the border since Uzbek bor-
der guards laid mines in August 2000. The mines were reportedly 
laid to prevent Islamic rebels from fleeing Uzbekistan for Afghani-
stan without procuring visas. 
Compiled from wire reports. 
70
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol5/iss1/1
